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This dissertation examines the production and reception of pan-ethnic identities 
and group relations of three Chinese migrant groups (PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and 
Hong Kongese) in Australia. In this dissertation I answer the questions why some people 
identify themselves as “Hua-Ren” (pan-Chinese or people with Chinese backgrounds) in 
some contexts, but claim they are “not Hua-Ren” in other contexts, as well as why 
	xiv 
intergroup competition/discrimination (e.g., between Chinese and white Australians) does 
not contribute to a broader pan-ethnic identity (like Asian-American movement in the 
United States). When speaking of “Chinese” or “Hua-Ren,” there seems to be little 
consensus. In Australia, the ambiguity of the Chinese status not only leads to complicated 
situations with political and cultural tensions among people from China, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong, it also influences the race relations between Chinese and Australians. 
However, few studies have systematically examined the complex differences between 
national (PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese) and pan-ethnic (Hua-Ren) identities. 
Nor have studies discussed whether, how, and to what degree national and pan-ethnic 
identities become stronger or weaker in different social settings (job-finding, workplace, 
community, and social life), nor how they shape and transform national identities and 
group relations among PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese. In other words, this 
dissertation explores differences in the interpretation of Hua-Ren identity within shifting 
contexts. I argue that pan-ethnicity is neither shaped voluntarily nor imposed by the 
mainstream society. Instead, it is a matter of what people subjectively interpret or believe 
about differences or not within shifting contexts. Pan-ethnic identity can thus become a 
tool of exploitation and intensification of ethnic stereotype in the cash-in-hand labor 
market; a strategy of managing differences and making/unmaking group boundary in the 
workplace; a process through which national identity is shifted to pan-ethnic identity (and 
vice versa) in various ethnic networks and community organizations; and a collectivity 
whether people adopt or reject in their everyday interactions with a non-Chinese group. 
In sum, this dissertation theorizes the formation and block of overseas Chinese identity, 
as well as what conditions favoring national or pan-ethnic identity. 	
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Identity must be negotiated. They are not simply a choice, because 
identity formation in individuals and groups derive from their interaction 
with the social and cultural context in which they live.”                                                        
                                                                                                     (Brown 2004: 13) 
 
“Chinese-ness was expressed at a number of levels: as one’s ethnicity, the 
culture of one’s daily life; as one’s background and its history and heritage; 
and as nationality and state to which one belongs.”          
(Mathews 2000: 136) 
 
At the entrance to Chinatown in Sydney, there is a prominent sign that reads: 
“Cosmopolitan Chinese.” Walking into the streets of Chinatown, you will hear many 
people speaking Mandarin or Cantonese. You will also constantly hear people identify 
themselves as Hua-Ren, which means pan-Chinese or people with Chinese backgrounds. 
When using the term Hua-Ren, people generally refer to its cultural and ethnic meanings; 
we do not actually know where they came from. It could be China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
or Singapore, or those who were born and grew up in Australia, the so-called ABC 
(Australian Born Chinese). 
In Australia, owing to the similar language (Mandarin) and cultural background, 
PRC-Chinese, Hong Kongese, and Taiwanese might share a similar identity under the 
larger “Hua-Ren” umbrella (Ong 1999; Yeh 2000), which may lead to a larger Chinese 
collective ethnic identity among PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese. Many 
ethnic Chinese people in Australia also search for jobs provided by either Taiwanese, 
Hong Kongese, or PRC-Chinese employers through Chinese websites (those websites 
contain information in both simplified and traditional Chinese). In other words, in a 
country where they are seen as “other,” National identities such as PRC-Chinese, 
Taiwanese or Hong Kongese identity may become a secondary identifier to that of a 
“Hua-Ren” or “outsider” identity. Or, perhaps people do not care about national identity 
because as long as they can get a job, they do not feel it is necessary to involve 
themselves in a specific national group. In this sense, a shift from PRC-Chinese, 
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Taiwanese, or Hong Kongese to a Hua-Ren identity is a process of boundary 
expansion (in Wimmer’s term, 2013). Or, as other scholars (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 
2001; Genova 2016; Wimmer 2013) suggest, people’s identities (national and ethnic 
identity) are nested and changed according to the socio-cultural contexts. 
During my one-year-and-half of fieldwork in Australia, however, I always heard 
my colleagues and friends saying: “I am Taiwanese/Hong Kongese, not Chinese;” or 
“maybe I am Hua-Ren, but only in a very narrow sense.” In other social settings, such as 
labor market, Hua-Ren employer is always associated with black market labor and people 
do not distinguish whether Hua-Ren employers or employees are from Taiwan, China, 
Hong Kong, or Singapore. Why do some people identify themselves as “Hua-Ren” in 
some contexts, but claim they are “not Hua-Ren” in other contexts? When speaking of 
“Chinese” or “Hua-Ren,” there seems to be little consensus. For some people, “Hua-Ren” 
may include all people of Chinese descent who are not living in China. Singaporean, 
Malaysian, or those who can speak Mandarin Chinese (Putonghua) can be categorized as 
Hua-Ren as well. For other people, though, it only includes people who are familiar with 
Chinese culture.1 Such phenomenon drove me to study how people differently interpret 
the concept of Hua-Ren and the change of national identity when people are overseas, as 
well as how such change influences the group relations of Chinese migrant groups in 
Australia. 
In Australia, the ambiguity of the Chinese status not only leads to complicated 
situations with political and cultural tensions among people from China, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong, it also reflects the race relations between different Chinese groups and white 
Australians. However, few studies have critically illuminated the complexity of a 
situation where pan-ethnic (Hua-Ren) identity across these three subgroups is invoked at 
some times, but rejected at others. Nor have studies discussed whether, how, and to what 
degree national and pan-ethnic identities become stronger or weaker in different social 
settings (job-finding, workplace, community, and social life), nor how they shape and 
transform national identities among PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese. In 
other words, my research explores different interpretations of Hua-Ren: How do people 																																																								
1 Of course, what can be included in and counted as Chinese culture, is still debatable. 
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interpret Hua-Ren differently in different social settings such as work, community, and 
social life? How and when do people identify with their country of citizenship or with 
other Chinese groups? Why is Hua-Ren solidarity an unlikely outcome even when facing 
racial discrimination from white people in Australia?  
In this dissertation I take three Chinese subgroups (PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, 
Hong Kongese) as example not because they can represent the whole overseas Chinese.2 I 
chose to examine identity change and group interaction among these three groups 
because on the one hand, these three subgroups might share a similar identity under the 
bigger Hua-Ren umbrella, which may lead to a larger collective ethnic identity among 
them. As a result, in the labor market neither of them might “select” employers or 
employees actively with specific nationality. On the other hand, however, although these 
three subgroups do fall into the same broad Hua-Ren category, there still exist different 
cultural practices—regardless if we are discussing political or national identity. I 
particularly focus on PRC-Chinese, Hong Kongese and Taiwanese also because their 
identities involve political tensions and cultural resistance, and directly relate to the 
Chinese government’s “One China Policy” (Kan 2013), which provides a good case to 
examine the relationship between national politics and migrants’ ethnic identities.3  
In terms of the contribution to the field, in the study of transnational migration 
and ethnic relation, current literature has been considering flows of Asian people in and 
out of North America, Australia differs from the U.S. not only in terms of its immigration 
policies, migrants’ immigration trajectories and their integration experiences are also 
very different. For example, a significant flow of PRC-Chinese immigrants came to 
Australia much later than Hong Kongese immigrants. Australian government created 
various visa types for specific groups: Working Holiday Visa for both Taiwanese and 
Hong Kongese youth and Work and Holiday for PRC-Chinese youth.4 In addition, 
nowadays there are more and more Chinese groups coming to Australia either to study, 																																																								
2 As one of my respondents claimed, Singaporeans or Malaysians cannot be categorized as Hua-Ren 
(Interview with Doris, February 18, 2015). Indeed, who can be counted as Hua-Ren is still debatable, but 
these three groups can represent the ambiguities of political and cultural identities, given their complicated 
history and status quo.     
3 Another topic can be explored in the future is other nationalities not affected by the One China policy 
(e.g., Singaporeans). 
4 Details about different visa type will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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work, or settle down permanently,5 which has made Australia a big Chinese community 
outside China. The choice to study national identity, group interaction, and migration 
experience among these three subgroups in Australia can challenge existing explanations 
in academic literature on the shifting of overseas Chinese identity by examining both 
inter-ethnic conflicts and people’s perceptions of other national groups in an immigration 
context. My dissertation thus advances study on Chinese diaspora as it not only points out 
that overseas Chinese ethnic community is internally divided along sub-ethnic lines and 
refracted through subgroup interactions; it also illuminates how the national identity 
shifts in the context of migration and how different interpretations of Hua-Ren contest 
with each other among PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese migrants. 
Furthermore, studying the group interaction among these three Chinese groups in 
Australia provides a good opportunity to compare experiences of Chinese migrants in the 
United States and other countries, and thus broaden the ways in which migration is 
understood.     
The immigration context is important because it might shape, transform, intensify 
or soften people’s national or ethnic identities. It also influences why ethnic networks are 
established as well as how community organizations are organized. As Melissa Brown 
(2004) points out, social experience is deeply influenced by the migration process. 
Situating these three subgroups in comparative context and looking at the dynamic 
processes of identity change, we can better understand the characteristics of each Chinese 
society, contested Chinese cultures across borders, the relationship between national 
politics and Chinese migrants’ ethnic identities, as well as the potential limitations of 
overseas Chinese identity and solidarity.  
As mentioned, Australia is an interesting case itself because it has a strong flow of 
different Chinese migrant groups who come to study or work there.6 This was not always 
the case. In 1901, the White Australia policy was introduced through two pieces of 
legislation: the Immigration Restriction Act and the Pacific Island Labourers Act, which 
placed restrictions on immigration and excluded Chinese and Japanese immigrants 																																																								
5 People tend to think it is easier to get permanent residency in Australia than in the United States. 
6 See relevant statistics from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Australia: 
http://www.immi.gov.au/media/statistics/statistical-info/visa-grants/index.htm. 
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(Fitzgerald 2007; Windschuttle 2004). To some degrees, Australia had a more strict anti-
Chinese law than Canada and the United States. Even these policies were abolished 
between 1949 and 1973, many people still feel there is implicit racism extant pervading 
Australia.7 These factors all make it interesting to analyze why PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, 
and Hong Kongese migrants choose to migrate to Australia, their specific identity 
formation process, integration experience, as well as how the interactions with white 
Australians change or influence their ethnic and national identity. 
I chose Sydney as my case for two reasons. First, according to the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (2011), Sydney is the obvious urban center in which migrants tend to 
be most concentrated. Among all immigrants, Chinese was the second largest group in 
Sydney, at least 4% of Sydney’s total population (147,000 people) is Chinese.8 On the 
other hand, those who originate from Taiwan also tend to favor Sydney more as a 
settlement destination. According to Chiang and Hsu’s (2000) study on Taiwanese 
population in Australia, in 1996, 41.5% of the Taiwanese population was in Sydney, 
37.3% in Brisbane and 21.2% in Melbourne. In 2006, 31.6% of the Taiwanese population 
was in Sydney, and 19.2% in Melbourne (Hsu 2009: 85). Second, the diversity of migrant 
groups makes Sydney a unique city in examining intergroup relations and group 
dynamics.  
In sum, my dissertation will highlight that identity is not just a fluid concept that 
encompasses a diversity of political, cultural, and ethnic interpretations (Alba 1990; 
Nagel 1995). It also involves how people negotiate and manage their different national 
and ethnic identities through boundary making/unmaking in different social settings of 
their everyday life. This dissertation will situate specific empirical findings from my 
fieldwork within studies of pan-ethnic identity (e.g., Alba 1985; Espiritu 1992; Okamoto 
2014) and theoretical framework of ethnic boundary making/unmaking (Barth 1969; 
Brubaker 2004; Wimmer 2008a, 2008b, 2013). I argue that Hua-Ren identity, is neither 																																																								
7 For example, a news story in September of 2015 reported that a Chinese woman was accosted on a bus 
with: “f---ing ugly…we all know what you are, China…Take your f---ing language and piss off, f---ing 
chink!” (Ting and Aubusson 2015) In March of 2017, there was a severe racist attack against a Chinese 
woman by an Australian man in Sydney. The woman was punched in the face and he told her to “get out of 
my country.” (Gillman 2017)  
8 See: http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.0main+features102014#SYDNEY 
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shaped voluntarily nor imposed by the mainstream society. For example, people might 
change the concept of Hua-Ren and view themselves as Hua-Ren or PRC-
Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese to different degrees. It is not just the origin of the 
migrant matters, it is also important to look at why certain identities are activated (or not) 
and what the processes look like. Hua-Ren identity, thus, is not a pure matter of ethnic 
difference, but instead a matter of what people subjectively interpret or believe about 
differences or not within shifting contexts. By understanding how people negotiate their 
identity and group boundary, we can examine under what contexts and how national 
identities and group relations will be influenced in the future. 
 
The Fragmentation of Chinese-ness: Are You PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, Hong 
Kongese, or, Hua-Ren? 
In English language, the label “Chinese”9 has come refer to, in its most specific 
sense, those who are citizens of the People’s Republic of China, and in its broadest sense, 
all people of Chinese origin regardless of where they live now. It has been argued that 
elements of “Chinese-ness” are derived from an ongoing historical process of nation-
building, shaping “a culturally Chinese universe with negotiated boundaries.” (Yeh 2000: 
3) In this sense, PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, Hong Kongese, as well as Singaporean, 
Malaysian, or those who can speak Mandarin Chinese (Putonghua) can be categorized as 
“Chinese,” just like “Latino” refers to people of Spanish-speaking living in the United 
States. Hence, words such as Hua-Qiao (overseas Chinese) and Hua-Ren generally do not 
distinguish between countries of citizenship. Rather, they refer to an identity constructed 
based on shared language, shared or similar customs, and a sense of a collective 
history/memory.   
Scholars have widely discussed the ambiguities and fragmentation of Chinese-
ness, either in terms of cultural expression or diasporic subjectivity (Ang 2001; Brown 
2004; Chan 2005; Chun 1996a; Mathews 2000; Ngan and Chan 2012; Siu 2005; Wu 																																																								
9 “Pan-Chinese,” “Ethnic Chinese,” “Chinese,” and “Hua-Ren” have ambiguous meanings. These terms are 
used differently by those who live overseas, the Chinese state, other individuals, and governments. The 
ambiguity of these terms has been subject to major debate among scholars in the field (Huang 2010). In the 
following I will provide a more consistent usage of these terms. 
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1994). For example, Ngan and Chan (2012) think Chinese-ness is like a mask, “to be put 
on and off, depending on whom you talk to (p. xv).” It can also involve power relations 
as some group might claim they are more “Chinese” or preserve more authentic Chinese 
culture than others (Chun 1996b; Mathews 2000; Shih 2007). Chun (1996b: 54) argues 
that Chinese-ness is a “constructed sense of identity in which things like language, 
history, custom, beliefs and values occupied particular niches.” With the varieties of the 
term “Chinese,” we may agree the notions of “Chinese-ness” and ideas of belonging to a 
Chinese community are “not universally defined, but locally determined and historically 
contingent.” (Siu 2005: 163) 
Despite these linguistic, cultural similarities shared by various Chinese subgroups, 
however, one should not assume that Taiwanese and Hong Kongese are merely a 
subgroup of Chinese who share similar ethnic and national identities with the PRC-
Chinese (Lien 2008). For example, political tensions between China and Taiwan still 
simmer. The political tensions are long-standing phenomena dating back to the 1920s 
when the Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party were involved in 
civil war until 1949. Furthermore, under colonial rule by the Japanese government from 
1985 to 1945, the introduction of economic and political modernization such as 
transportation, sanitation and education has changed Taiwan’s society after 1920—
various social philosophies developed, and nationalism and democracy were popularized 
(Liao and Wang 2006). The influences persist even in the post-colonial period, which 
made Taiwanese identification more distant from PRC-Chinese (Iwabuchi 2002; Tsurumi 
1977).  
Over the past twenty years, the nature and function of the Taiwanese state has 
shifted from an authoritarian to a democratic model. Among current studies, how one 
views Taiwanese and PRC-Chinese differences will depend on how one interprets 
China—Taiwan relations historically and what one focuses on in research—for example, 
economics, politics, or culture. Economically, because of different economic trajectories 
since 1949, the identity formation processes are different between PRC-Chinese and 
Taiwanese (Huang 2011; Rigger 2006; Tseng 2014). Huang (2011) uses Taiwanese 
migrants in China as an example to highlight how the identities of Taiwanese are shaped 
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and reshaped. Although when in China, Taiwanese migrants are situated in a Chinese 
context that might be familiar to them, Taiwanese migrants tend to see their migration as 
“sojourning” and maintain Taiwanese-only communities and interpersonal 
communications. The cognitive perspective here highlights how Taiwanese migrants 
identify themselves and perceive “others” in China.  
Politically, Taiwan’s transition from a state ruled by martial law to a democratic 
state marked a fork in the road between China and Taiwan (Chu 1992; Ho 2006). The 
trend of democratization in the 1980s and the loosening of political controls lead to 
significant changes in the social and economic environment in Taiwan. Taking Robert 
Dahl’s (1971) well-known concept of a liberal democracy as a benchmark,10 Taiwan can 
be said to have completed its democratic transition with the direct elections for the 
National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan in 1991 and 1992. The holding of the 
presidential election by direct popular vote in early 1996 and the change of regime in 
2000 further indicate that Taiwan has entered a phase of democratic consolidation. Since 
then, its democratic consolidation has made remarkable progress, especially in the realm 
of institution building and the emergence of a vibrant civil society (Lin 2008). 
Culturally, Taiwan has moved away from China to a certain extent. This has 
many roots, both real and imagined. Because the Communists banned the traditional 
Chinese culture and Confucian practice during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 
1976, some Taiwanese people are proud of the way they have preserved traditional, and 
more “authentic” Chinese culture and customs (Shih 2007: 122). In other words, in some 
aspects Taiwanese have more traditional Chinese values than people in Mainland China. 
One evidence that Taiwan preserves “traditional” Chinese culture is their continued usage 
of the traditional Chinese writing system (Harrell and Huang 1994: 1–5). There are 
currently two systems for Chinese characters. One is traditional Chinese (Fantizi), which 
is used in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, takes its form from standardized character 
forms dating back to the late Han dynasty. The other is simplified Chinese (Jiantizi), 																																																								
10 According to Dahl (1971: 3), a regime can only be called a liberal democracy if it has: “1) The freedom 
to form and join organizations; 2) The freedom of expression; 3) The right to vote; 4) Eligibility for public 
office; 5) The right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; 6) Alternative source of 
information; 7) Free and fair elections; and 8) Institution for making government policies depend on votes 
and other expressions of preference.”  
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which is developed by the People’s Republic of China in 1954 to promote mass literacy. 
Parts of this cultural aspect may have been “manufactured” because of political reasons 
(Chen 1996; Hsiau 1997). The maintenance of traditional characters as the national 
written language, may have had its origin in a politically motivated decision to set 
Taiwan apart from China.11 However, over time, language and lexical shifts have evolved, 
thus producing organic differences between how language is used in China, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong. These changes manufactured or otherwise, highlight the shift from a 
monolithic vision of “Chinese-ness” to an increasing recognition of a distinct Taiwanese 
identity. The point here is that what Taiwanese people count as tradition (Chinese culture) 
is different from what PRC-Chinese or Hong Kongese people count as tradition for them 
(Lo 2005).   
In regard to Taiwanese national or ethnic identity, according to the surveys 
(1992–2016) conducted by National Cheng-Chi University (see Figure 1), nowadays 
more and more Taiwanese people identify themselves as “Taiwanese” than “Taiwanese 
and Chinese” or “Chinese.” From the survey results we can see there is about 58% of 
people identity themselves as Taiwanese, and less than 10% of respondents see 
themsevles as “Chinese.” 
 
Figure 1. Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity of Taiwanese (1992–2016). 
Source: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166  																																																								
11 The motivation of creating a symbolic system to consolidate national identity reminds us of Hobsbawn’s 
(1983) concept of “invented traditions.” It shows how “cultural tradition” is very much the product of the 
contemporary state and can be manipulated by the state for the sake of its own legitimation. 
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Similarly, another phone interviews conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council 
of the Taiwanese government (2016) also shows that 59.3% of the Taiwanese public 
believes that the mainland Chinese government’s attitude towards the Taiwanese 
government is “unfriendly,” higher than the percentage believing it is “friendly” (20.9%). 
The figure below shows Taiwanese perceptions of the Chinese government’s attitude 
toward Taiwan. The blue line reflects perceptions of the Chinese government attitudes 
towards the Taiwanese government, and the red line reflects perceptions about the 
Chinese government’s friendliness towards the people of Taiwan. The higher the 
percentage, the more Taiwanese people feel the Chinese government is “unfriendly.”  
 
Figure 2. Taiwanese Public Opinion of the Chinese Government’s Attitude Towards 
the Taiwanese Government and the People of Taiwan. Source: 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/63292095449.pdf 
 
The Chinese government’s unfriendliness is expressed in different ways, for 
example, refusing to acknowledge Taiwan as a formal country and repeatedly threating to 
attack Taiwan. If immigrants from Taiwan have moderate or strong Taiwanese identity 
because of political tensions between China and Taiwan, and if there is a class difference 
between Taiwanese and PRC-Chinese immigrants, it is not surprising that Hua-Ren 
solidarity is less likely to be developed in the context of migration. However, as I will 
show in the following chapters, Taiwanese migrants do strategically adopt the concept of 
Hua-Ren, and to certain degrees, pan-ethnicity does operate at the diasporic level. 
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Taiwan is not the only ambiguous case when we discuss Hua-Ren identity. Hong 
Kong was historically a British colony for 156 years until 1997, and is now a special 
administrative region of China. Although the Chinese government guarantees 
maintenance of Hong Kong’s lifestyle and capitalist system for 50 years, it is almost 
impossible for Hong Kong not to change under the new sovereign government’s political 
and economic environment. Fung and Ma (2007) argue that the people of Hong Kong 
presently face the reality of appropriating a “dual” (Hong Kong and China) identity. They 
have manifested this duality in an identity that is hybridized between their local and 
national identities.  
Under the British rule over 150 years, the people of Hong Kong, especially 
younger generations who have always identified themselves as Hong Kongese rather than 
Chinese, have shaped their own identities (Wong et al. 1997). Surveys conducted by the 
Center for Communication Research and Public Opinion Survey (CCPOS) at the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong (2014), and the latest surveys by the University of Hong Kong 
(2016, see Figure 3 and 4) suggest that, in Hong Kong, the proportion identifying 
themselves as “Hong Kong citizens” outnumbers those who identify as “Chinese citizens” 
both in their narrow and broad senses.12 In 2016’s survey, for example, 34.6% saw 
themselves as “Hong Kongese,” 29.1% as “Hong Kongese in China,” while a mere 
16.3% considered themselves as “Chinese” and 17.7% as “Chinese in Hong Kong.” To 
be more specific, the people of Hong Kong perceive that the economic value of Hong 
Kong—Chinese differences are disappearing but are still conspicuous in terms of 
political values (Fung and Ma 2007).  
																																																								
12 See: Public Opinion Programs, The University of Hong Kong. Source: 
https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/ 
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Figure 3. Changes in the Ethnic Identity of Hong Kongese (1997–2016) 
 
 
Figure 4. Changes in the Chinese Identity of Hong Kongese (1997–2016) 
 
The “Pro-democracy” movement (Umbrella Movement)13 that started in Hong 
Kong in 2014 is a good example to show the anti-mainland China sentiment (Kaeding 
2014; Ortmann 2015). To protest against the controlled election committee for city’s top 
																																																								
13 Focusing on how specific event such as the Umbrella Movement influences the interaction between 
different groups is important. I acknowledge the “nature” of the event itself might generate certain 
identities (or group tensions) but not others. However, in this dissertation I focus more on the process how 
certain identities lead to particular interaction pattern, the reason why specific identities are generated, and 
to what degrees certain national/ethnic emotions are activated among different Chinese subgroups. 
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leader by the Chinese government, citizens of Hong Kong have occupied central Hong 
Kong to demand an open nomination process for candidates in the next election. The 
movement is not just about relations with the Chinese government or concerns over its 
authoritarian ways, but also about massive social inequality and the diminishing 
opportunities available to many people of Hong Kong.  
The historical context of Hong Kong lead us to a possible hypothesis that people 
of Hong Kong share a similar identity dilemma with Taiwan, and may share ideas on 
democracy and freedom with Taiwanese more than with PRC-Chinese. This can be 
evidenced when looking at recent protests in Taiwan. In March of 2014, there was also a 
huge student movement called “Sunflower Student Movement” which was a protest 
driven by a coalition of students and civic groups in the Houses of Parliament. The 
activists protested the passing of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) 
with China by the Taiwanese government at the legislature without clause-by-clause 
review (Ramzy 2014). During the large-scale protest in Taipei, people from Hong Kong 
also joined the march in solidarity with student protesters occupying the Legislature in 
Taipei. One of the most common slogans in the march was “Today’s Hong Kong, 
Tomorrow’s Taiwan.” (Tsoi 2014) In this regard, an authoritarian China has become a 
common threat to civil societies in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. In fact, during the 
Umbrella Movement, lots of Taiwanese also claim in solidarity with Hong Kong 
counterparts and expressed their support for the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong 
amid concerns over China’s influence (Kaiman 2014). 
Hence, the political identity, colonial legacy, education, and the idea of 
democracy may make Taiwanese and Hong Kongese closer to each other and more 
distant from PRC-Chinese.14 This may be important in thinking about why some Hong 
Kongese and Twainese migrants want to distinguish themselves from PRC-Chinese. On 
the other hand, different historical processes and language use (e.g., PRC-Chinese and 
Taiwanese both speak Mandarin Chinese, whereas Hong Kongese mainly speak 
Cantonese [Bai-Hua, white language]) make the group relations among these three 
																																																								
14 To certain extents, Taiwanese and Hong Kongese have more in common in terms of democratic 
institutions and educations with the Australians than they do with the mainland Chinese. 
		
14 
Chinese subgroups more complicated. When talking about “Chinese,” it can refer to 
either culturally Chinese or politically Chinese. One might identify himself/herself as a 
Chinese in cultural sense but politically categorizes himself/herself as PRC-Chinese, 
Taiwanese, or Hong Kongese in relation to claims of national belonging, as the figures 
showed above. Different generations of immigrant (“old” and “new” immigrants) may 
also represent their identities in different ways and connect their ethnicities to different 
ethnic elements (e.g., democratic, freedom, and other cultural values).15 In other words, 
in this dissertation I will substantiate that the concept of Hua-Ren and Chinese-ness is a 
contested field in which PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese and Hong Kongese each have different 
interpretations.  
In this dissertation I try to provide a consistent usage of the terms such as pan-
ethnicity, Hua-Ren, ethnic group, national group, among others, as they are discussed in 
relation to both claims of the overseas Chinese organizations as well as to the ways in 
which individuals define themselves different from their actual nationalities. I use pan-
ethnicity to refer to Hua-Ren ethnic identity shared by three targeted Chinese national 
groups. Hua-Ren has a more diasporic meaning than Chinese as it always refer to 
Chinese people live overseas. I adopt Wei-Ming Tu’s (1994: 25) definitions and 
throughout the dissertation, I use the term “Hua-Ren” to refer to people of Chinese origin 
who live overseas but either have Chinese backgrounds, Chinese identities, or have any 
linkage to Chinese culture. Rather than simply Zhongguo-Ren (citizens of the Chinese 
state), Hua-Ren designates people of a variety of nationalities who are ethnically and 
culturally Chinese in the context of migration.16 Thus, PRC-Chinese, Hong Kongese, 
Taiwanese, and other Chinese subgroups who are familiar with or self-identified as 
Chinese are belonged to this (ethnic) group. The identity based on this group is more 
about pan-ethnic identity rather than political or national identity, though I acknowledge 
in some occasions it can have political meanings and can also be used for political 
mobilization. On the other hand, I see different Chinese subgroups (PRC-Chinese, Hong 																																																								
15 For example, Leonard (1992) examines the way “culture” gets struggled over as cohorts grapple with 
their differences across time and generations. 
16 Tu (1994: 25) gives a detailed distinction between Hua-Ren and Zhongguo-Ren: “Hua-Ren is not 
geographically centered, for it indicates a common ancestry and a shared cultural background, whereas 
Zhongguo-Ren necessarily evokes obligations and loyalties of political affiliation.” 
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Kongese, and Taiwanese) as individual “national group” within the broader “Chinese” 
ethnicity. Therefore, when I mention “national” identity in this dissertation, I am referring 
to national/political identity among people who come from China, Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong. In other words, national identity may be associated with sovereignty issues; 
whereas “ethnic” or “pan-ethnic” identity involves more cultural or ethnic meanings such 
as shared Chinese history/culture and a broader diasporic ethnic Chinese identity.  
 
Theoretical Background 
The Formation and Decline of Pan-Ethnicity and Hua-Ren Identity 
In this dissertation I use pan-ethnicity to refer to the concept of Hua-Ren. “Pan” 
has been used to characterize macro-nationalism, movements seeking to “extend 
nationalism to a supranational form.” (Snyder 1984: 4) Pan-ethnic groups thus refer to a 
political or cultural collectivity made up of peoples of distinct, tribal, or national origins 
(Espiritu 1992: 2; Okamoto 2003). For example, Espiritu (1992) uses Asian American 
“pan-ethnicity” to describe an overarching Asian American ethnic identity constructed in 
the 1980s. She indicates that the pan-ethnicity emerging recently is the result of an 
imposition of mainstream society on ethnic minority groups in which dominant groups do 
not want to recognize ethnic sub-group differences. Similarly, Alba (1985) describes how 
the U.S. government and education system imposed ethnic label on European immigrant 
groups so that these groups viewed themselves as part of distinct ethnic communities.  
Okamoto and Mora (2014), on the other hand, argue that pan-ethnicity is 
characterized by a unique tension inherent in maintaining subgroup distinctions while 
generating a broader sense of solidarity. In her book Okamoto (2014: 2) claims: “When 
different ethnic groups come to share interests and a collective history and build 
institutions and identities across ethnic or cultural boundaries, the result is pan-ethnicity.” 
Here we can see subgroups might cultivate their pan-ethnic identities as a form of ethnic 
expression to highlight subgroup diversity and cultural legitimacy, on the one hand; and 
get together to protect common interests or against racial injustice, on the other hand.17 																																																								
17 One thing needs to be noted is that ethnicity and pan-ethnicity can coexist. As Okamoto (2014) claims: 
“one does not diminish the other, and indeed they can even enhance each other.” (p. 157) When ethnic 
group boundaries get wider to include others, the existing ethnic/national boundaries are not necessarily 
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For example, Chinese groups may not want to be placed in the Asian category and thus 
they emphasize their Chinese culture to distinguish themselves from other groups such as 
Japanese or Koreans. In this sense, it fits Wimmer’s idea of shifting ethnic boundaries 
through contraction because the boundaries get narrower and people dis-identify with the 
category to which outsiders assign them (Wimmer 2008a: 1036; 2008b: 987–88).  
Scholars have identified conditions under which pan-ethnic solidarities will be 
developed to consolidate group benefits, such as changes in immigration policy, racial 
segregation, ethnic organizing, economic and demographic conditions, and active leaders 
in the organizations (Espiritu 1992; Kwong 1987; Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Okamoto 
2006, 2014; Wei 1993; Zia 2000). In an immigration context, for example, intergroup 
competition or discrimination against Asians may encourage various Asian groups to 
organize collectively to make collective claims, such as electing Asian American 
candidates in particular electoral districts, anti-Asian physical violence, and protesting 
against the cut on welfare for Asian Americans in particular cities. Intergroup 
competition or discrimination may lead to “reactive” pan-Asian identity and solidarity 
(Espiritu 1992; Okamoto 2006; Wei 1993). The influence of residential segregation on 
the formation of pan-ethnic identity has also been noted (Min 1995; Ong et al. 1994). 
Meanwhile, sociological analyses highlight the relationship—in some cases co-
existence, in others conflict—between pan-ethnicity and national identity (Itzigsohn and 
Dore-Cabral 2000; Kim and White 2010; Okamoto 2014). Ethnic and national boundaries 
continue to remain meaningful for groups even when they share similarities in culture 
and history. In other words, pan-ethnic solidarity and pan-ethnic identity can be two 
different things (Rosenfeld 2001: 162). The former refers to the general alliances between 
individuals from the different national groups, whereas pan-ethnic identity describes the 
extent to which people feel themselves as part of an ethnic group (e.g., Asians, Latinos, 
or Chinese). In this sense, subgroups might only maintain pan-ethnic solidarity when they 
need to protect their common interests in politics, economic adaptions, social welfare, or 
as a way to react to racial violence.     
																																																																																																																																																																					
displaced. 
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Cornell (1996) provides evidences of groups based on shared interests are more 
inclined to change their membership. In Australia, although from different nations, PRC-
Chinese, Hong Kongese and Taiwanese migrants sometimes identify themselves as Hua-
Ren and emphasize Hua-Ren solidarity.18 For example, the creation of overseas Chinese 
business networks operating on a global scale has accelerated in 1990s as traditional 
voluntary associations, organized mainly under the principles of place, kinship, dialect, 
and dedicated to obligations such as ancestor worship (Ang 2001: 78). These 
organizations expand economic opportunities and strengthen diasporic cultural ties across 
national boundaries (Liu 1998). Hua-Ren solidarity may also occur in a particular 
electoral district or in connection with indiscriminate physical violence against overseas 
Chinese groups. In some contexts, Chinese-ness even becomes a form of cultural and 
economic capital that gather people together who speak the same language and exclude 
those like Australians who cannot speak Mandarin.  
If we agree that pan-ethnicity can be used as a way to expand common interests, 
then, under what conditions and for what reasons do people reject pan-ethnic solidarity 
and potential common interests? In this regard, my analysis is designed to shed light on 
some of the theoretical issues related to the circumstances under which subgroups are 
more likely to make or unmake pan-ethnicity. I also extend current studies by pointing 
out that individual’s block of pan-ethnic identity does influence the following collective 
pan-ethnic solidarity.19 
In this dissertation I offer a contrast understanding of pan-ethnicity between 
Chinese subgroups (PRC-Chinese, Hong Kongese, and Taiwanese) within the same pan-
ethnic category (Chinese). I will show that, although these three subgroups participate in 
Hua-Ren associations like the Australian Chinese Community Association or Chinese 
Community Social Services Center, and may all be discriminated because of the same 
reason (English proficiency or cultural differences), pan-ethnic consciousness or pan-
ethnic solidarity is not a guaranteed outcome. People may deploy Hua-Ren identity only 																																																								
18 I will discuss these issues more deeply in chapter five and six. 
19 There is both personal and collective identity, the former referring to “one’s sense of oneself apart from 
others,” and the latter “referring to who one senses oneself to be in common with others.” (Mathews 2000: 
17) 
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to a narrow extent. To be more specific, boundary work is more deliberate rather than 
reactive. In this dissertation I point out the reason is not just people identify themselves as 
pan-Asian/Hua-Ren or not, it is about how the nesting of identities works in different 
social settings. In other words, I focus on not only identity formation process but also the 
processes in which people negotiate the conflicts of their different identities. People can 
use cultural identities as a tool to either highlight or downplay their political identities. 
On the other hand, however, making or unmaking pan-ethnicity does not necessarily 
accompany with the decline or growth of national identity either. In this sense, my 
dissertation advances our understanding of the dynamics and potential limitations of pan-
ethnicity. 
However, it is not sufficient to simply examine identity differences between 
Asians and whites, blacks, or Latinos. How different Chinese subgroups differently 
interpret Chinese identity is equally important but remain understudied. Thus, we need to 
explore the heterogeneity and hybridity among different Chinese migrant groups. 
Examining the interactions and tensions among these three Chinese subgroups in an 
immigration context can help us understand the relationship between pan-ethnic (Hua-
Ren) identity vs. national politics, as well as how people negotiate the conflicts of their 
political and cultural identities. 
To be more specific, before migrating to Australia, Hua-Ren might be linked to 
national or political identities (e.g., some of my PRC-Chinese respondents feel Taiwanese 
and Hong Kongese people were “certainly” Chinese before moving to Australia), while it 
also has something to do with cultural and social values (e.g., only people who 
understand traditional Chinese culture can be called Hua-Ren). These tensions and 
contradictions result in possibilities for diverse strategic group boundary 
making/unmaking, which I will discuss more deeply in the next section. 
 
Ethnic Perception and Boundary Making/Unmaking 
Following Du Bois (1967 [1899]), Max Weber (1968 [1922]), and Robert Park 
(1950 [1928]), several themes have emerged in contemporary literature on race and 
ethnicity. Some of the most critical themes are concerned with the construction of racial 
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and ethnic identity, the origin and dynamics of group boundaries, and the impact of post-
industrial forces on ethnic relations.    
Social categories such as race/ethnicity always connote group “boundaries” and 
“interactions.” These categories intertwine and fundamentally shape our cognition of self 
and other. Previous studies (e.g., Weber) assume that specific racial and ethnic groups 
have “share cultures.” However, it is always hard to find a clear relationship between 
shared culture and group boundaries, and whether a shared culture exists objectively or is 
merely subjectively acknowledged. 
For example, when claiming there is a common Chinese culture among PRC-
Chinese, Taiwanese and Hong Kongese, we do not know if the shared Chinese culture (or 
the concept of Hua-Ren) people refer to is the same and how different Chinese groups 
draw an ethnic line between each other. Regarding this question, Barth (1969) 
emphasizes the importance of subjective side and proposes that only through subjects can 
objective indicators such as language and culture have meaning. In this sense, it is “ethnic 
boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff it encloses.” (Barth 1969: 15) 
Barth’s emphasis was echoed by the sociological turn from structural determinism to 
agency (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). 
Barth (1969: 13–14) argues that ethnicity is not a matter of shared traits but rather 
of practices of classification and categorization, including both self-classification and the 
classification by others. Barth extends the literature as he transfers the studies of ethnic 
identity from a focus on cultural content to seeking to understand ethnic boundaries, and 
highlights how boundaries are maintained between groups even when their cultures are 
similar.20 In a word, for Barth, the formation of ethnic consciousness is not from shared 
culture and common ancestry as Weber (1968 [1922]) suggests. Instead, his emphasis is 
on the boundary that distinguishes “us” from “them.” (p. 15) 
It would be careless, however, to conclude that Barth ignores culture altogether. 
In fact, in another article Barth (1994: 13) points out that culture plays an important role 
in ethnic studies and “rethinking culture provides a necessary basis for rethinking 
																																																								
20 The shared cultural background between PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese and Hong Kongese is a good example 
here. 
		
20 
ethnicity.” It should be noted that the culture he mentions here is different from Weber’s 
(1968 [1922]) conceptualization. Weber thinks that (subjectively) shared culture is based 
on objective ancestry with some stability. Barth (1994: 30) recognizes, however, that 
culture is in flux, is contradictory and incoherent. Cultural items might vary with time 
and place. Thus, boundaries may have varying cultural “contents” such as history, 
language and economic practices. These features cause Barth to focus more on subjective 
aspects of culture such as individual experiences and cognitions rather than on objective 
indicators.  
The “perception” and “cognition” process is important because it provides us with 
another way of thinking and explaining intergroup relations and boundaries. As Brubaker 
and his colleagues (2004: 32, 53) assert that: “...ethnicity or ethnic boundary is not a 
thing in the world, but a ‘perspective’ on the world.” Brubaker and his colleagues also 
highlight the importance of culture on people’s subjective side; and claims that we need 
to examine the ethnic issues from the cognitive aspect. In their article Brubaker and his 
colleagues think the focus should not be limited only to social categorization or how to 
classify social actors, but should also include how actors see the social world and 
interpret social experiences (Brubaker et al. 2004: 77). Along with Weber’s idea that 
social closure is inherently relational, Brubaker (2004: 11) also claims that instead of 
seeing ethnicity, race, and nation as “groups” in the world, it is more appropriate to treat 
it in “relational, procedural, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms.” Echoing 
Brubaker and Barth’s emphasis on subject’s cognition, in my dissertation I also show that 
although there are some common cultural understandings among PRC-Chinese, 
Taiwanese and Hong Kongese, they (subjectively) identify themselves in different ways 
and selectively highlight different ethnic elements (democracy, freedom, etc.) and 
cultural values. I also illustrate the ways that different Chinese subgroups nest different 
layers of identities (national identity and Hua-Ren identity) within each other. 
However, even if we accept that race or ethnicity is about cognition, we still want 
to know how the cognitive process (on other groups) and ethnic boundary becomes 
possible. A good example comes from Ribas (2015). In her research, Ribas explores how 
Latino immigrants and native-born African American workers negotiate social 
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boundaries and construct identities when they are lumped together in the workplace. 
Differing from most literature on immigration, Ribas views the incorporation experience 
as an ongoing social process of mutual adjustment by which groups both achieve and are 
assigned particular social locations in a stratified system of belonging. Rather than take 
ethnic groups as basic units of analysis, she illustrates the cognitive perspectives of how 
“group-making” and “grouping” activities influenced the identification within different 
ethnic groups.   
While agreeing with Barth’s and Brubaker’s idea about subjective categorization, 
Wimmer (2013: 2–3) further claims that boundary making should be based on contexts 
because ethnicity may matter in certain societies but not in others. Thus, he provides a 
comparative analysis of ethnic boundary making. In his book Wimmer (2013) identifies 
patterns of variations and provides a variety of boundary-making strategies (chap 3), 
including expansion, contraction, trans-valuation, repositioning and blurring. The idea is 
to point out that time and place also change where ethnic boundaries lie. 
In my fieldwork I found that in some contexts like workplace (chapter four), 
people play with the categories in relation to other subgroups without trying to change 
their own subjective/felt identity. In other words, they make and unmake group 
boundaries during their daily interactions without intending to revise their own ethnic 
positions in a more inclusive or exclusive direction, even in fact these actions may 
achieve the formation or decline of pan-ethnicity. Different interpretations of Chinese and 
Hua-Ren, along with the dynamics in specific contexts, together provide people a chance 
to make/unmake the group boundaries. By providing empirical evidence of how people 
draw a line and make/unmake the group boundary in relation to others, I complement 
earlier studies of strategic boundary making/unmaking by demonstrating the processes 
and contexts to which actors are reacting within existing boundaries based on country of 
origin and how they manage identity differences in different contexts.  
 
Through Stereotyping Ethnic Hierarchy Is Re-articulated and Contested 
Ethnic identity and group boundary imply there is an ethnic hierachy exisiting 
among different groups. Racial/ethnic hierarchy always involves material and positional 
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difference between groups, such as people’s socio-economic status and salary. Scholars 
have pointed out the importance of understanding how a racial/ethnic “hierarchy” is 
constructed and then become a “belief” system (Lamont 2000; Wilson 2012; Winant 
1994). For example, social Darwinism tries to explain (or justify) why white skin is 
considered “superior” to black, and why the unequal distribution of wealth and power 
turns on lines of race and ethnicity (Banton 1998: 95–100). As a result of differentiating 
between what is considered as superior and inferior, it seems legitimate to allow superior 
groups to enjoy economic rewards and cultural superiority at the expense of exploiting 
other “inferior” racial/ethnic groups (Almaguer 2009: Cornell and Hartmann 2007; 
Morning 2009). The existence of hierarchical race/ethnic relations leads to the question: 
who has the power to “define” or “decide” which racial or ethnic group is better than the 
other?  
To answer this question, we need to trace back the historical origins of racial 
formation and historical experiences of different racial/ethnic groups. More importantly, 
we should also look into how some “differences” (e.g., civilized vs. uncivilized; center vs. 
margin; included vs. excluded, etc.) are created by discourses or narratives, and which 
people use or try to “normalize” the inequalities (Wimmer 2013: 64–66).  
Values and cultural elements are always used for intergroup differentiation and 
evaluation. This leads to the development of stereotypes (Craciun 2013; Hagendoorn 
1993; Lamont 2000; Waters 1990). When we talk about terms such as “ethnic 
discrimination,” “ethnic prejudice,” or “ethnic stereotype,” they directly or indirectly 
represent our prejudice of other groups. Herbert Blumer (1958: 4) distinguishes the four 
basic types of feeling that seem to always be present in race prejudice in the dominant 
group: “a feeling of superiority, a feeling that the subordinate race is different and alien; a 
feeling of proprietary claim to certain areas of privilege and advantage, and a fear and 
suspicion that the subordinate race harbors designs on the prerogatives of the dominant 
race.” Here it is important to explore Blumer’s point that the process of group definition 
is concerned with an abstract image of the other racial group (p. 6). It is abstract because 
it is about the specific way to understand and define other groups as if it were an entity or 
whole (e.g., Negro, Japanese, Jews).  
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On the other hand, however, both Brubaker (2004) and Gil-White (2005) argue 
that we should not overemphasize the groupness when we talk about ethnic group, even 
people tend to treat individuals as being part of groups and conceive of ethnic groups as 
entities. They claim that in most cases, the so-called “ethnic group” is actually a 
“category” rather than a “group.” Furthermore, as mentioned above, Brubaker and his 
colleagues (2004: 77) claim that the point is to analyze how actors see the social world 
and interpret social experiences, because social interaction can change people’s original 
perceptions of other ethnic/racial groups.   
Thus, even if we recognize that race and ethnicity are cognitive processes, it is 
hard to tell that people share a collective sentiment or the same memory even though they 
are from the same race or ethnic group. From Ngai’s book (2004: 106, 159), we can 
clearly see immigrants not only compete with white labor, some immigrants (especially 
among the middle-classes) also try to distinguish themselves from their brethren. Waters 
(1999) also takes the case of West Indians to demonstrate that “by losing their 
distinctiveness, West Indians become not just American, but black Americans,” (p. 5) and 
thus “have better interactions with the dominant U.S. population and better labor market 
outcomes.” (p. 7) In Australia, the ways PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese 
self-identify themselves are also various, even it is long thought that they share similar 
cultural backgrounds, languages, and can all be lodged in the same ethno-racial category 
(Chinese).  
As I will show, in different social settings different Chinese subgroups link their 
interaction experiences to their ethnic beliefs and stereotypes. There are different cultural 
perceptions among PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese when each group 
claims there is an ethnic hierarchy. For example, given the ambiguous political status, 
most PRC-Chinese tend to think Taiwan should be part of the Chinese nation; however, 
for Taiwanese and Hong Kongese, they do not necessarily see themselves share the 
similar cultural and ethnic characteristics with PRC-Chinese. They see PRC-Chinese as 
“the other,” and perceive them in a specific (generally negative) way. Such stereotypes 
are activated or highlighted based on specific social settings and interaction experiences.  
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Segmented Participation of Ethnic Network/Community Organization 
Given social and civil life is another significant part for immigrants, another issue 
emerging here is: how is the identity reflected in ethnic network and community 
organization? One of the most widely accepted innovations in migration theory since the 
1980s has been the adoption of network theories, which focuses on the collective agency 
of migrants and communities in the organizing processes of migration (Boyd 1989). 
Academic discussions on social networks and social ties can be broadly grouped under a 
social capital theory (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000). Social capital 
theorists generally analyze international migration as a system in which migrant networks 
represent “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-
migrants to one another through relations of kinship, friendship, and shared community 
origin.” (Fawcett 1989; Portes 1997) These relationships are important because they 
facilitate migration decisions by providing various resources and information. 
Social network analysis is included here because it studies the pattern of ties 
linking the members of a society—ties that “connect persons, groups, organizations, or 
clusters of ties, as well as persons (Wellman 1983: 157).”21 In addition, social network 
also involves the transfer or exchange of information, advice, resources, or more tangible 
things like goods and direct services (Cook et al 1983; Cook and Emerson 1978). 
Through cooperation or exchange of resources in the social network, individuals could 
rely on each other and maximize their advantages (Haines 1988). Podolny and Page 
(1998: 63–66) also consider each of these proposed advantages: learning, legitimation 
and status, economic benefits, alleviate sources of external constraint or uncertainty, and 
social welfare benefits.  
When talking about migration networks or how people get information on the 
topics of migration, co-ethnic networks also provide crucial resources. The connection 
with co-ethnics already established in host societies provides potential or new migrants 																																																								
21 Wellman (1983: 172–79) introduces several analytic principles of social network analysis: “ties are 
asymmetrically reciprocal, differing in content and intensity; network members use a wide variety of direct 
and indirect ties to search for resources; the structuring of social ties creates nonrandom networks and then 
clusters, boundaries, and cross-linkages arise; cross-linkages connect clusters as well as individuals; 
asymmetric ties and complex networks distribute scarce resources differentially; networks structure 
collaborative and competitive activities to secure scarce resources.” 
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with valuable information, resources, housing and job opportunities, and other benefits. 
With such resources available, the costs and risks associated with international migration 
are reduced, at the same time the expected net returns to migration are increased 
(Bankston 2014; Fawcett 1989; Gold 2005; Granovetter 1974; Gurak and Cases 1992; 
Haug 2008; Massey et al. 1993; Nee et al. 1994; Portes 1997; Waldinger et al. 1985).  
For example, Nee and his colleagues (1994) point out that migration groups 
almost always find their jobs through the introduction of relatives or friends. Ethnic 
networks here are effective in expanding the employment opportunities and some 
migrants have been able to create successful enclave economies (Portes and Jensen 1987; 
Zhou 1992). With such resources available, the costs and risks associated with 
international migration are reduced, making migrants more likely to migrate to countries 
in which these co-ethnic networks can already be found (Haug 2008). Hsu (2002) 
conducted ethnographic interviews of 79 Taiwanese immigrants in Australia and found 
that they always choose to locate in close proximity to their family, friends and 
communities. An online survey conducted by Taiwanese Working Holiday Youth (2013–
2014, N = 452) also shows that 80% of Taiwanese temporary migrants found their job 
through friendship network, and 73.5% of respondents responded that they often use 
Chinese job-seeking websites to find a job. 
The sociological literature has dissected differences between ethnic networks and 
communities, emphasizing, for example, ethnic network connections with co-ethnics 
already established in host societies. Ethnic networks often provide potential or new 
migrants with valuable information, housing, job opportunities, and other benefits.    
Ethnic communities, in contrast, have a sense of groupness and are more likely to provide 
people with a stronger sense of belonging and identity attachment (Breton 1964; 
FitzGerald 2000; Zhou 1992). In particular, ethnic communities enforce a sense of 
belonging in which members imagine themselves as part of an organic diasporic 
community. As Cohen notes in his book Global Diaspora (1997: ix): “a member’s 
adherence to a diasporic community is demonstrated by an acceptance of inescapable link 
with their past migration history and a sense of co-ethnicity with others of a similar 
background.” 
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The differences within and between networks and community organizations 
deserve close analysis. Networks and community organizations have functional 
differences in social life and are talked about differently in the social science scholarship. 
Definitions of community organization and network affect the selection of my sample 
and my research findings as well. In this dissertation I see networks as having a more 
utilitarian purpose and mainly providing members with access to resources or 
information, while community organizations play a role in organizing group members 
and involve more affective/political meanings.  
The above discussions, however, focus on strategic needs such as finding a job, 
business linkage, seeking relevant information, or emotional support. They are limited in 
the way that people might have different senses of attachment to these networks and 
community organizations over time. In the quantitative data regarding ethnic networks 
and community connections from the Australian Bureau of Statistics,22 it is impossible to 
tell whether PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, or Hong Kongese see each other as part of the 
same membership in certain networks or organizations either. It is not surprising that 
Chinese migrants have different degrees of identification and senses of attachment to 
each migrant network and community organization, given there are complicated political 
tensions and cultural resistance among them. There is also a hybrid identity that Chinese 
migrants create. For example, Siu (2005) provides a different picture of PRC-Chinese and 
Taiwanese overseas. She mentions there still exist identity differences between diasporic 
PRC-Chinese and the Taiwanese communities, which reveal the tensions and 
contradictions within diasporic subjectivities. Taiwanese immigrants in Panama try to 
construct Taiwanese immigrant identities, which involve rejecting an all-embracing pan-
Chinese ethnicity. Similarly, Chan (2007: 56) also found older Hong Kongese 
respondents who perceived a declining level of trust in Sydney and attributed this to the 
increasing Mandarin speaking population in the neighborhood.  
Although scholars have pointed out that overseas Chinese networks and 
community organizations are heterogeneous (Chan 1999; Crissman 1967, 1991; Salaff et 
																																																								
22 Details available at: 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/3416.0Main+Features22012?OpenDocument 
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al. 2007), surprisingly, few studies address how PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong 
Kongese differentiate and selectively use “Chinese” networks or the extent to which 
disparate Chinese groups identify with specific Chinese community organizations. In 
other words, this dissertation aims to explore the relationship between pan-ethnic (Hua-
Ren) identities and national politics within migrant networks and migrants’ social life. In 
addition, considering statistical results can not really show people’s subjective feelings 
about ethnic/national identity and their motivations to join certain networks or 
organizations, this dissertation also seeks to supplement the usual statistical data with 
more detailed information about the everyday experiences of different Chinese subgroups 
and link them to the ways in which they identify themselves and other subgroups within 
the organizations. Understanding the implications of segmented participation in different 
ethnic networks and organizations not only allows us to better understand the meanings 
of overseas networks/organizations to migrants, it can be beneficial for future projects of 
social integration/assimilation as well. 
In my dissertation (chapter five), I will highlight the segmented participation of 
migrant network and community organization to supplement the existing literature on 
overseas Chinese networks and communities. The investigation into the segmentation 
patterns within different Chinese subgroups is significant to the overseas Chinese studies 
because past studies seem to suggest that overseas Chinese networks and communities 
play the same role of mobilizing around a singular point of cultural and political 
identification: Chinese-ness. Echoing Siu and Chan’s findings, in the empirical chapters 
(chapter two and five), not only will I highlight that Chinese communities are 
heterogeneous, I will also present how different Chinese groups use and perceive these 
networks differently, as well as whether they identify each other as the same membership 
of each community organization, and why (or why not). At the same time, I will look at 
how Hua-Ren or national identities get stronger or weaker within specific community 
organizations.  
On the other hand, this dissertation also seeks to have a conversation with other 
literature regarding politics of co-ethnicity (Ho 2011; Li 2016; Liu 2014; Wu and Liu 
2014) and extends current studies on migrant network/organization in a new direction by 
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exploring how pan-ethnic identity and national politics intertwine and separate within 
different networks and community organizations. Studying the politics of co-ethnicity 
within overseas network and community organization matters also because within the 
field of migration studies, little research has systematically examined the complexity of a 
situation where pan-ethnic identity across different organizations is invoked at some 
times, but rejected at others. Nor have studies discussed much about how different 
national identities are embraced by different migrant groups within the overseas 
organizations.  
Focusing on the social and community life of Chinese migrants in Australia, in 
my dissertation I discuss the purposes of various migrant networks/organizations, how 
Chinese migrants choose social affiliations and form group identities. As said, it is 
expected that people use social networks strategically and have different attachments to 
ethnic community organizations, if they have different national identities. Different 
organizations with different goals might conflict with each other as well. Linking 
networks/organizations to national identity, however, this dissertation explores contexts 
under which Hua-Ren identity could form, and why in other organizations national 
identities are more salient.  
In sum, the focus of my dissertation is to examine the collective beliefs, identities, 
or specific perceptions in such migrant networks and community organizations, and what 
these beliefs or perceptions are. In addition, I also examine whether there are any 
different national and pan-ethnic identity between PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong 
Kongese community organizations, and highlight how people’s attachment to notions of 
ethnicity shapes (or is shaped by) the community organization. 
 
Data and Methods 
Because of a lack of statistical data on subjective perception and ethnic identities, 
the data of this dissertation were collected through literature review and an ethnography 
of work, social, and community life of Chinese migrants in Sydney, Australia, where I 
spent a year and half investigating how post-arrival experiences shape and transform 
migrants’ identities. In the literature review, I chose publications (including e-papers) of 
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various ethnic networks and community organizations. I used these to gain information 
on their functions and goals. The fieldwork involved working in two places, regularly 
participating in various cultural and community activities held by different ethnic 
organizations, doing volunteer work with local unions and NGOs that provide legal help 
for migrants, as well as hundreds of hours socializing with worker-friends and having 
conversations with immigrants and their families. The methods I used for my work 
enabled me to look closely at the processes through which particular identities are formed 
in relationship to others, how national (PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese) and 
pan-ethnic (Hua-Ren) identities are defined and negotiated within individuals and 
communities.  
Workplace is an important social setting because migrants spend most of their 
waking hours there. It is also a good context to look at how different Chinese migrant 
groups interact with each other. Inspired by Burawoy (1979) and Ribas (2015), who 
conduct participant observation in the workplace, starting in August 2014, I worked in 
two places (a Chinese restaurant and a Chinese supermarket) as a waiter and as a 
storeman, respectively. I chose these two places as my main field sites because there are a 
large number of PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese and Hong Kongese employers and employees 
who were not born in Australia. Smith and Elliott (2002) also suggest that the workplace 
is an important site for maintaining race and ethnic inequalities. Spending time in the 
workplace allowed me to take account of the dynamic process and setting of work, where 
situational differences were enacted, so as to better understand how these differences 
affect ethnic identities and group boundaries. 
 
Field Site Descriptions  
Detailed job contents and my application processes for the job in two worksites 
will be documented in chapter four. Here I just briefly describe the ethnic combinations 
of these two workplaces. The Chinese restaurant that I started working in August 2014 is 
next to the casino, and many customers came to the restaurant after they finished 
gambling. It is one of the luxurious Chinese seafood restaurants in that area. In the 
restaurant, there were around 50 staff in the restaurant, including three managers (two 
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Hong Kongese, one PRC-Chinese), 10 to 15 cooks and kitchen hands (from Hong Kong 
and southern China), five dish-washers (all Korean Working Holiday makers), and 
approximately 30 waiters and waitresses (around 50% of them are PRC-Chinese students 
and another 50% are Taiwan/Hong Kongese Working Holiday makers). 
The restaurant opened seven days a week. During my time working there I had 
never had the chance of doing work in day shifts because it was always more busy in the 
night shifts. There were around 30 tables and 5 VIP rooms. Generally, one waiter or 
waitress was in charge of three tables. The routine work included serving/changing plates, 
serving hot tea and drinks, taking orders, cleaning the table and changing tablecloths 
when customers finish the meal.    
After two months, I decided to switch jobs and compare the group relation with 
another workplace. This time I found a job as a storeman in a middle-sized Chinese 
supermarket owned by a woman from Beijing. The supermarket was in a shopping mall 
in the west side of Sydney. Its two PRC-Chinese managers were the owner’s cousins. The 
medium-sized supermarket employed five female cashiers, four from Taiwan and one 
from Hong Kong—all Working Holiday visa23 holders who had done fruit-picking and 
farming before. They came to work in the supermarket because they wanted to live “close 
to the city.” In addition to the cashiers, the owner also hired two storemen (me and 
another Taiwanese Working Holiday maker) to take the shifts by turns. The supermarket 
mostly sold Chinese and other Asian products as there are already two big local 
supermarkets in the mall. The tags of all products there were listed in both Chinese and 
English. Most products providers the supermarket had cooperation with were also “Hua-
Ren” (mainly PRC-Chinese).   
In March 2015, I quitted my job in the supermarket and did other part-time work, 
such as unloading containers, furniture moving, house cleaning, and gardening jobs. 
Again, I found these jobs through the previously mentioned Chinese websites. The main 
purpose of doing different part-time work is to know more migrant workers and 
employers from other industries and backgrounds. I worked around 3 to 4 days a week 
																																																								
23 I will introduce specific visa categories in the next chapter. 
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and spent the rest of the week going to some Chinese organizations, taking rest,24 and 
writing my field notes. Doing different work not only allows me to understand group 
interaction in different types of workplace (e.g., regular vs. temporary work), it also helps 
me gain a more complete picture of how the labor market works when it involves 
different Chinese groups. By working with them closely (for instance, when I worked 
with a PRC-Chinese truck driver delivering products, I spent 14 hours a day with him in 
his truck), I began to understand how they interacted with me as a Taiwanese and how 
they identified their ethnicity.   
 
Engagement in the Community Organizations 
At the same time, since my goal is to illustrate the dynamic processes of identity 
change in different social settings, I also sought other opportunities and places to observe 
people’s interactions. I have been an executive member of the Taiwanese Working 
Holiday Youth (T-WHY) since 2014, and am responsible for translating policies and 
regulations regarding workplace entitlements into Chinese. One of T-WHY’s goals is to 
help Taiwanese Working Holiday makers cope with unfair treatment in the workplace, 
providing them legal consultation. Thus, I got the chances to work with relevant 
authorities such as the Fair Work Ombudsman25 and to know other local unions and 
NGOs such as Asian Women at Work (AWatW).  
Community association is another important social setting to look at national and 
pan-ethnic identity. Starting in October 2014, I took every opportunities to participate in 
various cultural and community activities held by various organizations such as the 
Australian Chinese Community Association (ACCA), Chinese Community Social 
Services Center, the Australian Associations of Hong Kong, the Chinese Baptist Church, 
Taiwanese Working Holiday Youth (T-WHY), and the Chinese Youth Corps (CYC, a 
Taiwanese organization), and hung out with people I knew from these organizations 
during the weekends. I got the chance to know certain organizations either through the 																																																								
24 For example, after doing a whole day of moving house, I had to spend another one or two days to 
recover. 
25 Fairwork Ombudsman is an independent statutory agency of the Government of Australia that provides 
information and advice, investigates workplace complaints and enforces Commonwealth workplace laws. 
See: http://www.fairwork.gov.au 
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introduction of my colleagues who had participated their activities before, or through 
their online advertisements. A prolonged and deep immersion through participant 
observation through different activities made it possible to know more people and 
examine how different Chinese subgroups distinguish between and join in different 
networks and community organizations.  
The reason I chose these organizations is not because they are the most 
representative ones in Australia. Instead, it is because the natures of these organizations 
cover various aspects of migrants’ social lives, such as social service, business 
networking, religious need, and political participation. One thing should be noted here is 
that I do not include any PRC-exclusive organization in this dissertation because for 
many PRC-Chinese citizens, “Chinese people” is a broader concept, which “certainly” 
includes Taiwanese and Hong Kongese. I acknowledge that in practice, PRC-Chinese 
migrants might think of Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants as slightly different from 
themselves, but overall, PRC-Chinese organizations would not see their organizations 
necessarily exclude Taiwanese or Hong Kongese. 
 
Being Taiwanese in the Field 
My own background as Taiwanese certainly has an influence during fieldwork. 
As a Taiwanese myself, I tried to be conscious of my own political and cultural beliefs 
and how this may bias my interactions with respondents and the data produced by my 
research. Furthermore, when respondents know that I am Taiwanese it is likely that they 
will assume I have my own political position on the question of Taiwanese independence. 
This may encourage respondents to tell me what they think I want to hear, in other words 
what they think may aligns with my own political position. 
Therefore I tried to implement some strategies to limit perceived biases from 
emerging in interviews. During interviews, I made sure that I maintained a neutral 
position on politically sensitive topics such as Taiwanese independence or cross-Strait 
tensions. If respondents (whether they be Taiwanese, PRC-Chinese or Hong Kongese) 
asked about my personal thoughts on Taiwan independence, I would tell them I do not 
have a specific position. When respondents ask this question, they have automatically 
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moved the interview from an “objective” interview for research purposes to a “subjective” 
political discussion. I would then ask them why they wanted to know about my opinion 
as a means to explore how they perceived my identity (both as a researcher and as 
Taiwanese). Their response not only provided more insight into the perceptions of 
identity but also provided a way for me to identify whether the opinions respondents 
shared may have been influenced by my own identity as Taiwanese. 
Another way I tried to reduce my own biases and those that respondents may 
perceive by me being Taiwanese was to only conduct an interview after having had 
several interactions with the respondent. This not only worked towards creating an 
atmosphere of mutual trust but it also may have helped respondents perceive that my 
questions are out of academic interest rather than furthering a perceived political agenda.     
In most occasions, I did not find my identity as a Taiwanese constitutes any 
difficulty when interacting with other Chinese groups. However, I was always careful to 
note the terms respondents used when referring to me as this could also indicate their 
perception of me (which aspect of my identity are they responding to — my identity as a 
Taiwanese citizen or my identity as a researcher. Respondents used various terms to refer 
to me including: Taiwan Tong-Bao [compatriots]; “You Taiwanese” and “We Chinese.” 
All of these terms link in to the cross-Strait politico-cultural discourse. Thus I had to 
create a way of deciphering what was meant or implied by the use of these terms in 
different contexts. For example, when referring to as Taiwan Tong Bao, I maintained 
neutrality and tried not to let my identity influence their response. And I tried not to 
agitate their particular political identities. Instead, I paid attention to what Taiwan Tong 
Bao means to them, and how they use it. 
In fact, in the workplace or in community organizations, very few of respondents 
would actively talk about issues regarding national identity. Only in certain occasions 
some of them would refer “You Taiwanese” to describe some political or cultural 
differences. In contrast, it is more common that my Taiwanese and Hong Kongese 
interviewees claim the differences between themselves and PRC-Chinese. For example, 
they would using “Dalu-Ren [mainland Chinese]” and “we Taiwanese” or “we Hong 
Kongese” to mark themselves as a different national group. This nomenclature will be 
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expanded on later chapters. 
 
In-depth Interviews 
I conducted interviews with sixty-five respondents,26 twenty-six of whom were 
PRC-Chinese, twenty-two Taiwanese and sixteen Hong Kongese (according to their 
place of birth), and one was Australian-born Hong Kongese (Amelia). I did not select 
equal numbers of each national group. Instead, I invited respondents for interview 
regardless of their nationalities. Some of my respondents were my colleagues in the 
workplace and several I had met in community associations (such as those mentioned 
above), and some others had been introduced through organizations such as T-WHY and 
Asian Women at Work. I use pseudonyms to maintain respondent anonymity. My 
interviewees included those who were staying in Australia temporarily, such as 
international students and Working Holiday makers (thirty-three respondents), and those 
who were either permanent residents or had Australian citizenships (thirty-two 
respondents). Including both short-term and long-term immigrants allows for an inclusion 
of different time and migration trajectory because one would expect very different 
processes of identify formation for longer-term migrants and for temporary migrants.27 
Furthermore, I asked my respondents to share with me not only their workplace 
experiences but also facts about their social lives and group interactions in various 
communities/organizations. I also understand, though, that the variance across the 
characteristics of my interviewees, including visa type, length of residence, immigration 
trajectory, socio-economic background, etc., will influence their identity and participation 
pattern in certain social settings. To avoid the bias, I covered samples as wide as possible, 
and probed them with “why” questions when they said they felt similar to or different 
from other subgroups. I will also provide as much information as possible on their 
individual characteristics in the following quotes to make more meaningful 
interpretations.  																																																								
26 For the demographic and ethnic backgrounds of my interviewees, see Appendix 1. 
27 However, generational status does not necessarily have a positive/negative relationship with ethnic and 
national identity. In my interview, for example, second-generation migrants do not necessarily feel 
themselves more Hua-Ren (or not) than first-generation counterparts. 
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In sum, I mainly sought three types of information during the interviews and 
coded the data accordingly:28 (1) I asked my respondents about their perceptions of other 
Chinese subgroups before and after moving to Australia; (2) I examined the situations 
and social interactions they had with their co-ethnics and other ethnic groups (including 
PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese and white Australians) in different social 
settings; and lastly, (3) I asked what being “Hua-Ren,” “PRC-Chinese,” “Taiwanese,” or 
“Hong Kongese” meant to them, and why. I coded my interview data based on their self-
identification (PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese and/or Hua-Ren), their perception 
of and interactions with other Chinese subgroups and white Australians, as well as under 
what conditions they choose or reject Hua-Ren category. 
 
Outline of Dissertation 
Chapter two provides historical context within which we can have a clearer 
picture of the immigration trajectory and different visa/legal status of these three Chinese 
subgroups, as well as their social and economic positions in Australia. In this chapter, I 
first compare the reasons why and the processes through which these three subgroups 
came to Australia, and then compare temporary migrants (e.g., international students and 
Working Holiday makers), and those who have stayed in Australia for over 5 years and 
had either permanent residency or Australian citizenship. I highlight how Australia 
government structures these three subgroups visa/immigration in different ways, how 
different visa status might lead to different economic and social positions within different 
periods of time. Providing immigration history and visa type is important in 
understanding how national and ethnic identity are shaped or changed by broader social 
conditions. 
The next three chapters draw more heavily on my field notes from participant 
observation and interview data, focusing on the formation and decline of national and 
pan-ethnic identity in different social settings. Chapter three starts with the job-seeking 
processes, with a particular focus on the provision/activities in the cash-in-hand labor 
market because informal labor is culturally embedded and does shape how these three 																																																								
28 For detailed interview guideline, see Appendix 2. 
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subgroups see each other, especially according to how co-ethnics should treat one another. 
Studies have discussed widely about ethnic hierarchy and ethnic stereotype between 
different racial/ethnic groups. Yet, not many studies examine the ethnic hierarchy and 
through which processes existing ethnic stereotypes are activated or intensified. Taking 
informal sector in Australia as example, this chapter argues that the exploitation 
experiences in the cash economy reflects there is an abstract ethnic hieracrhy within 
Chinese migrants, though expressed diffferently among each subgroup. On the other hand, 
the exploitation experience also intensifies people’s ethnic stereotypes so that people 
either feel there is something “wrong” according to their ethnic beliefs, or seize upon pre-
existing ethnic stereotypes of the other national group to interpret the fact that they are 
working for “the other” and being exploited.    
In this chapter, I illuminate the complexities of ethnic identities and stereotypes 
within the process of exploitation. In the cash-in-hand labor market, some people 
(especially employers) seldom distinguish national identity and tend to treat each other as 
a whole and unique group (Hua-Ren). They perceive Hua-Ren employers and employees 
with specific cultural imaginations in the cash economy. Others, in contrast, highlight 
existing stereotypes, though remain contested between subgroups. How PRC-Chinese 
employees think about their PRC-Chinese or Taiwanese employers is different from how 
Taiwanese/Hong Kongese employees think about PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese employers. 
For example, when Taiwanese migrants are exploited by Taiwanese employers, they tend 
to put their Taiwanese employers into the category of “Hua-Ren” (comments like: 
“Taiwanese are no different from other Hua-Ren bosses!”), but when the exploitative 
employers are PRC-Chinese, they would seize upon existing ethnic stereotypes and 
associate the exploitation to their existing ethnic stereotype. This situation also happened 
to PRC-Chinese students when they work for Taiwanese/Hong Kongese employers. By 
examining how different Chinese subgroups perceive each other and the change of 
identity in this specific social setting (cash economy), this chapter advances study on 
ethnic economy/business as it offers a critique on the common discussions of ethnic 
economy that are based on coherent ethnic communities with internal solidarities.  
Chapter four turns the focus to the group interactions happened in the workplace. 
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I first explore migrants’ interpretations of Hua-Ren identity before and after coming to 
Australia. For example, people might have strong national identity and perception of 
other groups before they arrive in Australia, but later, after interacting with more 
subgroups, they start shifting their national and pan-ethnic identities to different degrees. 
I argue that shifting interpretations of Hua-Ren identity, along with the dynamics in the 
workplace, together provide the flexibility for different Chinese migrants to make or 
unmake group boundaries with different strategies such as minimizing tensions, 
managing differences, or having fun in the workplace.  
Drawing from my fieldwork experiences as a waiter and a storeman in two 
Chinese workplaces, in this chapter I examine different degrees to which national and 
pan-ethnic identity nest within these three subgroups, how class and positional 
differences intersect with ethnicity, as well as how group boundaries become a field 
where people negotiate and “play” in their everyday interactions. Hua-Ren identity, thus, 
is not a pure matter of ethnic difference, but instead a matter of what people subjectively 
interpret or believe about difference within shifting social contexts. I also show that once 
people are familiar with the boundaries to other subgroups, people can selectively focus 
on particular ethnic elements and culture values without intending to change their 
national identifications. In this sense, some actions can have strategic purposes different 
from Wimmer’s idea of strategic boundary making/unmaking since my respondents are 
not trying to give their ethnicities a new value (trans-valuation) or reposition their ethnic 
status by engaging in ethnic humor. Instead, people hold their own national identities 
constant and even highlight group tensions during their interactions. In this sense, identity 
could be a strategic way of managing group differences. In this chapter I also compare 
the group interaction between regular and temporary work. Temporariness not only 
decides the ways different national groups interact with each other, it also influences the 
way one expresses his/her own national identity.     
In chapter five, I back to the concept of “cosmopolitan Chinese,” and focus on the 
aspects of migrants’ community and social life. Taking some ethnic networks like job-
finding forums and Facebook pages, and community-based organizations such as 
Australian Chinese Community Association, Chinese Baptist Church, and Chinese Youth 
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Corps (a Taiwanese organization), as example, I examine people’s national or pan-ethnic 
identity in these networks and their cultural activities in these organizations and 
communities. In this chapter I describe how PRC-Chinese, Hong Kongese, and 
Taiwanese migrants choose social affiliations, participate in social activities, and form 
group identities. I explore the contexts in which these three groups unify under Hua-Ren 
ethnicity and why in other communities the national identities are more salient. I ask: 
How do ethnic networks and community organizations such as religious congregations or 
business associations manage to override differences and enforce a Hua-Ren identity? 
Can such identity be carried over into other spheres of social life and why (or why not)? 
In other words, I examine why there is no distinction between different groups of Chinese 
within some ethnic social networks and community organizations whereas in others 
people distinguish Taiwanese/Hong Kongese from PRC-Chinese identity.  
This chapter shows that the co-existence of overseas Chinese 
networks/organizations and national-specific identifications among migrants from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China is not mutually exclusive. I highlight the participation of 
overseas Chinese networks and community organizations in Australia where segmented 
and different pan-ethnic and national identities are evident in community organizations. 
This chapter focuses not just on the fact that people with pre-existing identities create 
specific networks or communities. Instead, I examine the segmented ways people create, 
participate, and identify with particular networks/community organizations. I illustrate 
that creation of overseas networks/organizations and conceptions about Chinese identity 
fluctuate and depend on numerous factors, including strategic interests as well as national 
politics, linguistics, and historical relationships between different Chinese subgroups. I 
also highlight different roles of ethnic connection, imagination, and solidarity played by 
migrant networks and organizations.  
In chapter six, I include a “non-Chinese” group (white Australians) into 
discussion, to examine whether Australian context and interacting with another non-
Chinese group could cultivate common interests and ties among these three Chinese 
subgroups and lead to a stronger pan-ethnic identity and solidarity. Following the 
discussions in the previous chapter, the shared membership within Chinese networks and 
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the shared goal of Hua-Ren communities may lead us to expect that Chinese migrants 
would take actions together to protect collective interests, especially when discriminated 
against by white Australians. From the examples provided in this chapter, however, I not 
only challenge the literature on pan-ethnic solidarity, which portrays minority groups 
cooperating when facing outside group discrimination; I also extend our understanding of 
pan-ethnicity by pointing out that pan-ethnic solidarity has different meanings to different 
subgroups. For many PRC-Chinese migrants, pan-ethnic identity and pan-ethnic 
solidarity can be associated with a shared identity (with all other Chinese groups) to 
motherland (China) at both the diasporic and national level. For Taiwanese and Hong 
Kongese migrants, in contrast, assertions of pan-ethnic identity can be strategic, and can 
have different meanings at the diasporic and national level, respectively.  
In this chapter, I particularly focus on how Chinese migrants interpret racial 
discrimination and micro-aggression (such as rude verbal behavior and subtle racism), 
and whether people ascribe the pan-ethnicity to themselves or each other. I argue that 
racial discriminations or micro-aggressions from Australians may solidify Hua-Ren 
identity among these three subgroups, but only to a narrow extent. In fact, many Chinese 
migrants always compare the racial discrimination from Australians and their own 
political tensions among each other (e.g., China vs. Taiwan/Hong Kong). When the latter 
is stronger than the former, pan-ethnic solidarity is an unlikely outcome. As well, I 
explore the nature of racial discrimination and show that when racial discrimination is 
“micro,” it is not seen as serious as political tensions Chinese subgroups have with each 
other. By ignoring the sting of racism it minimizes hostility against Chinese and prevents 
these three Chinese subgroups from cultivating a strong pan-ethnic identity. In other 
words, people do not necessarily seek pan-ethnic solidarity when facing racial 
discriminations or micro-aggressions from other non-Chinese groups. In this sense, pan-
ethnic identity has its limitations, which also decrease the possibilities of following pan-
ethnic solidarity. 
Finally, I summarize the findings in my conclusion chapter. By summarizing how 
national and pan-ethnic identity nest within these three subgroups in certain times and 
social settings, for example, how ethnicity becomes a tool of exploitation and 
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intensification of ethnic stereotype in the cash-in-hand labor market; a strategy of 
managing differences and making/unmaking the group boundary in the workplace; a 
process through which national identity is shifted to pan-ethnic identity (and vice versa) 
in various ethnic networks and community organizations; and a collectivity whether 
people adopt or reject in their everyday interactions with a non-Chinese group; I theorize 
the formation and block of overseas Chinese identity, as well as what conditions favoring 
national or pan-ethnic identity. Different identities shape and transform the group 
interactions not just within these three Chinese subgroups, but also influence their race 
relations with other non-Chinese groups.  
In the end, I address the broader theoretical implications of this dissertation for 
understanding the concept of pan-ethnicity and group interaction in the way that it can 
have different interpretations in different social settings. The meaning of Hua-Ren is also 
different from one Chinese subgroup to another. I also point out that this dissertation 
makes a contribution to the study of pan-ethnic formation, boundary making/unmaking, 
ethnic hierarchy and stereotyping, ethnic economy/business, as well as pan-ethnic 
collective action. In hopes of providing some directions for future research, I consider 
issues that remain about boundary of “Chinese-ness,” a more comparative perspective on 
the migration experiences of different ethnic groups in different regions, the extents of 
diasporic identity and levels of social assimilation in other immigration societies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
AUSTRALIA DREAM: THE IMMIGRATION PATTERN AND TRAJECTORY OF 
CHINESE MIGRANTS TO AUSTRALIA  
 
 
“The air pollution is pretty bad in China, and there are not many job 
opportunities in my hometown, lots of people from my village have 
moved out. So I decided to come here, finding some opportunities.”  
                                                           (Interview with Paul, September 2, 2015) 
 
“On the day of my 29th birthday, I decided to give myself a birthday gift: 
a flight ticket to come to Australia. Now I am here! Still feel a bit surreal 
though!...I am here to fulfill my Australia dream!”  
 (Interview with Lily, December 15, 2014) 
 
 
I met Russell, fifty-eight-old who came from China, in a Chinese restaurant where 
I used to work. The restaurant is next to a casino, and Russell sometimes had dinner with 
his friends at the restaurant after gambling. I did not know he had been in Australia more 
than ten years until I had further conversations with him. When he was with his friends in 
our restaurant, he always talked to them loudly in Mandarin, with a strong northern China 
accent. Some of my PRC-Chinese colleagues recognized his accents and they always said 
something bad behind him, they called him “Tu-Hao,” which means vulgarian who 
makes a conspicuous display of wealth. 
One evening in September of 2014, before I went to work I bumped into Russell 
outside the casino where he was smoking by himself. He recognized that I was the waiter 
who always served him and his friends pieces of cake and fruit. We started to have a chat. 
I asked him how he could hang around the casino every day and seems he does not need 
to work. Was he retired? He started to tell me how he came to Australia and he owned a 
house-cleaning company. Luckily, I then scheduled an interview in a casino lounge 
where he played mah-jong. In the interview, he had no hesitation explaining his 
background and immigration trajectory, and he even spent time sharing stories of his 
personal relationship with his wife. 
 
My wife studied for her PhD here. She applied for permanent residency in 
1999. At that time I could not come to Australia because I 
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did not have a job here. I had a better job in China then, in a business that 
traded in plastic materials...I came to Australia in 2003, bought a small 
company, started a house-cleaning business. I hired three young 
Australian people and did the cleaning myself, too...you know, you have 
to save some money. Recently, there have been more and more cleaning 
companies. My business has been shrinking, so I had more time and 
started coming here to gamble...My wife was upset with me...actually we 
were separated for a while... 
 
Russell told me the majority (around 90%) of people who play in the mah-jong 
club are Hua-Ren.29 He said that in the casino we can always see the “bad-roots” of 
Chinese: greedy and lazy. The “Chinese” he mentioned here refers to all ethnic Chinese, 
including people from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and even Singapore. He admitted that 
he himself is part of the greedy Chinese (Interview with Russell, September 15, 2014): 
 
These Chinese people came to Australia doing nothing serious, just 
dreaming about getting rich quickly without spending any efforts. Most of 
them ended up spending lots of time in the casino, losing money, trying to 
win it back, and losing more, just like a vicious circle...some of them did 
several jobs but ended up with saving nothing. 
 
In the mah-jong club Russell introduced me another of his PRC-Chinese friend, 
John, who is a fifty-two-year-old shop owner. He owns a small shop trading Australian 
health products back to China. On another interview day John gave me a thorough 
explanation of his experience applying for a visa in the business migrant program: 
  
My visa is subclass 163.30 This visa is for business migrants who come to 
Australia to invest or open a business. The regulation requires that you 
have to run a business for at least two years...so the way it works is, the 
government gives you a five-year visa, within these five years, your 
business has to be registered for at least two years. I guess now you need 
to have at least 1 million AUD dollars for your business. When I applied 
to it five years ago, the amount was less. At that time, we must have had 																																																								
29 Another interviewee, Warren, who used to be a dealer in the casino, also told me that over 80% of people 
gambling in the casino are ethnic Chinese (Interview with Warren, March 11, 2015). 
30 Subclass 163 is the Business Owner Sponsorship visa, which allows for ownership and part ownership of 
an Australian business. The Business Owner Sponsored visa is also the first step in gaining permanent 
residency for Australia. See:  
http://www.immigratingaustralia.com/business/australia-business-owner-sponsored-visa.php  
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our own enterprise registered in China, the enterprise must have had 
shareholders, and you must have held at least 30% of the shares of stock. 
You had to have invested at least 200,000 AUD in your business in 
Australia, no matter what kind of business you have...oh and, you have to 
hire at least two local citizens...you must fulfill all these requirements 
before applying for the business migrant visa.  
 
Russell and John’s immigration experiences are only part of the picture of 
Chinese migration to Australia. Others migrated to Australia for family, study, work, and 
all other reasons. People also have different settlement plans, either temporary or longer 
term. In this chapter I will lay out the different immigration trajectories and patterns of 
both long-term migrants and temporary migrants from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. I 
will also introduce some common types of visas Chinese migrants have when they come 
to Australia and relevant visa regulations. With a clearer picture of why people migrate to 
Australia and what they tend to do in Australia, we are in a better position to discuss 
identity formation and changes in different social settings such as labor markets, 
workplaces, migrant networks, community organizations, and their everyday interactions 
with white Australians. In the following sections, I will briefly sketch history of Chinese 
immigration to Australia, visa categories, number of immigrants, and then compare these 
three Chinese migrant groups during their immigration processes.  
   
Fulfilling an Australian Dream 
Both Russell’s and John’s story illustrate different immigrant trajectories and 
motivations moving to Australia. Many Chinese migrants feel the opportunities and 
environment (both business and living environment) in Australia are better than in their 
original countries. Not only Russell and John but most of my respondents, except for 
those who came as political refugees in 1989, also see emigration to Australia as a way to 
earn and save more money and provide a better education and life for their children. In 
other words, there is an “Australian Dream” for many potential migrants, even though 
this term is not widely used by Chinese migrants. For example, one of my Taiwanese 
interviewee, Chien-Ting, who is now a bartender in a busy pub, told me that “getting 
		
44 
Australian Permanent Residency” has become a “civil movement” for Chinese migrants 
(Interview with Chien-Ting, May 2, 2015).31 He said: 
 
All the Chinese people…I do not know why, one question they always ask 
each other is: “Which visa do you have now?” Even they just meet each 
other for the first time, it is always the first question they would ask each 
other. And the next question will probably be: “Do you have PR 
[permanent residency] yet?” and “How did you get your PR?” In Australia, 
if you have PR, people would envy you. It is strange, right? For Working 
Holiday makers, the questions will be: “Where are you going to 
accumulate 88 days for the second Working Holiday visa?” or “Have you 
transferred your visa to student visa yet?” Gosh, everyone tries all possible 
ways to stay longer in Australia, it is really like a civil movement!    
 
Christine, a fifty-seven-year-old Taiwanese migrant who has immigrated to 
Australia over twenty years, told me she always feels lucky that she could migrate to 
Australia. She thinks Australians are relatively friendly and open-minded: “they are not 
like those in the United States who are always aggressive and competitive; here you can 
enjoy a more formal equality.” (Interview with Christine, September 18, 2015) 
Christine’s narratives reflect her stereotypes as she has not really lived in the United 
States, however the narratives show that she sees a brighter future in Australia, so that 
she is willing to risk investing money and facing the challenges that language and cultural 
barriers present.32 In this sense, except for political refugees who came around 1989 
because of the Tiananmen Square incident (Betts 2003), Chinese migrants came to 
Australia largely due to “pull” rather than “push” factors. They migrated seeking 
economic gain and more fulfilling lives in Australia.  
In regard to the history of Chinese migration to Australia, Chinese immigration 
first became noticeable in 1855 during the Australian gold rushes (Gittins 1981). In 1855, 
between 10,000 and 17,000 Chinese, almost all male adults and middle-aged migrated 
from Guangdong province in south China (Willard 1967: 21). However, anti-Chinese 
sentiment in Australia grew in the late 1880s, which led to restrictive legislations such as 																																																								
31 Chinese migrants’ desire to stay in Australia has already generated many migrant agencies who help 
people apply for all different types of visa and some of them even sell “fake visas.” 
32 Both Russell and John told me they could not speak English well, and it was tough for them to 
communicate with local Australians when they first arrived in Australia. 
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the 1897 Natal Immigration Restriction Act, the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, 
and the Nationality Act of 1903. The legislation prohibited the naturalization of 
“undesirable persons” (non-Europeans), depressing the number of Chinese arrivals, and 
created an image that Australia was an exclusively homogenous white community during 
the 1890s (Choi 1975: 27; Irving 1997: 101). One of the tools for exclusion was the 
notorious dictation test (in English or European language), which made it almost 
impossible for Chinese to remain in Australia (Ngan and Chan 2012: 3). In addition to 
restrictive immigration laws, family members still living in China also dampened 
immigrants’ desire to stay (Yarwood 1961: 246–47). The result was a steady decline in 
the numbers of Chinese migrants (Williams 1999). By 1947, the total number of Chinese 
migrants living in Australia had decreased more than two-thirds to about 9,000 (Choi 
1975: 42–43). 
Thus, before the 1950s, Chinese population in Australia was small and its 
migration to Australia was not a case of “chain migration.” (Massey et al. 2002; Yu 2007) 
In fact, early Chinese migrants always returned to China and did not bring their wives or 
children with them to Australia. Furthermore, due to immigration restriction on the entry 
of Chinese women, many PRC-Chinese men chose to return to China to find a bride then 
back again to Australia to work. The situation was the same in the United States and New 
Zealand, where the early Chinese migrants were described as “sojourners” because they 
move back and forth between China and receiving countries. Their principal aim was not 
to settle down but to return to China (Siu 1952). It was not until the 1950s that the right to 
bring in dependents was extended. 
The abolition of the “White Australia” policy in 1973 (Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship) resulted in a new wave of Chinese migration and refugees 
to Australia.33 Policy of integration (1960s) and multiculturalism (1970s) both have had 
profound influences on Chinese settlement. Chinese migrants as well as other “non-white” 
people were finally allowed to settle in Australia (Ngan and Chan 2012: 4).    However, 
when the White Australia Policy was finally abolished in 1973, the initial incoming 
																																																								
33 Regarding the political process of abolishing the “White Australia” policy and how it influenced the 
Australian immigration policies, see Mackie (1997: 18–28) and Windschuttle (2004) 
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waves mainly consisted of various ethnic Chinese groups rather than PRC-Chinese 
migrants. The PRC-Chinese immigrants had to wait until the opening up of China in the 
late 1970s (Xiang 2016). 34  As a forty-six-year-old Australian-born Hong-Kongese, 
Amelia, recalled her memory as a child (Interview with Amelia, October 17, 2015): 
 
It certainly changed a lot. When I was a child, if you went to Chinatown, 
everyone would be speaking Cantonese, and mostly people were from 
Hong Kong, or Malaysia, or maybe Southeast Asia. There were not many 
people coming from Mainland China…so obviously, in the last decade, it 
completely changed. Now if you go to Chinatown, you hear mostly 
Mandarin, and Mandarin is now more common than Cantonese…this has 
been a really big change… 
 
The dominance of PRC-born immigrants in numerical terms resumed since late 
1970s. During this period, the major sources of immigrants to Australia include China, 
Hong Kong, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan (Ho and Coughlan 1997). Although in the 
early twenty century many ethnic Chinese migrants came to study or for family reasons, 
the most significant wave of post-war Chinese immigration to Australia was in the mid-
1980s, following the Australian government’s vigorous promotion of educational 
programs that provided overseas students the opportunity to study at Australian 
universities and take English language classes (Ip 2001: 115). The sex ratio also became 
more balanced with an increase of females (Choi 1975: 66). In the late 1980s there was a 
shift in Australian immigration policy with the government issuing more business and 
skilled migrant visas. A detailed point test gave priority to “applicants who are young, 
well educated, English literate and qualified for high-demand jobs in which local skills 
are in short supply.” (Bertone 2009: 86). In 2000 the government initiated another 
expansion because of pressure stemmed from the skill labor shortages (Birrell 2009: 80). 
During this period, the major sources of immigrants to Australia include China, Hong 
Kong, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan.  
The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 led to more PRC-Chinese migrants, who 
came to Australia as political refugees (Betts 2003). After having experienced life in 																																																								
34 Here we can see a different trend of Chinese migration to Australia, in contrast with Chinese migration to 
the United States. 
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Australia, most sought opportunities to work and settle. Given the circumstances many of 
these political refugees were given a special four-year extension to their temporary entry 
permits. In addition, in the “1 November 1993 decisions” 35 the Australian government 
announced its intention “to resolve the status of certain groups of people who, for 
humanitarian reasons, had been allowed to remain in Australia as long-term temporary 
residents (usually because of internal conflict).” As a result, close to 37,000 PRC-Chinese 
obtained permanent residency by February 1996. They were also given the right to bring 
in family members (Gao 2011; Ip 2001). The number of PRC-Chinese immigrants 
remained high throughout the latter half of the 1990s. According to the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (2015), China was the third largest source country of migration, and had the 
highest percentage increase (26.1%) of short-term visitors.36 China outnumbered the 
United Kingdom and became the second largest source country of migrants in 2015–16.37 
From Figure 5 we can see, after 1990s, PRC-Chinese mostly came to Australia for 
family reasons and as skilled migrants. The number of PRC-Chinese arriving as political 
refuges has been decreasing since 1991. 
 
Figure 5. The Reasons and Trends of PRC-Chinese Migrated to Australia. Source: 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Settler Arrival Data, 1991–2010 
(www.immi.gov.au/settlement/)  																																																								
35 Source: http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/annual/1998-99/html/prog1_2a.htm  
36 Source: 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/3401.0Main+Features2Oct%202015?OpenDocument  
37 Source: https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/statistics/2015-16-migration-
programme-report.pdf 
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Because Hong Kong was historically the point of departure for thousands of 
migrants from throughout China during the gold rushes of the 1850s, people from Hong 
Kong also joined the departing ships. The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 brought 
about a peak in Hong Kong Chinese migration to Australia in 1991–1992 (Ip 2001). In 
1997, its return to China also increased the fear and uncertainty of the future (Lary et al. 
1994; Skeldon 1994). From late 1980s to early 1990s, rather than gaining entry under the 
family or refugee category, most people from Hong Kong who came to Australia did so 
as independent skilled migrants because of their professional qualifications (Kee and 
Skeldon 1994: 185). For example, among those who arrived in 1991–1992, 43.9% held 
professional occupations, and 13.8% were managers and administrators (Inglis and Wu 
1994: 204). At the same time, however, a significant proportion also came as business 
migrants. The Business Migration Program was initiated in 1978 to attract well-educated 
and affluent migrants from East Asia. Between 1982 and 1990, a total of 36,555 people 
from Hong Kong arrived in Australia as business migrants. Within the period 29% of 
business migrants were from Hong Kong, and 15% were from Taiwan. The ethnic 
Chinese migrants to Australia in 1980s thus marked a new wave of Chinese immigration. 
During this period, Hong Kong became the top source of Australia’s immigrants 
(Walmsley et al. 1999). This new wave was characterized by the arrival of upper-middle- 
or middle-class immigrants with professional skills and capital resources. They were 
distinct from earlier Chinese settlers, who were associated with “coolie” or physical labor 
(Inglis and Wu 1994; Ip et al. 1998). 
Taiwanese immigrants, on the other hand, began to arrive in the mid- and late 
1980s mainly because of the Business Migration Program (Ip et al. 1998). Taiwanese 
immigration resembled the “second wave” of Chinese immigrants that began in 1985 and 
peaked in 1991 (Ip 2001: 117). Some Taiwanese families migrated to Australia also 
because cross-Strait tensions with China. In the early 1990s, Taiwanese formed the 
largest immigrant group entering Australia through the Business Migration Program 
(Chiang and Hsu 2000). By the late 1990s, Taiwan became the ninth largest source 
country for immigrants to Australia, accounting for 2.5 percent of all arrivals in 1996–
1997 (Chiang and Hsu 2006: 37). 
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Since then, more and more Taiwanese have gone to Australia, whether in the 
family and skilled categories or with student, Working Holiday, or tourist visas that 
conferred a temporary status. Frequently, those with temporary statuses found 
opportunities to work and settle in Australia. From 1991 to 1996, the Taiwan-born 
community of Australia grew 8.5% annually (Hugo 1999). Compared to immigrants from 
China or Hong Kong, however, the size of the Taiwanese migrant population is relatively 
small. According to 1996 census data (Walmsley et al 1999: 78), most Taiwanese 
migrants are young adults between the ages of 15 and 24 (39.9%) and 25–49 (38.4%), in 
contrast to many PRC-Chinese who come to Australia at an older age (aged 65 and over).    
Compared to the early PRC-Chinese settlers in Australia, the immigration 
trajectory of Taiwanese immigrants reflects a significant disjuncture. The early PRC-
Chinese migrants were mainly adult and mostly characterized by rural origins. In contrast, 
the Taiwanese migrants in Australia, like most other PRC-Chinese and Hong Kongese 
migrants arriving in the early 1990s, were from a “new middle class” composed of 
mainly professionals, managers, and owners of small/medium size enterprises (Ip 2001).  
The immigration pattern and demography of Taiwanese and Hong Kongese 
migrants also differ from PRC-Chinese by gender and age. The trend can be described as 
“astronaut families” and “parachute kids” (Chiang 2008; Pe-Pua et al. 1996; Waters 
2003). These two terms are usually used to refer to Taiwanese and Hong Kongese 
families that migrated, in the early 1980s, to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or the 
United States. Generally, the (male) parent migrates to another country for work while 
sending remittances back home or to the country where the kids live. Astronaut families 
and parachute kids illustrate the difficulties that immigrant families experience in 
Australia (Khoo and Mak 2003; Pe-Pua et al. 1996). In this sense, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan have much more in common with the Chinese diaspora than they do with 
Mainland China. 
Currently, however, the situation may be different. The astronaut phenomenon in 
Australia may result from husbands returning to Taiwan or Hong Kong to run their 
businesses while leaving their wives and children in Australia (for the sake of their 
children’s educational opportunities). For example, from Figure 6 and Figure 7 we can 
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see the male-to-female ratio of Taiwanese migrants in Australia was 88% (88 males per 
100 females) in 2000, but it dropped down to 73% in 2010.  
 
 
Figures 6. Sex Ratio of Taiwanese and Hong Kongese Immigrant in 2000. Source: 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. Estimated Resident Population, Sex Ratio and Median 
Age, Selected Countries, 1996–2010.  
 
 
 
Figures 7. Sex Ratio of Taiwanese and Hong Kongese Immigrant in 2010. Source: 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. Estimated Resident Population, Sex Ratio and Median 
Age, Selected Countries, 1996–2010.  
 
In addition to the “feminization of migration” (Hugo 2009; Lee and Kim 2011) — 
female migrants (particularly from Asian countries) migrating to Australia as care or 
domestic workers associated with a phenomenon of children staying in Australia for 
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education reason. Generally, mothers migrate to provide childcare or company. As 
Christine said: 
 
Immigrants are not only coming for work or study. In the last ten or fifteen 
years, there are many new immigrants, especially middle-age females. 
Their husbands may come to Australia to work first, and they came here 
later to take care of their children or keep their children company. These 
female immigrants also represent an important trend of Chinese 
immigration…  
 
As a settlement strategy, it is common the wives generally come later than their 
husbands to take care of children. Again, the strategy creates some career-family 
difficulties for many (especially female) migrants. A fifty-year-old Hong Kongese 
respondent, Betty, came to Australia to take care of her son who was born in 2001. In her 
response she clearly shows that she places the importance of her child’s future ahead of 
her career considerations:  
 
My child was born here in Australia, at that time I had a good career in 
Hong Kong. I used to be an executive manager in a local company. You 
can imagine how tough it was to make a decision to give up my career and 
started everything off in Australia. I did not have any contacts or personal 
networks…and I was already 35 when I migrated here…it was all because 
my child need someone to take care of him so that I came here.  
 
Similar to Russell, Betty thought she had a better job in her home country. 
Because of family reasons, she had to give up her career and came to Australia. Russell 
and Betty’s experiences show that in addition to fulfilling an Australian Dream, migrants 
also came to Australia out of various reasons. It is thus hard to generalize the motivations 
and immigration trajectories of Chinese migrants. 
Another popular trend is, as said, husbands operate businesses in their original 
countries and leave their wives and children in Australia alone (as satellite kids), and 
come later to live with their children after retiring from work. These strategies and 
considerations show that work and family factors are important in terms of determining 
whether immigrants will stay or return to their original countries, or travel between home 
and host country. The different migration strategies also constitute various demographic 
characteristics of Chinese migrants in Australia. 
		
52 
 
Settle Down or Not: Temporary Migrants   
The Australian Dream includes making more money, seeking a better education 
for children, and having a better life. For Chinese migrants, it definitely also involves 
having a different experience of living overseas and cultural exchange. Such goals are not 
just for long-term immigrants. Recently, more and more young people have come to 
Australia for study, work, or tourism. In 1997, temporary entry arrangements were 
introduced that allowed employers to sponsor skilled migrants for up to four years 
(subclass 457 temporary working visa38). Chinese migrants on temporary visa generally 
hold either international student (higher education sector visa, subclass 573;39 and post-
graduate research sector visa, subclass 57440) visa, Working Holiday (subclass 41741) 
visa, or Work and Holiday (subclass 46242) visa. These visa holders are granted 
temporary entry to Australia and permitted to engage in paid work during their stay. They 
have their reasons and expectations for coming to Australia. Some may have no 
settlement plan after graduation or work, but others decide to stay after their “trial” 
period of staying in Australia. In fact, many long-term migrants used to come to Australia 
for temporary study and work. For example, according to the Migration Council of 
Australia report (2013), “48% of all 457 visa holders surveyed indicated the reason for 
applying was to live in Australia or become a permanent resident, and 71% intended to 
apply to become permanent residents after their visas expired.”43 Other studies (Gribble 
2014; Robertson 2013) have also shown that many international students prefer to remain 
permanently in Australia after graduation.44 Thus, the smooth transition to finding a 
secure job and getting permanent residency is one of the key drives of studying or 
working in Australia. It also influences which major that students take because selected 
fields (e.g., accounting, finance, information, technology, etc.) at the undergraduate or 																																																								
38 See: https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Visa-1/457- 
39 See: https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Visa-1/573- 
40 See: https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Visa-1/574- 
41 See: https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Visa-1/417- 
42 See: https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Visa-1/462- 
43 Source: http://fecca.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Migration-Amendment-Bill-Submission.pdf  
44 What makes people want to be permanent residents is another issue to be explored. The factors certainly 
vary, but most of respondents attribute it to better career opportunities, better social welfare, fresher air, and 
more advanced infrastructure, etc. 
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postgraduate degree level have been judged to meet professional standards by the 
relevant accrediting authority to apply for permanent residence. According to Yang (2007: 
8), most of the students claimed that their program choice was based on the profession 
list of skilled migration, such as accounting, finance, and information technology.45 
However, immigration policies can also structure uncertainties and contribute to a 
temporary visa holder’s decision to accept a cash-in-hand job and any associated unfair 
treatment, which I will discuss more in the next chapter.46 
 
Study in Australia 
Australia has become an attractive destination for study since the 1960s. The 
number of international students increased dramatically in mid–1980s. Before 1984 
international students were admitted to Australia only if they had scholarships. A new 
overseas student policy was introduced in 1985, allowing overseas students to enroll at 
Australian institutions if they met the entry requirements and paid the full cost of their 
course (Strategy Policy and Research in Education Limited 2009). Having degrees from 
English-speaking countries such as the United Stated, the United Kingdom, and Australia, 
is undoubtedly a trend for students from Asian countries (Department of Education and 
Training 2016). Study abroad can broaden their minds, improve their English proficiency, 
and make them more “international” and competitive in the future job market. Australia 
is a favorable destination also because of the reputation of its universities and geographic 
proximity to China (Yang 2007). Another reason of choosing higher education in 
Australia over other countries may be because it offers competitive lower tuition fees 
amongst English-speaking host countries (Yang 2007: 8). As well, getting admitted into 
Australian universities is easier than American universities. A twenty-three-year-old 
PRC-Chinese student, Tiffany, admitted: 
 
																																																								
45 See Department of Education and Training, 2016–17 skilled occupation list: 
https://submissions.education.gov.au/forms/archive/2015_16_sol/documents/Attachments/CPA%20Australi
a.pdf 
46 For how temporary migration policies in Australia structure uncertainties and normalize various forms of 
exploitation of those on student or Working Holiday visas, see Li and Whitworth (2016). 
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When I graduated from college in China, I did not want to find a job 
immediately. I wanted to see the world first. At that time my parents gave 
me several choices, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada. I excluded the U.S. because I felt it is not safe there, people seem 
to have guns easily. More importantly, to get admitted into grad school in 
the U.S., I needed to take the GRE exam, I heard it is more difficult than 
IELTS. So in the end, I chose British Commonwealth countries like U.K., 
Australia, and New Zealand; and then I compared the weather, living 
environment…finally I decided to come here.   
 
Australia does not have a “universal student visa.” Instead, Australia has four sub-
classes of student visas that correspond to the type of educational endeavors in which the 
applicant intends to participate. These subclasses are: subclass 573 (Higher Education) 
and 574 (Postgraduate Research) visas, Vocational Education and Training (VET), 
English Language Intensive Courses for Overseas Students (ELICOS) and school sectors 
having separate visa subclasses. As Figure 8 suggests, the number of international 
students coming to Australia for short-term courses, study exchanges, and higher degrees 
has been steadily growing: 
 
 
Figure 8. The Number of International Enrolments in Australia, 1994–2015. Source: 
Australian Government Department of Education and Training 
 
Student visas in Australia cover a period equal to the course of study plus one 
month (28 days after the last day of class). They can be tied to language, professional, or 
degree courses (bachelor, master, or PhD degrees). There are, however, work 
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entitlements and restrictions regarding international students when they study in Australia. 
According to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (2014a), 
international students who hold valid student visas in Australia are allowed to work 
legally part time (up to twenty hours per week) during courses period and full time during 
course pauses.  
Furthermore, those applying to study on either a 573 or a 574 visa must 
demonstrate that they have the means to pay for the cost of tuition fees as well as their 
living expenses for the duration of their stay in Australia. The average cost of a three-year 
degree is $99,000 AUD, and universities suggest that average living costs in Sydney will 
be approximately $18,000 AUD per annum.47 Thus, before being granted a visa, an 
applicant must demonstrate an ability to pay an average of $153,000 AUD. If an 
applicant’s partner or child comes to live with him/her during his/her stay in Australia, 
the applicant must then be able to demonstrate that he/she has the financial means to 
support the dependents. This aspect of the policy was expected to ensure that those who 
travel to Australia for the purpose of study will be able to devote a satisfactory amount of 
time to their studies as they will have enough money to support themselves without 
needing to work excessive hours. 
 
Cultural Exchange and Earning Money: Working Holiday Visa 
Different from those who come to Australia for long-term career development and 
settlement, the Australian Dream for many young people refers to earning more money 
than they could in their home countries, earning money to support later travel, and having 
a cultural/overseas experiences. In Taiwan, people call travelling to and working in 
Australia “Zhuang You”48 (Grand Tour, means travel and being strong). Many Taiwanese 
young people also see it as a chance to fill up the “gap year,” when they just finish the 
college, retire from the military service, or change current job but do not want to join the 
labor market immediately.  
																																																								
47 See: https://www.studyinaustralia.gov.au/global/australian-education/education-costs 
48 Nowadays this term has a negative meaning and is used to satirize those young people who travel 
overseas but do not want to face the reality.    
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For example, Cecilia, a twenty-nine-year-old Taiwanese respondent, who is on 
her second Working Holiday visa, explained why she finally chose Australia as her 
Working Holiday country: 
 
I came to Australia in 2013, and now I am on my second Working Holiday 
visa. I went to a farm to do blueberry picking, and worked there over 88 
days, so I am qualified to apply for a second Working Holiday 
visa…actually I was thinking to go to New Zealand originally, but New 
Zealand only allows 600 people to apply per year, it is too competitive and 
I do not want to wait in the queue. I also thought about going to Germany, 
but I cannot speak German. So Australia becomes the most reasonable 
option. I have been dreaming to go overseas and travel by myself. 
Financially, if I can earn some money, then I do not need to rely on my 
parents. So far I think it is a great experience, and I know if I do not come, 
I will regret it when I reach age 30.  
 
Compared to other countries, Australia has a substantially larger Working 
Holiday program (subclass 417). From Figure 9 we can clearly see, even though the 
number of Working Holiday visas granted was less than in the two previous fiscal years, 
there were still 12,000 to 16,000 Working Holiday visas granted every month in 2015–16 
year. 
 
Figure 9. Number of First Working Holiday Visa Application Granted, 2011–16. 
Source: Department of Immigration and Border Protection (2016). Working Holiday 
Maker Visa Program Report 
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The Working Holiday visa program was officially launched in 1975. It provides 
young people between the ages of 18 and 30 from selected countries, without dependent 
children, to travel, and work in Australia for up to a year. The program was originally a 
reciprocal arrangement with the United Kingdom that allowed young UK citizens to enter 
Australia for working holidays. Later the same year, citizens of Canada and the Republic 
of Ireland became eligible for Working Holiday visas. In 1980, it was extended to Japan, 
to South Korea in 1995, and to Malta in 1996. From 2000 to 2005, the program was 
extended to other 12 countries, mainly in Europe but also Taiwan and Hong Kong (Reilly 
2015). According to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (2016), 
Taiwan is now the fifth largest recipient of first Working Holiday visas in Australia 
(16.2%), and the second largest recipient of second [extended] Working Holiday visas 
(18.1%).49 Figure 10 shows the breakdown of visa application granted by citizenship 
country. 
 
Figure 10. Number of Working Holiday Visa Granted by Citizenship Country. 
Source: Department of Immigration and Border Protection (2016). Working Holiday 
Maker Visa Program Report 
 																																																								
49 See: https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/statistics/working-holiday-report-
jun16.pdf 
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Initially, Working Holiday makers could only stay in Australia for 12 months. 
From July 2006, however, the maximum time working for a single employer has 
increased from three to six months. Placing this limitation on visa holders was done with 
the expectation that it would encourage visitors to travel to different cities in Australia in 
line with the stated intention of this visa type. After broadening the intentions of the 
Working Holiday scheme to include filling the labor shortage found in the horticulture 
industry individuals may now apply for a second Working Holiday visa. In order to be 
eligible for the second visa, the individual must have completed three months in 
designated industries such as: plant and animal cultivation, farming, mining, or 
construction. Furthermore, this work must take place in regional Australia like Northern 
Territory (Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 2014b).50 
The Working Holiday program is supposed to be a “cultural exchange program, 
providing a once in a lifetime opportunity to young people from partner countries to 
travel in Australia for up to 12 months, during which they may undertake short-term 
work to supplement their travel costs…the Working Holiday maker program is not 
designed to fill ongoing labor shortages.” (Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection 2014c: 8) However, according to the Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection (2014d), the express rationale for adding the option of a second Working 
Holiday visa was “to provide an incentive to Working Holiday makers to work in the 
harvest industry which is experiencing severe labor shortages.”   
In recent years, a new problem has been identified and the stated intention of the 
Working Holiday visa scheme has broadened. As Ruhs (2013: 27) points out, economic 
efficiency and how immigration can be economically beneficial to the host country is the 
objective when making immigration policy.51 In Australia, job vacancies and labor force 
needs, especially in the construction and horticulture industry, have been high (Birrell 																																																								
50 In 2015–2016, 7,354 (18.1%) of the second Working Holiday visa holders were from Taiwan. Source: 
https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/statistics/working-holiday-report-jun16.pdf 
51 Ruhs notices the limited ability of receiving countries and argues that there is always a trade-off 
(negative relationship) between admission of labor migration and some of the rights of migrant workers 
who are admitted to high-income countries (p. 6, 39). In his book he claims that sometimes, in order to 
achieve net economic interests, the receiving countries might increase the admission and employment of 
low-skilled migrants while at the same time reducing their wages or making a loose standard in regulating 
or protecting migrant rights (p. 44). In this sense, migrant rights might be sacrificed as the “price” of 
admission. 
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2009: 83). Given the slow rate of growth of the Australian workforce, however, the 
government decided to extend the Working Holiday visa to two years since 2005 and to 
include the regional work requirement indicates that the scheme is not just about 
facilitating a cultural and tourist experience for young people. Instead, its main purpose is 
to fulfill the labor shortage in specific industries (Robertson 2014: 1920). In fact, 
Working Holiday makers “consistently make up about 50%–85% of the seasonal 
workforce in the horticulture industry.” (Tan and Lester 2012: 373–74) This can explain 
why the recent tax rule change (the tax-free threshold for Working Holiday makers will 
be cancelled to raise tax revenues) has generated lots of protests and petitions by the 
tourism and agricultural industries calling for the planned changes to be reversed 
(Ironside 2016).52 Other studies also show that an increasing number of migrants use the 
visa mainly to make and save money, rather than travelling (Reilly 2015). I will discuss 
more deeply in the next chapter about how the Working Holiday programs generate 
problems and increase the vulnerability of Working Holiday makers. In addition, I will 
show how experiences of exploitation influence people’s national and pan-ethnic 
identities. 
 
Subclass 462 and 457 Visa 
Under the increasingly ubiquitous pressure of neoliberalism and de-regulation, 
Australia seems to shift toward a neoliberal policy paradigm. Regardless if the Liberal or 
Labor Party is in power, neoliberalism is the reigning ideology (Campbell and Tham 
2013), which comes along with social inequalities and uncertain lives, especially for 
immigrants (Quiggin 1999; Stratton 2011). For example, the Australian government has 
issued more student and Work and Holiday visas to PRC-Chinese youth, either to 
encourage cultural exchange or to fill the labor shortage in the domestic labor market. On 
June 17, 2015, the Australian and Chinese governments signed the China-Australia Free 																																																								
52 As of July 2016, to raise its revenues, the Australian government will remove the tax-free threshold 
$18,200 for temporary Working Holiday makers. Working Holiday makers will have to pay a 32.5% tax 
from the first dollar earned (Yeates 2015). However, considering the tax changes could add to already 
decreasing Working Holiday makers and damage Australian agriculture and tourism, the tax reform is 
being reduced to 15% on earnings up to $37,000 from January 1 of 2017. See:  
https://www.ato.gov.au/General/New-legislation/In-detail/Direct-taxes/Income-tax-for-individuals/Tax-
rules-to-change-for-temporary-working-holiday-makers/ 
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Trade Agreement (ChAFTA), under which Australia will grant Work and Holiday visas 
(subclass 462) for up to 5,000 young Chinese annually.53 According to the agreement, 
Chinese nationals between 18 and 30 with at least two years of higher education are 
eligible to apply for the new visa online. Applicants also need to score at least 4.5 in the 
IELTS English test and prove they have at least 5,000 Australian dollars in the bank. 
People who hold this kind of Visa can stay in Australia for up to 12 months. Visa holders 
can spend up to four months in school and six months working (Williams 2015), and they 
can apply to extend to their visa to two years if they worked in designated occupations in 
regional areas. Work and Holiday is a reciprocal agreement with selected countries, also 
restricted to young people from 18–30 years old. It requires additional eligibility 
including functional English, successful completion of two years of university study, and 
a letter of support from the applicants’ home government. In June of 2014, Australia had 
agreements with 19 countries in the Working Holiday program and 12 in the Work and 
Holiday program.54   
Furthermore, if temporary migrants want to extend their stay, they can also 
choose to transfer their visa to a temporary working visa (subclass 457) with employer’s 
sponsorship. The temporary working visa was launched in 1996, through the insertion of 
a new Pt 457 in Sch 2 of the Migration Regulations (Amendment) 1996 No. 76 (Howe 
2016: 132). This visa is similar to the H-1B visa in the United States. H-1B visas in the 
United States are for three years, extendable to six years. There are numerical limits to 
the number of H-1B visas issued each year but for 457 visas there are no upper limits 
(Bertone 2009; Hugo 2014). By allowing employers to sponsor foreign workers in a 
range of skilled occupations for up to four years, the temporary working visa was aimed 
to address skill shortages in the domestic economy. According to the statement of the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000: 48): 
 
																																																								
53 Source: http://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/statistics/nom-september-
2015.pdf#search=china%20population  
54 See Australia’s Working Holiday Maker Program: A Quick Guide. 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp16
17/Quick_Guides/WorkingHoliday 
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Temporary business visas allow employers to fill skill shortages from 
overseas and assess new ideas, skills and technology. The visa holders 
tend to be highly skilled and have relatively high income levels and 
therefore able to contribute to economic growth through improved 
productivity and increased demand for goods and services.  
 
By 2008, the number of temporary migrants arriving in Australia had increased to 
100,000 (compared to 40,000 in 2003). As well, many immigrants have applied for this 
visa as a first step towards permanent residency (Employment Nomination Scheme, 
subclass 18655). Some Chinese agencies even provide the visa service of “all the way 
from 457 to 186.” Once a skilled worker (under age 50) is nominated by an approved 
Australian employer and meets the skills qualifications and English language 
requirements, he or she can apply for the subclass 186 visa. Some of my respondents told 
me that applying for this visa and becoming a permanent resident explain why they are 
willing to bear with unfair treatment from their employers for several years. Because the 
regulation requires applicants complete at least two years of employment as a 457 visa 
holder in the nominated role before applying for a subclass 186 visa, a Taiwanese 457 
visa holder, Wayne, told me: “it is just like you signed an indenture by which you sell 
yourself.” (Interview with Wayne, August 30, 2015) 
The employer nomination can also be used to bring family members to Australia. 
It is common for Chinese migrants to employ family members or relatives as assistants in 
a café shop or supermarket for two years so that they can eventually obtain permanent 
residency. For example, when one of my ex-colleagues tried to sue the supermarket over 
a pay issue in 2014, the boss told me it might negatively influence her cousin’s 
permanent residency application. Her cousin is an assistant for the supermarket at that 
time, even during my time working there I seldom saw her coming to work (Field notes, 
December 1, 2014).  
 
The Relationship between Visa Type and Identity 
PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese travelling to Australia apply for 
different visa types because they serve distinct purposes. Those purposes also shape 																																																								
55 See: http://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Visa-1/186- 
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diverse identities expressed during the processes of immigration. In my dissertation I 
focus on both temporary and long-term migrants because their migration experiences, 
identities, and linkages to the networks/community organizations differ. Different 
immigration trajectories also lead to different interaction experiences they have with 
other ethnic groups. For example, temporary Working Holiday makers face a completely 
different labor market from those who come as skilled migrants or under business 
migrant program. Temporary and long-term migrants also have respective needs when 
joining various migrant networks and community organizations. Meanwhile, pan-ethnic 
and national identity are constructed and negotiated in different courses of immigration.  
In terms of pan-ethnic or national identity, many of my respondents would call 
themselves “Hua-Ren” or use this category in contrast with Koreans, Japanese, and, of 
course, Australians. They see overseas Chinese networks and organizations as “Hua-Ren,” 
given the shared experiences of being a foreigner or ethnic minority in Australia. In my 
fieldwork, however, there are also some migrants, especially temporary migrants from 
Taiwan or Hong Kong, come with a strong national identity and do not identify 
themselves as “Chinese” or “Hua-Ren” at all. For some of them, when their settlement is 
longer their connection with home countries is “faded.” Yet others keep maintaining their 
own national identity and actively distinguish themselves from other Chinese subgroups. 
Including long-term migrants in my analysis provides us with a better vantage point to 
examine identity change and how pan-ethnic and national identity nest within each other 
and together produce a hybrid identity in different social settings.  
The change of identity because of visa status can be vividly substantiated from a 
PRC-Chinese respondent, Ruby, who migrated to Australia in 2001 on student visa: 
 
Back at that time, when I studied in Australia, I had not decided whether I 
would stay here or not. I would say I was Zhongguo-Ren [PRC-Chinese] 
without any hesitation. I hung out mostly with people from China and 
spoke Mandarin most of the time…but then I received permanent 
residency and eventually citizenship…I gave up my Chinese passport. So 
even now I still hang out with many Zhongguo-Ren, I would probably say 
I am “half-Chinese.” I mean, culturally, I am still Zhongguo-Ren, but 
legally or politically speaking, I am Australian… 
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Ruby’s narratives show that at different stages, migrants’ identity may change 
according to the visa type he/she is on. For Ruby, affiliation with the PRC-Chinese 
category is looser after she got the Australian passport. Because the Chinese government 
does not allow citizens of China to have dual citizenship, Ruby had to “choose” between 
citizenship of China and Australia. She gave up her Chinese passport and now sees 
herself as “half-Chinese” even culturally she still recognizes her Chinese-ness.  
For temporary migrants, many of them do not have chances to interact with other 
Chinese subgroups before coming to Australia, their perceptions of other subgroups were 
largely based on the media, education, political system, or their existing stereotypes in 
their countries of origin. After they hang out more frequently with other subgroups, their 
identity may change as well. Indeed, there is a transitional process that provides an option 
for pan-ethnic or national identity. In this sense, time and ethnic/national identity 
intersect during the life course of immigration. Migration process also reflects 
individual/collective memory of migrants, inter-generational effects on migrants’ 
connections to country of origin, as well as migrant community formation and change, 
which I will discuss more in chapter five.  
 
Summary 
From the introductions of different visa types above, we can see that Chinese 
migrants come to Australia, either temporarily or for long term for various reasons: 
family, business, study, or work (working visa or Working Holiday visa). There are also 
differences existing between PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, Hong Kongese in respect to the 
immigration trajectory and visa types migrants are travelling to Australia on. For example, 
young Taiwanese immigrants are mostly coming to Australia on a Working Holiday visa 
(22,157 in year 2015–16),56 many Hong Kongese come as business migrants, whereas 
China is the largest group among all student visa applications in the last seven years.57 In 																																																								
56 Source: https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/statistics/working-holiday-report-
jun16.pdf 
57 Compared to 10,244 PRC-Chinese who lodged student visa application in year 2015–16, the number of 
student visa applications from Taiwan is only 1,822. Source: 
https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/statistics/student-visa-2015-16-to-2015-12-
31.pdf 
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Australia when someone speaking Mandarin reports that he or she is holding a Working 
Holiday visa, people tend to assume that the holder is either from Taiwan or Hong Kong 
(Field notes, September 12, 2014). On the other hand, if someone is from China and on 
Work and Holiday visa, people tend to assume their English proficiency reaches certain 
level because they need to pass the IELTS test (Field notes, October 28, 2015). In sum, 
the following table shows the three Chinese subgroups I will address in my dissertation. 
The numbers in the table is based on 2011 Census since the Census count is taken every 
five years (2016 Census has been undergoing). 
 
Table 1. The Immigration Status of PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese in 
Australia. Source: http://stat.abs.gov.au//Index.aspx?QueryId=743  
 
 PRC-Chinese Taiwanese Hong Kongese 
Number  447,370  55,960  94,420  
Long-term 
Migrants 
From mid-1800s, 
peaked in 1980s. 
Business migration; 
skilled migration; 
family migration 
From late 1980s. 
Business migration; 
skilled migration; 
family migration 
From mid-1800s, 
peaked in 1991-
1992. Business 
migration; skilled 
migration; family 
migration 
Temporary 
Migrants 
Student (20.2% of all 
international 
enrolments as of the 
end of 2015); 
temporary working 
(skilled, subclass 457); 
Work and Holiday 
(subclass 462, since 
June of 2015, 5,000 
grants) 
Student; Working 
Holiday (subclass 
417, 3rd largest 
country for 
combined first and 
second Working 
Holiday visa grants 
as of 2016); 
temporary working 
(skilled, subclass 
457) 
Student; Working 
Holiday (subclass 
417); temporary 
working (skilled, 
subclass 457) 
Language  Mandarin (Cantonese 
for people from 
southern China) 
Mandarin/Taiwanese Cantonese/ 
Mandarin 
 
In the next chapter, I will focus on how these three Chinese subgroups find their 
jobs in Australia. Job-seeking process and employment relationship is an important 
setting as it illustrates how different groups perceive and interact with each other. I will 
first examine which networks they rely on in getting a job. I particularly focus on 
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activities in the cash-in-hand labor market because it is a market that lacks labor 
regulations and can better reveal the economic rationale and cultural perceptions of both 
employers and employees, especially their beliefs of how co-ethnics should treat one 
another and the roles working for a good/bad co-ethnic play in shaping specific 
ethnic/national identity and migration experience. Cultural expectations and the 
formation of national/pan-ethnic identity will be analyzed for both employers and 
employees in the cash-in-hand labor market. Meanwhile, I will also discuss how the 
ethnic stereotypes of these three subgroups are activated and contested within the cash 
economy in Australia. I will point out that the interaction experiences in the cash 
economy not only present class distinction (employer vs. employee), they also reveal the 
existence of ethnic hierarchies existing among different Chinese subgroups, though 
differently they are presented and contested. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONTESTED HIERARCHY: THE INTENSIFICATION OF ETHNIC 
STEREOTYPES AND WHEN THE “HUA-REN EXPLOIT HUA-REN” IN THE CASH-
IN-HAND LABOR MARKET 
 
“I was too stupid to think that we are all Hua-Ren, Hua-Ren should help 
Hua-Ren, especially when we are overseas. I chose to trust Hua-Ren but 
found I was wrong…”                    
(Interview with Patty, December 16, 2014) 
 
Johnson (A delievery man from Taiwan): “How sad! A Taiwanese 
working for a PRC-Chinese — it is like the sky and the ground are upside 
down!”   
                                                                      (Field notes, November 13, 2014) 
 
Patty is a twenty-five-year-old Working Holiday visa holder from Taiwan. When 
she was looking at jobs before coming to Australia, she used several Chinese job-
searching websites and Facebook pages. Lacking English proficiency, she acknowledges 
that she felt more comfortable using Chinese websites and reading information in 
Chinese. Through a Taiwanese middleman, she found a job in a factory boning chickens. 
The middleman told her the salary was paid by piece-rate; if she worked quickly, she 
could earn more than $1000 AUD per week. After working a few days, however, she 
regretted trusting him. It turned out she had to work over 14 hours per day, and the 
supervisor reduced her salary randomly, simply because he thought she worked too 
slowly. Patty told me during the interview:  
 
The middleman promised me it is a good job but in fact it is not true…I 
felt exhausted every day after work and have been thinking about quitting. 
But I already deposited my rent. I had to stay in the share house for at least 
two weeks otherwise my deposits would be forfeited. The rent was 
deducted from my fortnight salary…I felt pain when thinking about living 
there. The living condition was also terrible, you know what? I lived with 
17 other people in an apartment, and there are only two bathrooms…  
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Patty is not alone feeling “cheated” by her co-ethnics. Co-ethnic exploitation is 
common everywhere in the world, and Australia is no exception. Employers know the 
situation of co-ethnic employees whose poor English and need for a job make them 
vulnerable to lower wage offers and other disadvantages. Not every Chinese migrant, 
however, feels cheated. In fact, many already know available jobs entail substandard 
conditions (including salary and working hours). As I will show in the following, despite 
a lack of language facility and other disadvantages, their relatively high pay (than original 
countries) and the flexibility of cash-in-hand jobs encourage Chinese migrants to accept 
jobs in the cash economy.  
In discussions of immigration and immigrant assimilation, the contemporary 
literature focuses on how shared language and common ethnic and cultural backgrounds 
help in job-search processes and lower the costs and risks of immigration (Bankston 2014; 
Gold 2005; Haug 2008). Speaking the same language (Mandarin) and sharing a broad 
cultural background, PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese immigrants in 
Australia may share a similar identity under the larger Hua-Ren umbrella (Ong 1999; 
Yeh 2000). For example, in the Australian labor market, because it is difficult for 
temporary migrants to get a job in the formal economy, many international students and 
temporary visa holders search for cash-in-hand jobs with either PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, 
or Hong Kongese employers through Chinese websites such as backpackers.com, tigtag, 
or Sydney Today.58 Wang (1994: 135) also points out the cultural gap is always a reason 
why Chinese migrants feel more comfortable working with co-ethnic groups. There is a 
tendency for recent arrivals to work in Chinese firms or factories for Hua-Ren employers 
and to get paid in cash.59 
For Chinese migrants who are working in the cash economy, the reasons they take 
cash-in-hand jobs involve many economic as well as cultural considerations. For example, 
long-term migrants may see cash-in-hand jobs as a way of earning extra money, whereas 
students and Working Holiday makers take these jobs to extend their stay in Australia. I 																																																								
58 I will discuss more deeply about how these three subgroups distinguish and strategically use these 
websites in chapter five. 
59 The situation can be applied to other non-English-speaking immigrant groups such as Koreans and 
Indians as well. 
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acknowledge the differentiation between the needs/interests of the long-term and 
temporary migrant workers. The need for money to pay daily life and the desire for 
flexibility would not be so to the migrants who are looking for longer-term and legal 
work. Similarly, the costs of taking a cash-in-hand job are also different to long-term and 
temporary migrants. In this chapter, however, I center my discussion on the cultural 
perceptions of undertaking/providing cash-in-hand jobs and how exploitative experiences 
activate and intensify Chinese migrants’ identities and ethnic stereotypes toward each 
other.  
Considerable research has explored ethnic hierarchies and ethnic stereotypes 
between different racial/ethnic groups, but less attention has been paid to the processes 
through which existing inter-ethnic stereotypes are intensified within the same ethnic 
group (Chinese). By examining how PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese 
migrants perceive themselves and each other in the cash-in-hand job market, I show that 
the experience of exploitation substantiates existing ethnic hierarchies in which specific 
ethnic stereotypes are magnified. I will also demonstrate what the inter-ethnic hierarchy 
looks like. For example, when being exploited, different Chinese groups associate with 
political emotions with the exploitation process, either based on cultural stereotypes or 
political situations. 
Yet identities and stereotypes within the process of exploitation are complicated. 
In the cash-in-hand labor market, people seldom distinguish national identity and tend to 
treat each other as a whole and unique group (Hua-Ren). Hua-Ren employer is always 
associated with black market job and people do not actively distinguish their 
employers/employees are from China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong, as long as they can 
understand at least simplified Chinese. It might not be too surprising that if the employers 
are running small family businesses, to keep their costs down or simply feel more 
comfortable to communicate with their employees in their mother language, they prefer 
hiring co-ethnic employees and pay them by cash. However, in my fieldwork I found that 
in addition to class distinction (employer vs. employee) and language factors, employees 
also perceive their employers with ethnic belief and intensify their own national identities 
(and at the same time block the pan-ethnicity) when working for other Chinese subgroups, 
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though differently they are presented. In other words, here I focus on the cultural 
perceptions of undertaking cash-in-hand jobs offered by co-ethnics (either PRC-Chinese, 
Taiwanese, or Hong Kongese) and how exploitative experiences and interactions with 
employers in the workplace activate or intensify Hua-Ren employees’ national identities 
and ethnic stereotypes.  
Focusing on the employee side, I show that when Taiwanese migrant workers are 
exploited by Taiwanese employers, they tend to highlight pan-ethnicity and put their 
Taiwanese employers into the category of “Hua-Ren” (comments like: “Taiwanese 
bosses are no different from other Hua-Ren bosses”), but when the exploitative 
employers are PRC-Chinese, they would highlight their national identity and seize upon 
existing ethnic stereotypes toward specific national group. This situation also happened to 
PRC-Chinese migrants when they work for Taiwanese/Hong Kongese employers.  
In this chapter I examine cash-in-hand jobs rather than the formal economy 
because the market lacks labor regulations and can better reveal the economic rationale 
and cultural perceptions of both employers and employees. I will focus on employee’s 
ethnic perceptions of cash-in-hand jobs and then discuss the role exploitation plays in 
activating or itensifying various national identities and ethnic stereotypes. Even though 
Chinese migrants take cash-in-hand jobs for various economic reasons (such as language 
barrier, relatively higher pay in Australia than in their home countries, the flexibility of 
cash-in-hand jobs), and even it is true some people may not care too much about which 
national group they work for, there are still different extents of cultural expectations and 
identities involved.  
Taking Chinese migrants in the cash economy as an example, this chapter will 
show that, the low expectations that job-seekers have of co-ethnic employers increase 
their willingness to accept cash-in-hand employment. In other words, employees consider 
taking cash-in-hand jobs a “voluntary action.” At the same time, employers understand 
the situations of co-ethnic employees and know there will always be Chinese people who 
will be willing to work for them. By creating the image of a “good boss,” employers can 
significantly decrease worker expressions of hostility and, in some instances, even make 
them tolerate low wages, long working hours, and other situations they know to be 
		
70 
exploitative. To some degrees, this mutual understanding constitutes and justifies an 
exploitative cash economy labor market between Chinese employers and employees in 
Australia. 
I acknowledge that to demonstrate the effects of working in the cash economy on 
employee identity, one must also study those who are not in the cash economy; I also 
agree that stereotype and perception of other groups might be different if people do not 
work with exploitative co-ethnic employers.60 However, the purpose of this chapter is on 
how the stereotypes of different Chinese subgroups in Australia are activated and 
strengthened. As mentioned, it is more likely to see the activation of such stereotypes 
when people are exploited in the cash economy rather than in the formal economy.  
In the following I will first introduce the nature of cash-in-hand job in Australia,  
and how Chinese employers and employees see “Hua-Ren” as a whole ethnic group in 
the cash economy. I will discuss both economic considerations and culutral perceptions 
of cash-in-hand jobs, and then distinguish the differences of perception when doing cash-
in-hand jobs for PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, or Hong Kongese employers. Most 
interviewees mentioned in this chapter are temporary migrant workers such as 
international students and Working Holiday visa holders, although migrants who stay in 
Australia for longer periods, like those holding working visas (subclass 457) and 
permanent residents, do cash-in-hand jobs to earn extra money and may experience 
exploitation as well. The employers I report on in this chapter are mostly first-generation 
and long-term migrants.  
 
The Nature of Cash-in-Hand Jobs in Australia 
The nature of the cash economy depends upon place, time, and social context. The 
definitions of cash-in-hand jobs in one country may not be applied to other countries 
because national legislation and enforcement vary considerably from one country to 
another. On their website the Australia Taxation Office defines cash-in-hand jobs as 
																																																								
60 To avoid the bias, during the interview I also asked my respondents about how they think of Australian 
employers. Most of my respondents think Australian employers are more trustworthy and if they can 
choose, they would prefer working for Australian employers. 
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those “paying wages by cash and not withholding any tax and superannuation.”61 Thus, 
for employees, there is no insurance, pension, or other compensation. For employers, by 
paying cash they can evade taxes in which income-producing activities are concealed and 
not represented through normal accounting conventions. Braithwaite and his colleagues 
(2008: 63) also find that the cash-in-hand job is not only widespread and visible in 
Australia but surprisingly tolerated. 
In regard to the motivations of taking cash-in-hand job, in her report Arbes (2012) 
differentiates people who travel to Australia for a cash-in-hand job and those who “fall 
into” the cash economy.62 Her subjects have come to Australia from China, Thailand, 
India, Korea, and Malaysia on student, Working Holiday, or tourist visas (p. 3). Her 
sample is made up of migrants with substantive visas (i.e., with the legal status to work). 
In this sense, the subjects Arbes writes about are different from undocumented migrants 
in other contexts who need to develop survival strategies in order not to be sent back 
home (Piper and Grugel 2007). This is why her subjects, who perform underground jobs, 
have few concerns about being caught because they believe “the worst thing that could 
happen is to be sent home.”63 (Arbes 2012: 16) Similarly, employers also perceive little 
risk of getting caught because there is minimal government enforcement of policy in this 
area. Although there are strict penalties apply to both employers and employees 
breaching Australia’s migration laws, the employers can always be benefited from the 
underpaid salaries. In other words, employers will “calculate the savings from long-term 
exploitation of workers against the risk of detection and penalty.” (Clibborn 2015: 468) 
For example, an international student appearing on the ABC Four Corners program 
documentary 7-Eleven: Price of Convenience (2015)64 repeated his boss’s warning: 
 
																																																								
61 See: https://www.ato.gov.au/Individuals/Working/Working-as-an-employee/Being-paid-wages--cash-in-
hand-/ 
62 Arbes (2012: 17–28) distinguishes several sub-categories of employees who participate in the cash-in-
hand labor market. For example, heroes refer to those who want to make a better life for themselves and 
their families; everymen are those who take cash-in-hand job when the opportunity present itself; and 
victims are people who feel themselves bound to and unable to get free of the cash-in-hand job. 
63 Several of my respondents expressed the same attitude as well. It certainly increases the willingness of 
taking cash-in-hand jobs. 
64 See: http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/2015/08/30/4301164.htm 
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If you make a complaint, then I am going to get you deported. I have the 
proof that you work more than 20 hours per week. For me it is alright, I 
will get thousands in fines maybe, but I will get paid off from your 
salaries. So you decide, who loses.   
 
Arbes (2012) found that migrant workers often expect to find legal jobs before 
they come to Australia. However, they often find they have little choice but to accept 
cash-in-hand employment and other substandard working conditions. If a labor market 
limits the opportunities for migrants to find jobs or if they have extra time, migrants may 
be encouraged to take cash-in-hand jobs to earn extra money. Another reason for taking 
cash-in-hand jobs is that migrant workers always have little confidence in their English 
language abilities. The narratives of my respondents demonstrate that most did not feel 
their English was good enough to qualify them for better jobs. In this regard, Chinese 
migrant workers do not have options but have to join the cash-in-hand labor market and 
can anticipate being exploited because they already know that available jobs entail 
substandard conditions. 
The Fair Work Act (2009) sets out workplace entitlements in Australia. These 
include award rates, daily and weekly hours of work before overtime loadings must be 
applied, breaks while on shift and rest periods between shifts. If violated, the employers 
might be subject to civil penalties (for example, the Fair Work Ombudsman can initiate 
legal action for penalties of up to $10,800 AUD for an individual, or $54,000 AUD for a 
corporation).65 However, as the narratives quoted above suggest, employers are still 
willing to breach employment regulations and risk incurring these hefty financial 
penalties.  
Under the increasingly ubiquitous pressure of neoliberalism and de-regulation, 
Australian governments have little control over cash-in-hand labor (Campbell and Tham 
2013). The Australian government has issued more student and temporary visas to 
Chinese youth, either to encourage cultural exchange or to fill the labor shortage in the 
domestic labor market. In a report on visa policy change Williams (2015) says that the 
government has changed its immigration policy and extended more Work and Holiday 																																																								
65 See: https://www.fairwork.gov.au/how-we-will-help/templates-and-guides/fact-sheets/minimum-
workplace-entitlements/parental-leave-and-related-entitlements 
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visas to young Chinese. Even though Australia has institutions such as the Fair Work 
Ombudsman and relevant labor unions, such institutions seldom actively intervene in or 
launch an investigation of cash-in-hand jobs unless migrant workers register a complaint. 
Without sound labor inspection mechanisms and sufficient information, many migrant 
workers accept their plight or assume that the state will not enforce labor laws. As a 
result, cash-in-hand workers infrequently lodge complaints against employers 
(Conversaion with a union organizaer, Field notes, May 7, 2015). 
The reluctant attitude of temporary migrants to report to the authorities also 
involves a more practical concern: whether one has time or not. For some migrants, 
particularly temporary migrant workers like international students or Working Holiday 
makers, given the short period of their stay in Australia, they spend most of time studying, 
making money, and travelling. Thus, they prefer to find another job rather than going 
through a long legal process in which they need to collect enough evidence, particularly 
when it is not guaranteed that they will win their money back. For some Working 
Holiday makers who do farming jobs in a remote area, it might also be difficult for them 
to access legal services (Berg 2016; United WHY 2015). All these institutional 
constraints shape specific choices for temporary migrant workers and contribute to 
potential exploitative practices. 
International students and Working Holiday makers are not completely coerced, 
they have some degrees of agency and choice in the acceptance of substandard working 
conditions (Ruhs 2013). In this chapter I emphasize the threshold conditions for joining 
the cash economy that Chinese migrants face take into consideration economic conditions 
and cultural perceptions. In general, Chinese migrant workers do not see the cash-in-hand 
job as an illegal activity, but still they acknowledge it is a lower paid job and admit that 
they are exploited. Because of the cultural understandings of the Hua-Ren employers, 
however, they are willing to take a cash-in-hand job. Additionally, they temper hostile 
feelings toward their employers. At the same time, Hua-Ren employers assume that Hua-
Ren employees will be hard-working and accept low-wage jobs. These mutual 
understandings constitute an exploitative situation, but employees find them tolerable in 
Australia. 
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Exploitation and Co-Ethnic Exploitation 
Marx (1961 [1984]) distinguishes between necessary labor and surplus labor: the 
former is needed for worker’s own subsistence, whereas the latter is labor expended 
above socially necessary labor and generates surplus value. In Marx’s analysis, 
exploitation is the extraction of surplus labor, and those who own the means of 
production can extract surplus value from the working class. In other words, exploitation 
always involves an “unequal” exchange of labor and is usually understood to require 
coercion. 
Although exploitation can occur in all modes of production, what is unique about 
capitalism is that the capitalist mode of production is “masked” (Boltanski and Chiapello 
2005; Burawoy 1979; Shaikh 1997). In a capitalist society, labor is paid for and regulated 
according to a contract negotiated between two seemingly equal and voluntary parties. If 
we look behind the seemingly equal relationship, however, we find “a world of hierarchy 
and inequality, of orders and obedience, of bosses and subordinates.” (Shaikh 1997: 70) 
In his book Wertheimer (1996) maintains that exploitation happens when one person pays 
a non-standard market price in a transaction. In the cash economy, employers are 
engaged in obviously illegal exploitation since they pay their employees lower than the 
legal standard. Ethnicity matters here because by examining how ethnic stereotypes are 
perpetuated, we can better understand how exploitative treatment of co-ethnics is justified 
and even taken for granted. On the other hand, we can also see how some employers try 
to create the image of a good employer and how it is sustained and accepted by co-ethnic 
employees. 
The cash-in-hand job provided/taken among Chinese employers/employees 
constitues an ethnic economy. Ethnic economy directly relates to how ethnic identity is 
created and shaped. Not every ethnic enclave economy, however, leads to successful 
assimilation. Scholars have noticed the dark side of ethnic economy that leads to the 
exploitation of co-ethnic employees and may have adverse economic consequences in the 
immigration context (Bonacich 1973; Cranford 2005; Den Butter et al. 2007; Di Falco 
and Bulte 2011; Kwong 1987; Sanders and Nee 1987; Zhou 1992). Others also pointed 
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out that reliance on social or ethnic ties is most common for move into jobs of low 
occupational prestige (Sander et al. 2002) For example, overseas Chinese networks may 
not reduce the cost of finding jobs in Australia. Instead, they could become a tool by 
which employers hire workers who they presume will work hard and accept lower 
salaries.66  
Chinese migrants present a case that confirms Goodin’s (1985: 37) argument that 
exploitation is “a kind of abuse or taking advantage of the vulnerability of others.” 
Because Chinese migrants have few choices but to rely on co-ethnic networks — co-
ethnic employment agencies or online job search websites, for example — they need to 
know about the job content, salaries, and, most importantly, the cultural characteristics of 
their co-ethnics (whether employers or employees). Exploitation is expected and 
understood from their cultural sense of each other. As I will show in the following, 
Chinese employers hire co-ethnic workers with the specific understanding that they may 
be more willing to take cash-in-hand jobs than other ethnic groups. I will also 
demonstrate that exploitation can be normalized through to the point where some 
temporary migrant workers consider that the cash-in-hand jobs and other potentially 
exploitative work practices are “preferable” or “their best option.”  
Furthermore, if temporary migrants want to extend their stay and transfer their 
visa to a temporary working visa (subclass 457), they also have to rely on their co-ethnic 
employers’ sponsorship.67 Getting sponsorship from an employer, however, sometimes 
means workers have to be compliant and are dependent on employers for their 
nomination/verification to work and stay in Australia. The need for employer sponsorship 
increases employer control over employees. A report on the 457 visa claims that people 
“may endure, without complaint, substandard living conditions, illegal or unfair 
deductions from wages, and other forms of exploitation in order not to jeopardise the goal 
of permanent residency.” (Deegan 2008: 25) Velayutham (2013) also illustrates the 
vulnerability and potential exploitations existed for temporary migrants that during the 																																																								
66 An interesting topic here is: which is the most-exploitative network? Is it constructed by Hong Kongese, 
PRC-Chinese, or Taiwanese? One possible way to this question is to measure the effectiveness of different 
co-ethnic network operated by Hong Kongese, PRC-Chinese, or Taiwanese. 
67 Job sponsorship allows people to work in a full-time position for an Australian employer for a maximum 
of four years. 
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migration processes, unlawful employment practices and exploitative living arrangements 
are likely to happen. 
In job sponsorship cases, Chinese employees commonly tolerate situations they 
know to be exploitative, such as low wages and long working hours. Employees realize 
that they cannot seek alternative employment because they fear losing their visa status 
and are “heavily reliant on their employer for their continued presence in Australia.” 
(Deegan 2008: 55) Legally, most of my Chinese employee respondents believe the legal 
process to be both time and effort consuming. As said, in circumstances that they are not 
guaranteed to get their money, they would prefer just to find another job. They do not 
have the concept of joining the union either, because union activism is weak in their 
origin countries.68 These institutional constraints, along with how migrants understand 
their own situations, contribute to the perception that it is hard to enforce their rights 
through legal remedies. 
Most of studies on co-ethnic exploitation start from an economic perspective, 
arguing that to minimize labor costs employers use ethnic networks to take advantage of 
the vulnerabilities of their co-ethnics. Few studies, however, have systematically 
examined how people subjectively perceive the exploitation expereicne from their co-
ethnics and how pan-ethnic or national identity involved during the process. In this 
chapter I show that co-ethnic exploitation experiences influence how one sees Hua-Ren 
as a whole group as well as how one attaches different values to each Chinese group. 
In this dissertation I also argue the exploitation in the cash-in-hand job market is 
one particular social setting through which specific ethnic hierarchies and associated 
ethnic stereotypes are presented and intensified. Such ethnic stereotypes also reflect 
national identity of each Chinese subgroup. In this sense, my research challenges the 
existing literature in that people consider the characteristics of their co-ethnic 
employers/employees in the sense of respective ethnic stereotypes, rather than just ethnic 
“proximity.” (e.g., Chinese) To certain degrees, my findings also echo other scholars’ 
(Chaganti and Greene 2002; Koning and Verver 2013; Tsui-Auch 2005) findings that 																																																								
68 In Taiwan, for example, unlike Western unions, which focus on workers’ rights and collective bargaining, 
unions in Taiwan have become the basic units responsible for welfare and health insurance. The crisis of 
Taiwan’s labor movement is thus about its weakening protest capacities and less “militant.” (Lee 2011: 8) 
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“ethnic entrepreneur” should be defined by the levels of personal involvement of the 
entrepreneur in the ethnic community instead of reported ethnic grouping. 
 
A Despotic Labor Market Constitued by Hua-Ren 
Before discussing cultural and ethnic perceptions of cash-in-hand job, we need to 
introduce migrants’ economic considerations first. For Chinese migrants who are 
working in a cash economy, their first concern, undoubtedly, is the language barrier. In 
Australia, it is not surprising that English proficiency directly determines whether 
migrants can get a proper job. When I asked my interviewees to self-evaluate their 
English proficiency, only a few said they were confident of their English. Most employee 
interviewees expressed that they would like to find a legal job and work for Australian 
employers but were unsuccessful. Due to their limited English proficiency and the urgent 
need for a job, they had to compromise. In some Chinese job-search websites such as 
backpackers.com, job advertisements will indicate whether positions are “black market 
jobs” (cash-in-hand jobs) or “white jobs” (legal jobs with insurance and 
superannuation69). Even though migrant workers know that they should “never look for 
jobs offered by Hua-Ren! They only give you shitty pay!” (Field notes, September 1, 
2014), nevertheless, there are still many PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese 
who use these Chinese networks to find jobs because “it is hard to find a proper job 
unless your English is like a native speaker’s.” (Interview with James, December 4, 2014). 
A twenty-four-year-old Taiwanese Working Holiday maker, Lily, shared her experience: 
 
My English is very poor. It certainly limits my chances of finding a proper 
job. When I first arrived in Australia, I tried to go to local agency and find 
a job with legal pay. Then, after one week, two weeks passed, I realized I 
had to give up this goal and take those shitty jobs offered by Hua-Ren 
employers. What else can I do? Return to Taiwan? Or keep spending 
money? I can not just wait! 
 																																																								
69 Superannuation refers to the arrangement which people make in Australia to have funds available for 
them in retirement. In Australia it is government-supported and encouraged, and minimum contributions 
are compulsory. For example, employers are required to pay a proportion of employees’ salaries (9.5% as 
of 1 July 2014) into a superannuation fund.  
See: http://www.australia.gov.au/information-and-services/money-and-tax/superannuation 
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Such reactions result from racial stereotypes based on national origin and racism 
in the job-seeking process. There is clearly a racial hierarchy in the Australian job market 
because people tend to think Hua-Ren bosses, compared to white Australian bosses, are 
more exploitative and seldom follow the employment laws. As such, the priority of 
finding a job is to work for Australians, and then people will consider working for Hua-
Ren employers.  
Second, compared to China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong, people can earn more in 
Australia. The relatively high wage compensates for the risks of holding a cash-in-hand 
job. Peggy, a twenty-eight-year-old Taiwanese Working Holiday maker, said:  
 
I have compared all the living costs and wages I can earn here with the 
ones in Taiwan. In Sydney, even if you find a cash-in-hand job that pays 
you only $10 AUD per hour, you can still save more money than in 
Taiwan. That is why I would rather stay here. 
 
Another nineteen-year-old Hong Kongese Working Holiday maker, Jojo, also said: 
“If you work harder, if you do two or three jobs, you still can earn and save lots of 
money.” (Interview with Jojo, May 12, 2015) The idea of “still earning/saving more” 
makes a cash-in-hand job not that difficult to accept. 
Finally, for temporary migrants like international students and Working Holiday 
makers, cash-in-hand jobs provide them with flexibility. Many studies (Deegan 2008; Li 
2015; Reilly 2015) have reported that, for temporary migrants like international students 
and Working Holiday makers, cash-in-hand jobs provide them a choice with flexibility. 
Here flexibility refers to both greater economic freedom and having more control over 
time. Respondents provided several reasons that informed their perception that working 
in the cash economy provides greater economic freedom. First, working in the cash 
economy, they need not worry about paying taxes,70 and unburdened by legal regulations 
they can work many jobs at the same time. Respondents articulated that, avoiding the 
requirement to pay tax represents a way to earn more than they otherwise would. Second, 
(and related to the first) working in the cash economy allows them to work more than one 																																																								
70 Taxes are an important issue here because having cash in hand may give people more money than they 
would otherwise have if they were paid at the proper rate and then had to pay taxes. 
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job and thus earn more than they otherwise could. Furthermore, if they do not like a job, 
they can always leave. For temporary migrants such as students and Working Holiday 
makers, given the limited time they stay in Australia, flexibility is particularly important. 
According to one PRC-Chinese student, Adam: 
 
If you want to get a legal job and work for Australian bosses, generally 
you will have to prepare your resume, and then go through interview 
processes, and then you may have to wait for another couple of weeks for 
results. However, working for Hua-Ren bosses is more flexible. 
[Interviewer: Flexible?] Well, you just go to their workplaces, restaurants, 
or supermarkets…wherever, if they are hiring people, they will ask you to 
work tomorrow or even immediately! That is why now I can take three 
jobs on the same day when I do not need to go to school. I am a cashier in 
the daytime, in the late evening I do house-cleaning, during weekends I 
help people move their households. 
 
Adam’s answer shows that the flexibility of a cash-in-hand job contributes to an 
individual’s economic freedom in the labor market because he feels the decision to join 
the market is voluntary. At the same time, his narratives also indicate such flexbility is 
easy to find in the jobs provided praticularly by Hua-Ren bosses. Furthermore, felxibility 
is not just important for temporary migrants; for long term migrants, cash-in-hand jobs 
are also seen as good opportunities to earn some extra money. 
In regard to motivations and perception about doing cash-in-hand jobs, my 
respondents can be broadly divided into two groups: the first group is students who come 
to Australia on student visas and who may take cash-in-hands jobs to earn extra money 
because as said, the student visas allow them to work only 20 hours per week. They have 
extra time after school and if they want to work longer and earn more money, they 
generally do not care much about their salaries (Field notes, November 28, 2014). Being 
able to work more than one job may be particularly relevant to individuals on student 
visas as they may have formal employment for 20 hours but need more money than this 
can provide. A twenty-five-year-old PRC-Chinese student, Paul, expressed it 
straightforwardly: 
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If I just work for 20 hours a week, I could not save any money. I have to 
pay $150 AUD per week for rent, maybe another $150 for meals and 
transportation…and many other things. To work for more hours and get 
more money, I can only take cash-in-hand jobs.  
  
In contrast, Working Holiday makers work for fun, to gain life experiences, and to 
support their day-to-day living costs. In this regard, people may not make ethical 
judgments about the proper pay and national minimum wage. These motivations and 
needs, to a certain extent, fit the flexibility of cash-in-hand jobs and thus increase 
people’s willingness to accept a cash-in-hand job.  
It may be too facile, however, to jump to the conclusion that Chinese job-seekers 
are thus “willing to be exploited” by their co-ethnics and think the wage paid is “fair.” It 
needs to be noted here that when Chinese employees accept cash-in-hand jobs they are 
not participating in what Burawoy (1979) describes as “manufacturing consent.” 
Burawoy (1979) mentions that management uses various strategies such as the piece-rate 
payment system, internal labor market, and collective bargaining between unions and 
management to create “voluntary servitude” among workers. Such strategies help 
employers extract and “hide” the surplus value created by workers. Chinese migrant 
workers, however, already know (or can anticipate) the hourly rate before choosing to 
accept a job and its substandard conditions. The employers do not play tricks on 
employees nor create strategies to hide the surplus value. Instead, it is the characteristics 
of cash-in-hand jobs that make them attractive and the voluntary servitude of employees 
possible. Chinese employees are aware the job is not as good as other legal jobs, though. 
They take those jobs partly because they lack language proficiency, partly because they 
pay better than in their home countries, and partly because of the flexibility of the jobs. 
Chinese migrants attribute working in the cash economy to their “own decisions” and do 
not feel strongly that they are being exploited. 
Knowing the situations of Chinese students and Working Holiday makers, Hua-
Ren employers do not worry about finding Chinese people for work. For example, 
employers can take advantage of two aspects of their co-ethnic employees’ language 
barrier: Firstly, employers understand the fact that Chinese migrant workers generally 
cannot find other legal jobs because of a lack of English proficiency but are in need of 
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jobs to cover their everyday expenditures including rent and meals. A forty-four-year-old 
Hong Kongese employer Henry expressed this point directly: “Apparently, most Hua-
Ren job-seekers are not competitive. I mean, their English is not good, it is thus 
impossible for them to find a job with a good rate.” (Interview with Henry, February 11, 
2015) Additionally, they are confident that they can offer jobs paying wages below the 
legal minimum because they believe a lack of English proficiency decreases their 
employees’ likelihood of resorting to authorities such as the Fair Work Ombudsman or 
labor unions. They thus never worry about the supply of labor. A fifty-five-year-old 
PRC-Chinese employer, Charlie, who was a boss of a delivery company, said this when 
interviewed: 
 
Charlie: I just go to those online job-finding websites, tigtag or Sydney 
Today, post the ad, mentioning the work starts from 8:30 am, to 8 … or 9 
pm. I pay $130 AUD per day, that is it! If you work quickly, then you can 
get off work earlier. It is all based on your ability. 
 
Interviewer: So you are not afraid of…say, if it becomes more difficult to 
hire people with this rate? 
 
Charlie: No! I never worry about that! (smile) 
 
In addition, due to various economic considerations, temporary migrants find it 
easy to take cash-in-hand jobs, which then even shapes the competition within the cash 
economy. In other words, people still have to compete for cash-in-hand jobs, even though 
they are lower paid and without insurance and superannuation. A Hong Kongese 
Working Holiday maker, Peter, shared his experience: 
 
I saw a job ad on Sydney Today, unloading containers, $15 AUD an hour. 
You know what? I called just two hours after the ad was posted, and the 
boss said they already found workers! Crazy! The rate of physical labor 
used to be at least $20 per hour, but now, maybe because there are more 
and more Chinese people coming to Australia, now you have to be lucky 
and apply as soon as possible. 
 
Some of my Working Holiday responsdents also told me, they feel employers 
prefer to hire students than Working Holiday makers because the former group tends to 
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stay longer (Field notes, April 7, 2015). Such consideration also creates competition 
between groups with different visa types. The phenomenon that employees have to 
compete for cash-in-hand jobs and a constant supply from a pool of temporary migrants 
constitutes a market rule that employers use to justify the wage they offer. For example, 
being asked if he knows the national minimum wage here in Australia is $17.29 per hour, 
Henry started to get a bit angry: 
 
Yeah I know, so what? Do not always tell me the law says this, says that. 
Come on, it is a cash economy! The point is the market rules! Today the 
wage becomes $8 or $10 AUD for its own reasons. I pay $8 per hour, and 
I can still find employees. What does this mean? This means there is no 
problem with this rate in this labor market! If you feel it is wrong, fine, do 
not take the job. Nobody forces you to do it. Let me ask you a question: if 
today you were the boss, would you pay $17.29 per hour? 
 
For employers like Henry, the low wage is seen as a result of a “consensus” they 
share with their co-ethnic employees in the illegal cash-in-hand labor market. Because 
there are always students or Working Holiday makers ready to work (and even compete 
over a job) whenever employers need them, they justify the low wage as normal and the 
result of a voluntary exchange between employer and employee. In other words, they do 
not really and would never see their illegal treatment as co-ethnic exploitation. 
 
Cultural Perceptions of Hua-Ren Employers/Employees in the Cash Economy 
For Chinese migrants, when making a decision about whether to take a cash-in-
hand job, they consider many economic factors as well as ethnic and cultural issues. 
Their economic considerations are intertwined with the cultural perceptions of their Hua-
Ren employers and employees. Cash-in-hand jobs also allow more room for the cultural 
influences of ethnicity. In this section I discuss Chinese migrants’ perception of “Hua-
Ren” as a whole ethnic group, though I acknolwdge there are always good and bad 
employers among every ethnic groups.  
It became clear from my interviews that in the cash economy, Chinese employees 
do not have high expectations of Hua-Ren employers. Within the cash economy in 
Australia, there seem to be established prices offered by Hua-Ren bosses: waiter or 
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cashier jobs generally get paid $8 to $10 AUD per hour; other physical labor such as 
unloading containers, house-cleaning, or moving furniture is paid at around $15 AUD per 
hour. The market rule, for job-seekers, has created a consensus that such wage levels are 
normal, although unfair. A twenty-four-year-old Taiwanese Working Holiday maker, 
Lawrence, who is doing house-cleaning work, commented: 
 
Hua-Ren bosses seldom pay over $15 AUD per hour. If they do, then you 
have to be mentally prepared. They will ask you to do lots of physical 
work. These bosses know Chinese students and Working Holiday makers 
are eager to find a job, even though they pay $8, $9 AUD per hour, they 
can still easily find people to do the job for them. 
 
As opposed to ethnic network scholars, who see the advantages of co-ethnics in 
host countries can help reduce risks of immigration, my employee interviewees seldom 
think Hua-Ren bosses are good employers. But surprisingly, they did not get angry when 
I asked their opinions of Chinese employers who offer lower-paid jobs. According to a 
twenty-seven-year-old PRC-Chinese student, Sally, who works part-time in the 
cosmetics-packing factory: 
 
In Australia, the Hua-Ren bosses are all the same. The chance of finding a 
good Hua-Ren boss is very low. When you realize all other Hua-Ren 
bosses are the same, you gradually get used to it and do not have high 
expectation of them.  
 
Sally’s response represents a typical cultural perception of Hua-Ren bosses within 
the cash economy in Australia. Such cultural percpetion reminds us of Russell’s 
comments on the “bad-roots” of Chinese metnioned in the previous chapter. When people 
find a job offered by Hua-Ren bosses, they hardly expect them to be proper jobs. Hua-
Ren boss has beocme an impression associated with low-paid job. Workers understand 
what the job content will be and expect a low salary. This cultural perception of Hua-Ren 
employers reflects employee understandings of how the market works and the cultural 
characteristics of Hua-Ren bosses. Workers attribute their exploitation, however, to a 
cultural characteristic (Hua-Ren bosses are exploitative) and somehow temper hostile 
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emotions toward employers because these exploitative conditions are “not surprising.” In 
other words, Chinese employees do have an understanding that many Hua-Ren will take 
advantage of ethnic proximity and exploit their co-ethnic Chinese employees in the cash 
economy. A quote from one twenty-eight-year-old Taiwanese Working Holiday maker, 
Lisa, who is a kitchen-hand in a restuarant, clearly expresses this “consensus:” 
 
I think everyone comes to Australia would find that Hua-Ren bosses are 
the most dodgy and exploitative. I believe there are also bad employers 
among other ethnic groups, but they are not as common as Hua-Ren 
bosses. In Australia, out of ten Hua-Ren bosses, you would probably find 
eleven of them are bad! [means almost 100%]    
 
Thus, the “Hua-Ren boss” has become a cultural concept rooted in Chinese job-
seeker’s mind. When employees take cash-in-hand jobs offered by Hua-Ren employers, 
they feel it is they who need to be responsible for the outcomes, whether good or bad. 
Commenting that Chinese migrants always find jobs working for Hua-Ren employers, a 
twenty-nine-year-old Hong Kongese Working Holiday maker, Kathy, who now finds a 
legal job in a restaurant, said: 
 
If today you come to Australia, but you still find those shitty jobs offered 
by Hua-Ren bosses, sorry, I can only say you deserve it! There is no 
empathy for you. You cannot complain about being exploited. I feel 
we…those who take cash-in-hand jobs, should also be responsible for it. 
You should have known that these Hua-Ren bosses are always stingy and 
demanding! 
 
The consensus that “Hua-Ren bosses are exploitative” creates a cultural 
stereotype that distinguishes Hua-Ren bosses from other ethnic groups (e.g., Australians), 
even though exploitation may also happen among other ethnic groups. As some scholars 
suggest (Craciun 2013; Lamont 2000; Waters 1990), people tend to ascribe cultural 
meanings and values to specific ethnicities. In the case of Chinese, Chinese migrants 
seldom think Hua-Ren employers will provide them with proper jobs. This ethnic 
element accompanies a passivity that does not expect legal wages or proper working 
conditions from co-ethnic employers because they attribute the exploitation of Hua-Ren 
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bosses to a rooted cultural phenomenon that is almost impossible to eradicate. Because of 
their cultural understanding of Hua-Ren employers in the cash economy, the relevant 
conditions (lower wage, no insurance, no superannuation, and no overtime/holiday pay) 
are thus not surprising nor that hard to accept. As a result, the sense of being exploited is 
softened.     
For employers, however, one cultural expectation of the cash economy is that 
Hua-Ren employers believe those who take cash-in-hand job are more “obedient” or do 
not have good English abilities. The rationale behind this is simple: job content and wage 
rates are either posted on job-search websites or become a “consensus” among Chinese. 
If employees want legal pay or equivalent compensation, they would not bother to apply 
for the job from the very beginning. 
The perception that “Hua-Ren employees are obedient” also comes from the 
employer stereotype of the Chinese work ethic and values (Harrell 1985; Jaw et al. 2007). 
Here “Hua-Ren employers” provides a good example of how class intersects with 
ethnicity. As Waldinger and Lichter (2003: 40) point out, employers already have “a 
cognitive map that associates ethnic and national traits with the qualities that make for 
subordination.” Thus, employers do not need to develop control strategies in the 
workplace to limit employee resistance. When such stereotypes combine with the 
understanding that Hua-Ren employees either have been unable to find a proper job or 
that they speak English poorly, employers can thus take advantage of their employees and 
strengthen their belief that they do not need to pay higher salaries or required benefits to 
recruit employees. Furthermore, it is easier for them to communicate in Mandarin, the 
chance for Chinese employees to complain about the hourly rate and other insurance 
compensation is also lower than if they hire local Australians. Again, my conversation 
with Henry is a good example: 
 
Henry: Well, I would not bother to hire a local Australian worker since I 
know if I do that, I have to pay them more, and they may complain if I do 
not give them insurance or pay into their superannuation. I would rather 
hire Hua-Ren employees because, on the one hand, it is easier to 
communicate; on the other hand, they are more obedient. 
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Interviewer: What do you mean by “obedient”? 
 
Henry: They take whatever job I ask them to do, never complain about the 
hourly rate and other tax, insurance compensation. 
 
Another PRC-Chinese employer, George, who owns a small grocery shop, even 
shared tips about how to pay his employees low wages and make them feel appreciated. 
His tips fit well with Herzberg’s (1966) idea that by creating intrinsic rewards, such as 
providing sponsorship or job advancement, the employer can reduce the need for 
extrinsic rewards (wages and other benefits): 
 
It is always easy to find Hua-Ren employees to work for you. If you treat 
them well, pay them on time, and if you can even provide them with job 
sponsorship, trust me, they would feel appreciated and would never report 
the low wage issue to the authorities.  
 
From George’s interview we can see that some employers still try to create the 
image of a good employer, though they do not switch the stereotype that “Hua-Ren 
employers are exploitative.” Zhou (1992) pointed out that workers are willing to accept 
lower wages or poorer working conditions in the absence of social solidarity between co-
ethnic employers and employees, as in the case of allowing flexible working hours. One 
reason is that employers care whether they can retain their “obedient workers” and 
decrease complaints from their employees. The image created here is not economic-
oriented or about paying higher salaries. Instead, it is about the way the employers treat 
their employees. In some cases, such an image does significantly decrease the expression 
of hostile emotions by employees towards their employer, and sometimes can even make 
employees tolerate situations they know to be exploitative, such as low wages and long 
working hours. For example, after interview Lily told me she was worried that her stories 
would be brought to the attention of the authorities because she thought her boss was “a 
nice person” and treated her well.71 She did not want to “get him in trouble with the 
authorities.” (Field notes, December 15, 2014) Other respondents echoed this sentiment, 																																																								
71 During the interview Lily kept saying that the low-paid situation is common, and it is not her boss’ fault; 
she could understand the purpose is to save the labor costs. She also constantly highlighted that her boss is 
a nice person and takes care of the employees.    
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saying that in most cases, rather than falling out with their boss, they would prefer just to 
find another job (Field notes, February 15, 2015). In a sense, such reactions may further 
prove and strengthen employer perceptions that Hua-Ren employees are obedient than 
other ethnic groups. 
 
Contested Hierarchy: Different Stereotyping among Chinese Subgroups 
Racial/ethnic hierarchy always implies material and positional difference between 
groups, such as people’s socio-economic status and salary. In the cash-in-hand job market, 
employers undoubtedly have more resources and higher status than employees. In 
addition to positional differences, there are also different cultural perceptions involved. 
As I discussed above, Hua-Ren employers link exploitative jobs to the characteristics of 
pan-ethnicity and think Hua-Ren employees are “obedient” and always ready to come to 
work for them. On the other hand, employees do not have high expectations of Hua-Ren 
bosses. Even they take cash-in-hand jobs because of various economic and cultural 
considerations, they at the same time develop different discourses to justify or interpret 
the power inequality.  
Snellman and Ekehammar (2005) claim that people tend to form ethnic 
hierarchies when judging persons with various ethnic backgrounds. However, how does 
the ethnic hierarchy within Chinese migrants and their respective identities look like 
when exploitation happens? In previous section I showed that Hua-Ren is seen as an 
integrated ethnic group without subgroup differences. In this section, though, I 
demonstrate there are also differences among different Chinese subgroups in how people 
perceive ethnic hierarchies and develop discourses toward individual Chinese subgroup. 
In this regard, pan-ethnicity and national identity can coexist.  
Cultural analysts have noted that constructions of national and ethnic difference 
have always relied on creating stereotypes (Lee 1999). As mentioned above, political 
tensions, economic developments, and cultural practices between China, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong have created different imaginations and narratives within the “imagined” 
Chinese community. In addition to “exploitative” Hua-Ren employer and “obedient” 
Hua-Ren employees, when different Chinese subgroups link exploitation to their different 
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ethnic beliefs and stereotypes, they at the same time block pan-ethnicity and highlight 
sub-group differences. 
After knowing people’s perception of Hua-Ren employers/employees, the second 
set of my interview question focuses on people’s opinions of working for specific 
subgroup (e.g., PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese employers) in the cash economy. 
Most of my respondents acknowledge that there are always good and bad people in each 
subgroup, it is hard to generalize the “image” of specific national group. Generally, 
however, people believe the other subgroup does not have the rights to exploit their group 
because it is unfair and illegitimate. In this section I further ask a question: when and how 
are these existing stereotypes presented and intensified? The perceptions of the other 
subgroup are socially constructed and may not appear until people have specific 
interaction experiences with each other. I argue that exploitation experiences in the cash 
economy serve as a specific context through which different groups’ ethnic stereotypes 
and self-identifications are activated and intensified. The exploitation and interaction 
experiences with the employers of specific nationality tie to and reflect various national 
and ethnic identities among different Chinese subgroups.  
Within the constructed ethnic hierarchies, there are always political emotions and 
cultural identities. However, different from Snellman and Ekehammar’s (2005) and 
Bessudnov’s (2016) assumption that there is a consensus regarding the ethnic hierarchy 
among various subgroups, in this section I focus on different ethnic hierarchies existing 
among PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese employees. I also explore how 
experiences of working in the cash economy and being exploited shape or influence 
employee ethnic and national identity. The following data will draw more heavily on how 
PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese employees see Taiwanese/PRC-Chinese because in my 
fieldwork, I found that for Taiwanese or Hong Kongese employees, there is less national 
identity involved from the work experiences when they work for Hong Kongese or 
Taiwanese employers. In other words, one scenario that people are more likely to 
associate with exploitation experience with their national identity is the political 
ambiguities/tensions between China and Taiwan/Hong Kong.     
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For example, given Taiwan’s ambiguous political status, most PRC-Chinese tend 
to think that Taiwan is part of China; however, Taiwanese do not necessarily see 
themselves sharing similar characteristics with PRC-Chinese. Instead, they see PRC-
Chinese as “the other group” and perceive them in a specific way. Different perceptions 
provide the flexibility for people to shift their identity to meet situational needs. When 
Taiwanese employees are exploited by Taiwanese employers, for example, one strategy 
they created is to highlight the characteristics of pan-ethnicity, putting their employers 
into the broader Hua-Ren category and transform their patriotic emotions. As a twenty-
seven-year-old Taiwanese colleague, Jinbo, who works as a waiter in a Chinese resturant, 
said: 
 
Taiwanese employers are no different from other Hua-Ren bosses, they 
are equally bad. They always think about taking advantage of their co-
ethnics [Taiwanese] and other Hua-Ren employees! At first I thought 
Taiwanese will solidify together when they are overseas and help each 
other, I soon realized I was wrong. 
 
This discourse can be applied to PRC-Chinese and Hong Kongese employees as 
well. When interviewed, several of my PRC-Chinese respondents complianed about the 
job information they got from their hometown association is wrong — mostly cash-in-
hand jobs. As mentioned, PRC-Chinese and Hong Kongese employees do not have high 
expectations of Hua-Ren employers either. Yet they do have a hope on their hometown 
associations. Thus, people would feel frustrated when exploited by their co-ethnics who 
are from the same country. To soften their frustration, one strategy being used is 
highlighting pan-ethnicity and creating the narratives such as “Hua-Ren bosses are all the 
same.”  
Even people do not really distinguish whether Hua-Ren employers/employees are 
from Taiwan, China, or Hong Kong; interestingly, many PRC-Chinese and Taiwanese 
employees still think it is inappropriate to work for Taiwanese/PRC-Chinese employers 
because of their respective national identities and ethnic stereotypes. When I worked in 
the Chinese supermarket, a delievery man (Johnson, a Taiwanese migrant) from a food 
factory chatted with me one day. After learning I am also from Taiwan and the slaries I 
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got paid, he spoke to me in Taiwanese (a local dialect different from Mandarin).72 He 
asked me where the boss of the supermarket is from; I told him that she is from Beijing. 
He sympathized: “How sad! A Taiwanese working for a PRC-Chinese — it is like the 
sky and the ground are upside down!” (Field notes, November 13, 2014) Johnson’s 
national identity might be “pre-existing” and does not change too much even he has 
migrated to Australia over 20 years. It is through learning my experience in the cash 
economy, however, that he associated with the constructed hierarcy in his mind.   
Another Taiwanese colleague, Abby, who is a cashier in the supermarket, also 
expressed how she dislikes PRC-Chinese bosses after getting paid low wages (Interview 
with Abby, November 17, 2014):  
 
…sometimes I feel it is unfair, we work hard for them [PRC-Chinese] but 
only get paid $10–$12 AUD per hour. If one day I own a supermarket, I 
will put a sign saying: “No PRC-Chinese allowed;” or if they come in for 
shopping, they have to pay 25% extra of the original cost of each item!  
 
Abby’s perception of PRC-Chinese is clearly influenced by her experiences 
working for PRC-Chinese employers in the cash economy. Involvement in exploitive 
employment relationships leads to changes (intensification) in actor’s ethnic 
stereotypes. In order to understand how and whether such perception changes, I asked 
Abby about her perception of PRC-Chinese before and after coming to Australia. She 
told me that before coming to Australia, she had some negative stereotypes of PRC-
Chinese because of the way the media reports, but she was not sure whether it is true until 
she had the interaction experiences with PRC-Chinese: 
 
You know, the media in Taiwan always presents PRC-Chinese in a 
negative way. I got the impression that they are rude, stingy, and 
uncivilized. I did not know whether it is true or not because I have not 
been to China, I did not have chance to interact with them…until now. It is 
like, I see them every day and I know why the news reports them in that 
way…    
 																																																								
72 Interestingly, he supposed that I could speak in Taiwanese. But in fact, many people in Taiwan do not 
really understand or speak in Taiwanese, especially for those who came to Taiwan after 1949 (mainlanders) 
or Hakka people. See Avenarius (2007). 
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Here we can see the different ways in which Taiwanese and PRC-Chinese 
migrants may see each other because they have come from very different political 
systems and have been raised and educated in very different educational environments 
with access to different kinds of information (Chun 1996b). For example, in China, 
people have been taught that unification (i.e., one China policy) is the most important 
thing, whereas in Taiwan people are leaning toward a rejection of the PRC’s expansionist 
aims. The educational and political environment of home countries is certainly involved 
in shaping specific national identities of each Chinese subgroup. Constraints on cross-
group interaction contributes to stereotyping. Thus, when exploitation happens, people 
may resort to exisitng ethnic stereotypes and highlight the negative sides of the other 
subgroup.  
Abby’s narratives also reflect uneven modernization, communism vs. 
capitalism/democracy, which suggest that PRC-Chinese is socially more unlike western 
societies than is either Hong Kong or Taiwan. A twenty-nine-year-old Taiwanese 
Working Holiday maker, Cecilia, commented on low-paid job in the cash economy: “we 
should not take the job offered by PRC-Chinese bosses…they have different culture, 
different ways of thinking…I just found there are lots of barriers between us after coming 
here.” (Interview with Cecilia, February 12, 2015) The suggestion here is that she 
distinguishes between Taiwanese and PRC-Chinese bosses, attributing exploitation from 
PRC-Chinese bosses but not from Taiwanese bosses. This in turn substantiates that 
exploitation is shaped by cultural perceptions. 
On the other hand, when Taiwanese employees have good Taiwanese employers, 
they would highlight the value of their own ethnicity and distinguish Taiwanese 
employers from other Hua-Ren bosses. Justin, a thirty-year-old Taiwanese Working 
Holiday maker, who works in a warehouse, said: 
 
The job here is quite reasonable. The manager paid us on time, and we got 
superannuation as well, which is quite rare here if you work for other Hua-
Ren bosses. That is why I always try to find jobs through some Taiwanese 
forums or Facebook pages, and if possible, I prefer to work for Taiwanese 
bosses rather than PRC-Chinese. The chance of getting a bad job is lower 
than you work for those dodgy Hua-Ren bosses or agents.  
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To a certain extent, Taiwanese migrants anticipate that Taiwanese employers, 
compared to PRC-Chinese employers, are more likely to treat them well. The preference 
shows an identity category as Taiwanese is used to associate identity with co-ethnic 
support and fairness, as ethnic network scholars have suggested. At the same time, it also 
shows that they block pan-ethnicity and distinguish between Hua-Ren and Taiwanese 
employers. Even though those who find good PRC-Chinese bosses attribute it to their 
own “good luck,” the ethnic stereotype still exists. As a thirty-year-old Taiwanese 
migrant worker, Cody, told me: 
 
I am now like an apprentice, working for a master, doing all the housing 
maintenance jobs, from making tiles, carpentering, painting, and so on. 
My boss is from China, he is good, he pays me $18 AUD per hour, no 
overtime work, and I do not need to work during the weekends. He does 
all the work with me, and I feel he really wants to teach me something…I 
am lucky, but I know not every PRC-Chinese boss is like him, some of my 
friends who work in similar industries, their bosses ask them to do 
eveything but never teach them how to do the job.  
 
Cody’s stereotypes about PRC-Chinese bosses did not grow less negative even he 
ackowledges his PRC-Chinese boss is good. However, he attributes his luck to individual 
case and is pessimistic about other people would be as lucky as him when working for a 
PRC-Chinese boss. 
Similar sentiments are expressed when PRC-Chinese work for Taiwnese 
employers. For example, Frank is a thirty-six-year-old PRC-Chinese colleague I worked 
together when unloading containers in a warehouse. He came to Australia because his 
wife now works here. He loves talking about politics and always asked me how 
Taiwanese would think on specific issues, such as the presidential election in Taiwan, the 
economic prospect in Taiwan, the free trade agreement between China and Australia, etc. 
Believing that Taiwan is a part of China, one day he told me (Field notes, May 6, 2015):  
 
Most Taiwanese people are wealthier than PRC-Chinese, that is why I am 
here working for them. I know you Taiwanese people always look down 
on PRC-Chinese, you feel we are poor and uncivilized. But so what? You 
are part of us and will return to China ultimately one day. I also know lots 
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of Taiwanese people want independence. If Taiwan claims independence, 
then sorry, Chinese government will absolutely attack Taiwan. 
 
During my other interviews I also found PRC-Chinese employee interviewees feel 
being looked down upon by Taiwanese because of the stereotype that China is poor, less 
democratic, and undeveloped. Some of them thus feel there is a need to develop different 
discourses to switch the cultural inequality or to justify the fact thay they work for 
another subgroup (e.g., Taiwanese). Regarding the stereotype of Taiwanese employers, 
another twenty-three-year-old PRC-Chinese student, Barry, who works part-time in a 
Chinese resturant, expressed it more directly: 
 
I do not want to say this but…to be honest, Taiwanese bosses do not have 
good impressions on me. I feel the Taiwanese bosses I met here are short-
sighted. They would not treat their employees like friends or have further 
interactions beyond work, they just tell you to do this and do that…they 
see themselves as your “bosses.” And they always see PRC-Chinese as 
uncivilized, seriously, I still remember one Taiwanese boss said something 
like this in front of one of our PRC-Chinese collegaues. I feel they…how 
to say…it is like a discrimination, I feel they particularly discriminate 
against people from China. 
 
In contrast with seeing Hua-Ren bosses as mostly exploitative, PRC-Chinese 
migrants attribute different ethnic characteristics to Hong Kongese employers as well. 
Commenting on a Hong Kongese manager, a thirty-four-year-old PRC-Chinese migrant, 
Patrick, who has worked in Sydney over 7 years, also expressed his stereotypes of Hong 
Kongese employer: 
 
Overall, Hong Kongese are more pragmatic and profits-driven. They only 
want to increase their own earnings. They would not want to build 
relationships with you if you are not beneficial to their careers. My 
supervisor is a typical example. He is a pragmatic, and always 
distinguishes between work and private life clearly. He would not talk 
about his private life with you and he is not interested in yours either.  
 
Some PRC-Chinese migrants also compare PRC-Chinese bosses with Hong 
Kongese bosses. Paul told me he had worked for both PRC-Chinese bosses and Hong 
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Kongese bosses before. Acknolwdeging all Hua-Ren bosses are exploitative, he thinks 
Hong Kongese bosses are particularly worse: 
 
You might not believe this…in Australia, Hong Kongese bosses are more 
stingy than PRC-Chinese bosses. I took several part-time jobs before, 
among them, the worst one, as I can remember, was working in a Hong 
Kongese resturant. During the time…I was assigned lots of work and 
guess how much I got paid? $7 AUD per hour! PRC-Chinese bosses may 
at least give you $10 AUD, but Hong Kongese…they can be very very 
stingy.  
 
In contrast, for Hong Kongese employees, as other Chinese migrant workers, they 
are fully aware of the fact that “Hua-Ren boses might be exploitative.” And PRC-Chinese 
boss is certainly within this Hua-Ren category. When referring to exploitative Hua-Ren 
bosses, however, as Abby’s narratives, my Hong Kongese respondents also use the fact of 
exploitation to prove their cultural imagination of people from China. One twenty-eight-
year-old Hong Kongese Working Holiday maker, Louis, linked his stereotype to the 
Chinese ethnic economy in Australia: 
 
In Hong Kong, we saw tourists from China everyday. They always 
behaved in a domineering way. So when I arrive in Australia, and hearing 
the news about those Zhongguo [PRC-Chinese] bosses exploit workers 
everyday, I feel a bit…numb, or, not surprising to me anymore. See, when 
we say exploitative Hua-Ren bosses in Australia, how many of them are 
Taiwanese or Hong Kongese? Very few!     
 
Exploitation expereiences only strengthen Louis’ stereotype that PRC-Chinese 
employers are always bossy and do not care about labor rights. In other words, when 
distinguishing between PRC-Chinese and other Chinese subgroups, Louis blocks pan-
ethnicity. Jojo, who works in a packing factory, also complained about her PRC-Chinese 
manager:  
 
The PRC-Chinese manager always asks us to go faster, faster, and faster. 
He basically treats us like machines! Sometimes I wonder what is wrong 
with him…maybe he will not know how unreasonable he is until he comes 
to do our job on the production line. I can swap the job with him and I 
believe I can do a better supervision job than him! 
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Comparing Louis and Jojo’s experience with PRC-Chinese employers, and Paul’s 
perception of Hong Kongese employer, there is clearly a contested inter-group stereotype 
exisitng in people’s minds. In my interview I found their perception of other Chinese 
subgroup is largely based on their work experiences in the cash economy as both see the 
other subgroup as the most exploitative. The only similar thing is when referring to the 
exploitation expereicnes, they all block pan-ethnicity and distinguish between Hua-Ren 
and other Chinese subgroups within the Chinese ethnic economy in Australia.  
These narratives demonstarte certain stereotypes and ethnic hierachies exist in the 
minds of different Chinese migrant groups, so when they work for other subgroups, they 
clearly distinguish the other subgroup from Hua-Ren and there are some emotions 
involved and identities reflected. In addition to seeing Hua-Ren as a whole ethnic group 
with certain ethnic charateristics, people also associate exploitation experiences with 
specific perception and stereotype on specific Chinese subgroup. In this sense, we can see 
how pan-ethncity and national identity are strategically used to justify or explain people’s 
exploitative situation from other subgroup. Table 2 briefly summarizes my findings of 
how Taiwanese, PRC-Chinese, and Hong Kongese employees perceive their employers 
when they have good or bad Taiwanese/PRC-Chinese/Hong Kong bosses. 
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Table 2. Chinese Employees’ Perception When They Have Good or Bad 
Taiwanese/PRC-Chinese/Hong Kongese Bosses 
 
 TW boss PRC boss HK boss 
TW employees Good TW bosses 
are different from 
PRC bosses; bad 
TW bosses are no 
different from Hua-
Ren bosses 
Attribute having a good 
PRC boss to their luck, 
it is not always the case. 
When having a bad 
PRC boss, exploitation 
is anticipated and it is 
sad “we” have to work 
for “them.” 
Not too different 
from their 
perception of 
other Hua-Ren 
bosses 
PRC 
employees 
When having a bad 
TW boss, it does 
not matter, TW will 
return to China one 
day 
Attribute having a good 
PRC boss to their luck, 
it is not always the case. 
When having a bad 
PRC boss, exploitation 
is anticipated. 
Hong Kongese 
employers are 
pragmatic and 
some of them are 
even worse than 
PRC bosses.  
HK employees Not too different 
from their 
perception of other 
Hua-Ren bosses 
Exploitative PRC 
bosses fit their 
stereotype.   
 
Not too different 
from their 
perception of 
other Hua-Ren 
bosses. 
 
This table is a brief distinction of how each subgroup see their own group and the 
other subgroup in the cash economy. I am not claiming, however, that every single 
subgroup member will follow this distinction and has specific stereotype of employer 
from the other subgroup. What I aim to highlight, is how people define Hua-Ren as a 
whole ethnic group but at the same time, they could also disitnguish subgroup 
charaterisitcs to fit their situational needs. 
 
Summary 
There is much research on ethnic hierarchies and ethnic stereotypes between 
different racial/ethnic groups, but not many studies examine the ethnic hierarchies within 
the same ethnic group (Chinese) and the contexts/processes through which existing ethnic 
stereotypes are activated or intensified. This chapter examines how Chinese migrants 
understand co-ethnic exploitation in the cash-in-hand labor market and how exploitation 
experience present or intensify their respective identities and ethnic stereotypes. Different 
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from Snellman and Ekehammar’s (2005) and Bessudnov’s (2016) assumption that 
various groups might have agreement on the ethnic hierarchy, I show there are varieties 
of ethnic stereotype existing among different Chinese subgroups when being exploited in 
Australia.  
It may not be too surprising that to maximize wages and minimize tax payments, 
employees are willing to take a cash-in-hand job to get extra money. For similar reasons 
employers prefer hiring low-paid workers through cash-in-hand jobs. In this sense, ethnic 
identity is not significant in deciding whether people take/provide cash-in-hand job or 
not. It may be too facile, however, to conclude that the informal labor market is simply 
based on a consensus between or the mutual economic freedom of employers and 
employees. 
Rather, the interview data introduced above show that co-ethnic exploitation is 
also formulated and justified by both employees’ and employers’ mutual cultural 
expectations when seeing the other party as a whole “Hua-Ren” group. For employees, it 
is clear that many Chinese employees think it is “not surprising” because it is too 
common for Hua-Ren bosses to be exploitative. Even employees have good Hua-Ren 
bosses, they would not change their stereotype that Hua-Ren bosses are exploitative. For 
employers, my interviews also reveal that Hua-Ren bosses perceive potential employees 
through a cultural lens. That is, they understand the vulnerabilities of co-ethnic 
employees and assume they will be “obedient” once they accept a job. On the other hand, 
even though they pay less, employers try to create the image of a good boss to retain their 
“obedient workers” and to decrease expressions of employee hostility.  
However, I argue the exploitation experiences of cash-in-hand job not only show 
that “Hua-Ren” as an integrated ethnic group, nor can they only be explained through the 
perspective of class distinction (employer vs. employee). The interaction experiences in 
the cash economy also reveal the existence of ethnic hierarchies exisitng among different 
Chinese subgroups, though differently they are presented. The exploitation actually 
intensifies people’s ethnic stereotypes and national identity so that people either feel there 
is something “wrong” according to their pre-existing ethnic beliefs, or seize upon existing 
ethnic stereotypes of the other subgroup. For example, Taiwanese and PRC-Chinese both 
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think there is something “wrong” to work for their counteraparts. When Taiwanese 
employees are exploited by Taiwanese employers, they tend to activate their national 
identities and put their Taiwanese employers into the broader “Hua-Ren” category and 
transform their patriotic emotions (comments like: “Hua-Ren bosses are all the same”), 
but when the exploitative employers are PRC-Chinese, they would seize upon existing 
ethnic stereotypes and associate the exploitation with their existing political 
identities/tensions of Taiwan vs. China. Same situations apply to Hong Kongese 
employees. When they are exploited by PRC-Chinese bosses, they tend to strengthen the 
(negative) stereotype of PRC-Chinese and distinguish between (exploitative) PRC-
Chinese bosses and other Hua-Ren employers who are from the Chinese world other than 
China.  
When Taiwanese employees have a good Taiwanese boss, on the other hand, they 
block pan-ethnicity, their ethnic stereotype of “Taiwanese boss is better than PRC-
Chinese boss” also gets strenthened. Different ethnic stereotypes can be seen within 
PRC-Chinese group when they work for Taiwanese (comments like: “so what? They are 
part of us”) and Hong Kongese employers (“Hong Kongese are more pragmatic and the 
most exploitative.”) Similar to Taiwanese, PRC-Chinese and Hong Kongese also 
cultivates discourses to justify or explain the fact that they work for their counteraparts. 
These discourses involve either cultural belief, political status, or ethnic stereotype. When 
attaching certain charatersitics to their own group and other subgroups, people highlight 
the value of their own ethnicity and block the Hua-Ren pan-ethnicity. 
Indeed, ethnic stereotypes are subjective and can vary among individuals. People 
from the same ethnic group might have different stereotypes on other subgroups as well. 
What I want to highlight in this chapter, however, is pointing out that such pre-existing 
stereotypes may be highlighted or substantiated in the context such as cash-in-hand labor 
market. I also show that different Chinese subgroups can selectively use pan-ethnicity or 
national identity and connect the epxloitation experiences to their existing ethnic beliefs. 
Some may think the cash-in-hand jobs are more about class relations rather than 
ethnic hierarchy or stereotype. However, in addition to the relevance of class, through the 
narratives provided we can clearly see Chinese migrants attach different sentiments to the 
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jobs and interpret their exploitation experiences through ethnic lens. In other words, 
status distinctions always come along with people’s ethnic stereotypes and cultural 
perceptions. As Brubaker (2015: 34) suggests, inequality along ethnic or religious lines 
can be generated by social separation as well as cultural difference. By showing how 
ethnic perception matters in influencing people’s understanding of their exploitation 
experience in the cash economy, this chapter portrays what the ethnic hierarchy as a 
whole looks like and the process in which ethnic stereotype is presented and intensified. 
In this sense, job-seeking processes and the cash-in-hand labor market provide an 
important social setting where we can understand the formation of multi-level identity 
(Hua-Ren as a whole group vs. individual Chinese subgroups). 
In the next chapter, I will more deeply examine how the workplace culture 
(including regular and tempoary work) as a specific context shapes and changes group 
interactions among these three Chinese subgroups. Focusing on the time axis, I will first 
look at migrants’ interpretations of Hua-Ren and the change of their national identity 
before and after coming to Australia, and then examine how different identities (national 
and pan-ethnic) are nested that give people room to make/unmake group boundaries 
during their daily interactions in the workplace. I will also compare how the national 
identities are substantiated and group interactions among these three subgroups between 
the regular and casual workplace. 
Parts of this chapter are published in Critical Sociology. The dissertation author 
was the primary investigator and author of the published article.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
“PLAYING” AT THE GROUP BOUNDARY: STRATEGIC BOUNDARY 
MAKING/UNMAKING IN THE WORKPLACE  
 
 
Haley (a PRC-Chinese manager of the supermarket I worked at): “Have 
you heard the story about PRC-Chinese who could not afford to buy a tea 
egg? It is a joke from Taiwan that refers to their stereotype of poor PRC-
Chinese people. The other night Susan (a Taiwanese colleague) called me 
to come by her place. I stayed in her place and talked to her for over two 
hours, during which I ate one tea egg. I posted this on my Facebook and 
my friends all said I really confirmed Taiwanese’s stereotype of PRC-
Chinese!” 
(Field notes, December 16, 2014) 
 
Christina (a Taiwanese colleague): You should come out and be our 
president in the future!   
I: By then, we probably will not have a president. We might only have a 
Head or a Representative of the Taiwan Special Administrative Region, 
you know, just like Hong Kong. 
Christina: You are always so humble and obedient, that is why these PRC-
Chinese people like you so much. 
      (Field notes, September 22, 2014) 
 
 
Stepping into the Workplace 
In the method section I have briefly introduced the characteristics and ethnic 
combinations of my field sites. But here it would be useful to introduce the details of my 
daily routines in these sites since these routines involve interactions with other Chinese 
groups. In 2014, when I arrived Sydney at the end of August, I started looking for a job 
immediately after settling down. To find a workplace with employers and employees 
from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, I searched jobs on those Chinese websites such as 
backpackers.com, Sydney Today, and Tigtag. You can find these websites simply by 
typing in Chinese, “searching for jobs in Australia.” There are so many different types of 
job posted everyday, and many jobs are cross-posted in different websites. To better 
understand the group interaction, I avoided jobs that require independent work such as 
masseur and instead I looked for places where there are co-existence of different Chinese 
subgroups.
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My first job in Sydney was a waiter in a Chinese seafood restaurant next to the 
casino. I found this job through a recruitment advertisement on Sydney Today. The ad 
asked for waiters, kitchen-hands, all-rounders [handymen], and numerous positions. It did 
not clearly mention salary or working hours.73 I submitted my résumé, mentioning I was 
interested in applying for the waiter position. After a few hours, the manager texted me 
about a short interview. 
I scheduled a 4 pm interview because the restaurant generally closes every day 
from 2 to 5 pm. The forty-six-year-old Hong Kongese manager, Simon, arrived to 
interview me and the other applicants at the same time. He introduced the environment of 
the restaurant, which is famous for expensive seafood (lobster, crab, etc.). He also 
outlined the job description. Basically, we would be working as a “boy” (Lo-Mian, 
trainee) for the first few months.74 In my résumé I mentioned that in Taiwan I had the 
experiences as a waiter for a couple of months, but the manager indicated that everyone 
needed time to learn how to become a formal waiter in the restaurant. The “boy’s” tasks 
included cleaning the table and changing tablecloths, passing orders to the kitchen, 
serving hot tea, and delivering dishes and fruit/snacks during the meal. The hourly pay 
was $12.50 AUD. Tips were calculated daily and shared by everyone.75 
I told the manager I was here for Working Holiday and collecting data at the same 
time. He asked me nothing about my study, but he said he was impressed by my résumé, 
and he believed I would be helpful to the restaurant given that I study in the United States. 
He expected me to speak “good English” and greet “foreign customers.” He asked me if I 
could start working immediately. I walked out of the restaurant with the other applicant 
who told me: “the salary is too low, I might try other jobs first.” At that time, though, I 
did not have many options; the group diversity of employers and employees in the 
restaurant (from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea; including permanent residents, 																																																								
73 It only showed: “Negotiable.” In fact, in Australia lots of black market jobs offered by Hua-Ren bosses 
indicate the salary is negotiable. 
74 How long the management would take to “upgrade” our position was indeterminate. I met a Taiwanese 
colleague who had been working there for 11 months but was still a “trainee.” He was the second most 
senior trainee among the 30 waiters and waitresses. In other words, waiters and waitresses generally do not 
stay long at the restaurant (Field notes, September 30, 2014).   
75 During my time working in this restaurant, I received $5 to $15 AUD in tips every night. One colleagues 
said he received $30 AUD in a single night, but that was because that night was Chinese New Year’s Eve, 
and it was super busy.  
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students and Working Holiday makers) also helped me make the decision. I was excited 
about knowing more about the group dynamics and ethnic relations in a place where 
diverse groups were present.   
On the first day of work (August 30, 2014), Simon asked about my working day 
availability. I soon realized that he always assigns the busiest time for new trainees. For 
example, I was assigned to work 6 days a week, Tuesday to Sunday, and all night shifts 
(5 pm to 11 pm). I asked Simon if I could have some day shifts (10 am to 4 pm), he 
replied: “we do not need that many people for day shifts.” (Field notes, September 5, 
2014) I was also asked to have an English name (I used “Oscar”) because it is easier for 
guests to call us when needed. I was given a walkie-talkie, a name card, and a white shirt. 
Because the Australian government requires those serving alcohol to have the RSA 
(Responsible Service of Alcohol) certificate,76 I spent $100 AUD and took a one-day 
class to get it. 
My first day on the job was spent learning everything, literally, including how to 
deliver the orders and dishes.77 Learning was important because for the same ingredient 
(e.g., lobster), there were different preparations. Simon warned me: “if today the 
customer orders the dish as a salad and you put it on the wrong clip78 and it is deep-fried, 
then sorry, we have to ask you to compensate for it.” (Field notes, August 31, 2014).  The 
cost of a lobster or a crab was equal to at least my one-week salary.   
Simon assigned me a “senior boy,” James, to teach me what to do. When I was 
having my first staff meal, James asked me to finish it quickly. He said: “the rookies are 
supposed to do all the tidying-up before the shift starts.” (Field notes, August 30, 2014) 
Throughout my stint in the restaurant, I frequently discovered “informal” rules. For 
example, below the managers there were several senior waiters whom we call “white-
vests”—unlike us, they wore black shirts with white vests. They always sit in another 
table with the managers.  
																																																								
76 See: http://www.hia.edu.au/responsible-service-of-alcohol/what-is-rsa-training/ 
77 For the employee record and training checklist of the restaurant, see Appendix 3. 
78 In the restaurant, orders sent to the kitchen were accompanied by different colored clips that indicated 
whether the dishes were going to be deep-fried, braised, stir-fried, etc.  
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As a rookie, my daily work in the restaurant started with cleaning staff plates after 
they finished their meal; then I had to move the watermelons and oranges from storage to 
the kitchen. After these were done, I returned to my “station” (there are three stations in 
different areas of the restaurant) and organized everything, including tealeaves, hot 
towels, and chopsticks and spoons. During the night shift—guests generally started 
showing up around 5:30 pm—I would have to greet them, serve them hot towels, and ask 
them what kinds of tea they liked. Then I gave them menus; when they were ready to 
order, I would call the “white-vests” to take their orders; then I would deliver the order 
notes to the kitchen with the correct clips (how many dishes, how they will be cooked). 
Interestingly enough, I seldom served the meals because serving was typically a waitress’ 
job unless it was very busy. Later, I learned how to debone fish and how to mix shallots 
and sauce the roast duck. Yet it remained the waitress’ job to present the dishes to the 
guests. There was certainly a gendered division of labor resting on a gender stereotype. It 
is a Chinese stereotype that is different from some Western high-end restaurants where 
the job would be done by a waiter. I also spent sometime remembering the list regarding 
different brands of wine. 
During the shift, I had to keep an eye on whether plates should be changed or 
when the alcohol is ordered. I would serve fruit and dessert after guests finished their 
main courses. I was in charge of clearing dirty plates, dragging the full cart to the kitchen, 
and returning to my station with a new cart and clean chopsticks and forks/spoons. Of 
course, I was also taught to change the tablecloth quickly when the guests had left,79 and I 
put out new sets of chopsticks, bowls, and spoons. Indeed, there were lots of jobs for a 
“boy.” I had to be “smart,” always pay attention, and react to the changes immediately. 
Work was six hours of non-stop stressful activity.      
After two months, I decided to switch jobs and compare it with another workplace. 
This time I found a job through tigtag.com. The position was a storeman in a middle-
sized Chinese supermarket owned by a woman from Beijing. Its two PRC-Chinese 
managers were the owner’s cousins. In addition to this supermarket, the owner also had 
																																																								
79 The manager said he only gives me 30 seconds to change the tablecloth for each table (Field notes, 
September 2, 2014).  
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several massage parlors. Wendy (the owner) frequently told me: “running supermarket is 
just one of my interests, it actually does not help me earn any money.” I do not know why 
she told me this, but I had a feeling that she was trying to “justify” why she gave us low 
pay and could not give us a significant pay raise. (Field notes, November 8, 2014) 
When I first called the owner about the job in the supermarket, she asked about 
my height and if I had any relevant experience. She told me the salary was $12 AUD per 
hour (as a trainee), which would increase after the first two months. I had a one-day trial 
(the owner who was trying me out) and decided to stay because there were also PRC-
Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese employees working there. On the day of my 
interview she mentioned the “perquisites” of working in the supermarket: taking home 
“just-expired” products and an invitation to Chinese New Year’s Eve dinner (Field notes, 
November 3, 2014).  
Wendy also told me she always prefers hiring Taiwanese “because I trust them.” I 
asked her why she trusts Taiwanese more than PRC-Chinese or other ethnic groups, and 
she told me it was because most of her employees were Taiwanese and they worked 
pretty hard and were always courteous (Field notes, November 3, 2014).     
 Everyday around 8:50 in the morning, I opened the shop and waited for the 
vendors who shipped the vegetables and eggs to the supermarket. I cleaned up the space 
in the frozen sections and arranged the vegetables. Then I had to quickly walk around the 
store to see which sections needed replenishing first. Generally, given they are the most 
popular products in the supermarket and always need re-stocking, I would start from the 
frozen food section and move on to the sauce and instant noodle sections. And finally, I 
would go over each section and see what was missing from the shelves. If the products 
are out of stock, I would notify the manager to see if she wanted to call the vendors. 
Every three months, we took inventory to make sure the number of products sold and our 
stock were in balance and check whether the products had expired (or would soon expire). 
We would make a special sale on the soon-to-be-expired products. Overall, the work in 
the supermarket was simpler, and I thus had more time to chat with my colleagues and 
managers.   
		
105 
In March 2015, I decided to quit my job in the supermarket and do other part-time 
work, such as unloading containers, furniture moving, house cleaning, and gardening jobs. 
Again, I found these jobs through the previously mentioned Chinese websites. The reason 
I quitted the job in the supermarket is because I wanted to know more migrant workers 
and employers. By working with them closely (for instance, when I worked with a PRC-
Chinese truck driver delivering products, I spent 14 hours a day with him in his truck), I 
began to understand how they interacted with me as a Taiwanese and how they identified 
their ethnicity.   
In addition to emphasizing that identity of individuals are socially constructed, 
formed and negotiated through everyday experiences and social interactions, in this 
chapter I will also look at how people change their national identity and ethnic 
categorization before and after migrating to Australia. Using workplace as a specific 
social setting, I will show how people highlight group tensions as a way to make and 
unmake the boundaries, as well as how they “unmake” pan-ethnicity and highlight their 
national identity (rather than Hua-Ren identity).80 Workplace is an important site to 
examine group interaction because it involves with everyday interaction patterns of 
Chinese migrants, on the one hand; its uniqueness of intersecting between class, gender, 
and ethnicity also generates different identity and group interactions, on the other. 
 
Before and After Coming to Australia 
Before examining the group dynamics in the workplace, it is important for us to 
have a broader picture of the identity differences among these three subgroups before and 
after they work in Australia, because the change of identity might influence the ways they 
interact with each other in the workplace after moving to Australia. In the interview with 
my colleagues and employers, one question I asked my PRC-Chinese respondents was 
whether they identify themselves as PRC-Chinese (Zhongguo-Ren) or Hua-Ren. Instead 
of explaining my ideas of PRC-Chinese and Hua-Ren, I asked them to tell me what these 
two categories mean to them. Surprisingly, many of my PRC-Chinese respondents, 																																																								
80 However, unmaking pan-ethnicity does not necessarily mean the national identity will be automatically 
highlighted. As I constantly emphasize in this dissertation, different layers of pan-ethnicity and national 
identity can be nested together within different Chinese subgroups. 
		
106 
especially older generations, told me that there are no differences between PRC-Chinese 
and Hua-Ren. For them, Hua-Ren only means “overseas Chinese” or “Zhongguo-Ren 
who hold another citizenship.”81 One thing should be noted: for many PRC-Chinese, 
“Zhongguo-Ren” is a broader concept, which “certainly” includes people in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Macau. Growing up in China, people have been taught that “one China 
policy” is the most important thing. In this sense, Hua-Ren identity is projected from their 
national identity as well as through connections to common origin (China) and shared 
Chinese culture/history. Yet, such an identity excludes other “overseas Chinese” such as 
Singaporeans or Malaysians of Chinese descent. The distinction can be shown from an 
interview with a twenty-four-year-old PRC-Chinese student, Doris:  
 
Interviewer: You said PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese can 
all be categorized as Hua-Ren. How do you perceive Singaporeans or 
Malaysians? 
 
Doris: They are other Asians. But I do not think Singaporeans and 
Malaysians are Hua-Ren, even though some of them can speak Mandarin. 
They do not know deeper Chinese culture and characteristics…they only 
know how to speak another language [Mandarin].  
 
People might question that to what extents these three groups represent the whole 
“Chinese world.” Here we can see that for many PRC-Chinese migrants, Mainland China 
has been the symbolic center both culturally and “politically” for the Hua-Ren identity. 
For Doris, Singapore and Malaysia are different “countries.” They are certainly different 
from Hong Kong or Taiwan that are seen as “part of China.” Thus, if today Taiwan gets 
its independence from China, or if Taiwanese people become “foreigners,” PRC-Chinese 
would feel very strange. When I kept asking Doris why she would feel strange, she said: 
“it is just like your fellow citizens suddenly become the citizens of another country, they 
are not close to you anymore.” (Interview with Doris, February 18, 2015) 
Many of my PRC-Chinese respondents did tell me, however, that they have 
adjusted their opinions about ethnic identifications after coming to work in Australia. For 
example, one of my colleagues (PRC-Chinese) doing house-cleaning together with me 																																																								
81 So far, the Chinese government does not allow people of China to have dual citizenship. 
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said that after working in Australia and contacting with more Taiwanese, he realized only 
PRC-Chinese identify themselves as “Zhongguo-Ren.” (Field notes, February 28, 2015) 
Nick, a PRC-Chinese student who was doing house-moving with me, also stated: 
 
Before coming to Australia, I thought there was no difference between the 
Hua-Ren and PRC-Chinese. When I am abroad, however, I gradually find 
PRC-Chinese are PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese are Taiwanese. You can see, 
Taiwanese here do not identify themselves as PRC-Chinese at all. Hong 
Kongese…maybe compared to Taiwanese, they are more PRC-
Chinese…there do exist some differences, no matter in terms of culture, 
politics, or language use. 
 
Nick’s narratives show the role immigration context play in changing his 
perceptions of Taiwanese. My PRC-Chinese respondent, Russell, whom I introduced in 
chapter two, also expressed similar opinions when being asked about his perception of 
Taiwanese vs. PRC-Chinese. He did not associate the national education with 
brainwashing in China, but he pointed out the importance it plays in influencing people’s 
thoughts:  
 
Russell: You should first understand our ways of education. In China, we 
have been taught unification is the most important thing since we were 
young. To be honest, I used to feel angry when seeing Taiwanese are 
wealthier than PRC-Chinese people. But after coming to Australia, after 
interacting with more Taiwanese people, I gradually changed my mind 
and started to think about these issues from different perspectives. 
 
Interviewer: How about Hong Kongese? Do you feel the same way? 
 
Russell: We never felt Hong Kong ever belonged to other countries. We 
always knew it is a concession and has to be returned to us one day, so, the 
concept is totally different.    
     
These changes have raised issues about what Hua-Ren means to PRC-Chinese 
within the context of migration and how they see other Chinese subgroups after they 
migrate to Australia. For most PRC-Chinese, ideas about Hua-Ren identity are expressed 
as a “racial” form of identification (covering Taiwanese/Hong Kongese but excluding 
white Australians) or national loyalty extending beyond the boundaries of the nation state 
(China). Hua-Ren pan-ethnic identity is difficult to distinguish from PRC-Chinese 
		
108 
identity because it comes from a shared Chinese culture and common origins. In short, 
PRC-Chinese people do not really distinguish PRC-Chinese and Hua-Ren before 
migrating to other countries; ethnic and nationalist sentiments of Chinese identity overlap. 
In addition, for most PRC-Chinese people, political reasons and “One China Policy” also 
bond PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese together into the same group.  
Here we can use a graph to approximately present the change in PRC-Chinese 
perceptions of Hua-Ren identity in Australia (see Figure 11). Before coming to Australia, 
PRC-Chinese thought that Hong Kong and Taiwan both belonged to China, but after 
interacting with more Taiwanese people in the workplace, some gradually realized that 
Taiwan may not be within this (PRC-Chinese) circle. For them, Taiwan is under the 
category of Hua-Ren but in terms of its relation with China, it is only on the side and has 
some intersections with the Chinese government. 
 
 
Figure 11. The Change of Perception of Hua-Ren Identity among PRC-Chinese 
Interviewees 
 
For most of my Hong Kongese and Taiwanese respondents (either older or 
younger generations), in contrast, Hua-Ren identity is more a cultural/ethnic concept than 
a political one. In other words, when being asked about their political identity, they still 
feel themselves distant from PRC-Chinese. Mary, a twenty-five-year-old Hong Kongese 
Working Holiday maker whom I met in the cosmetics-packing factory, told me:  
 
I am proud of being Hong Kongese! Not Chinese…some of PRC-Chinese 
colleagues sometimes do not understand why we speak Cantonese 
frequently; they think all Chinese are supposed to be able to speak 
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Mandarin. What they do not understand is, the “white language” [Bai-Hua, 
Cantonese] is our first language. 
 
Another Hong Kongese respondent, Eason, who worked in the same restaurant 
with me, expressed his Hong Kong identity even more directly: 
 
I would say I am Hong Kongese, or maybe, Hua-Ren in Australia, but I 
would not say I am Zhongguo-Ren [PRC-Chinese]. I do not know whether 
Australians can distinguish Hong Kongese and Zhongguo-Ren; maybe 
they think we are all the same, we both have yellow skins, black hair, and 
Chinese faces. But I personally do not think I am Zhongguo-Ren. Because 
I am not a communist! 
 
When asked about Taiwanese, he said: “They are not PRC-Chinese. Because 
Taiwanese are not communists either!” (Interview with Eason, December 21, 2014) Here 
we can see a boundary of national identification existing between Hong Kongese and 
PRC-Chinese. Even though Hong Kong has now returned to China, most of my Hong 
Kongese respondents still hesitated (or were relatively reluctant) to claim that they are 
PRC-Chinese. When I kept asking them why, another Hong Kongese migrant, Lok, who 
is a construction worker, gave me an explanation: 
 
It is not because we do not want to admit that we are PRC-Chinese, it is 
because we still feel there are some gaps between we Hong Kongese and 
they PRC-Chinese. You know what? Somehow I feel I am half-Chinese, 
not totally Chinese… 
 
Lok’s response represented that he acknowledges the linkage between Hong 
Kongese and PRC-Chinese, but he is unwilling to be called PRC-Chinese. Such reluctant 
attitude can be partly explained by their colonial experience. My Hong Kongese 
respondents always compare the situations of Hong Kong before and after it returned to 
China and feel that life under British rule was much better. The experiences under British 
rule have led to differences with China in terms of cultural or social habits. Many of my 
Hong Kongese respondents said that in Hong Kong, they seldom interacted with PRC-
Chinese (Field notes, March 2, 2015). 
Indeed, language can be a barrier for Hong Kongese and PRC-Chinese 
communication. In addition to Cantonese vs. Mandarin, in my interview I also found that 
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Hong Kongese people attach “moral” elements to their national identities and see that 
they find “democratic” and “freedom of speech” as desirable identity markers as opposed 
to PRC-Chinese because the latter lacks certain elements. 
In this regard, it is not surprising that Taiwanese feel themselves to be different 
from PRC-Chinese. Similar to Hong Kong, Taiwan was also under another country’s rule 
for over fifty years. During Japanese rule, the Taiwanese absorbed different degrees of 
modernization and created different identities. Such identities, along with the process of 
Japanization and Westernization, have made Taiwan shift away from traditional Chinese 
culture to certain degrees (Heylen 2004; Huang 2006). One Taiwanese Working Holiday 
maker, Cecilia, said: 
 
I would not say I am PRC-Chinese, or Hua-Ren. I always say, or insist 
that I am Taiwanese, even when I meet PRC-Chinese people. Because I 
know I am here in Australia, not in China. I still remember when my 
friend said: “you are PRC-Chinese” to me, I felt uncomfortable and a bit 
angry. For me, PRC-Chinese is associated with the concept of foreigner; 
for example, if today you ask me about PRC-Chinese and Koreans or 
Japanese, I would feel they are all the same to me, because they are all 
foreigners. 
 
Similar to PRC-Chinese see Hua-Ren from a nationalist perspective, Cecilia also 
links Hua-Ren to her national identity, and she overlaps Hua-Ren with PRC-Chinese as 
well. It is exactly because of such overlap that Cecilia is hesitant to claim herself Hua-
Ren. Peggy, another Taiwanese Working Holiday maker, also clearly differentiated Hua-
Ren and PRC-Chinese. She said she is fine with people who categorize her as Hua-Ren, 
but only in a very narrow sense (e.g., speaking Mandarin Chinese). She cannot accept the 
idea of being categorized as PRC-Chinese (Interview with Peggy, December 18, 2014).  
Here we can illustrate the perception of Hong Kongese and Taiwanese migrants 
when they see their relationship with PRC-Chinese by using another graph (see Figure 12, 
left side refers to Hong Kongese and right side refers to Taiwanese). Both Hong Kongese 
and Taiwanese are fine with being put under the Hua-Ren category, but only to certain 
extents. Yet, they do not see themselves as being in the PRC-Chinese category.82  																																																								
82 However, the national identity can vary and can be changeable depending on the contexts. As I will 
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Figure 12. The Ethnic Identity of Hong Kongese and Taiwanese Interviewees 
 
These examples show the diverse views in Australia of national and pan-ethnic 
identity among PRC-Chinese, Hong Kongese, and Taiwanese migrant groups. Figure 13 
summarizes my findings into a graph. It shows how national identity (PRC-
Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese identity, the y-axis) and pan-ethnic identity (Hua-Ren 
identity, the x-axis) nested within different Chinese subgroups. In this figure we can see 
that Taiwanese migrants identify themselves as “Hua-Ren” only to a limited extent; Hong 
Kongese migrants are in a more mixture sense: they see themselves as “Chinese overseas” 
while still holding their Hong Kongese identity; and PRC-Chinese identify themselves as 
both PRC-Chinese and Hua-Ren within an immigration context. 
 
 
Figure 13. The Interaction of National Identity with Pan-ethnic Identity after 
Immigrating to Australia 
 
When talking about ethnic groups, Weber (1968 [1922]) focuses on a set of 
subjective “beliefs,” collectivities in their common ancestry and shared culture (p. 385, 
389). However, the narratives of my respondents provided above demonstrate that for 																																																																																																																																																																					
discuss in the following sections, people can either hide their national identity to meet situational needs or 
accept the fact that when the concept of Hua-Ren is shared among these three subgroups, they are seen as 
the “same” ethnic group. 
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Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants, the fiction of common origins or shared customs 
is neither important nor real when they are in Australia. Instead, they focus more on the 
“symbolic” elements of their own ethnicities (democratic, freedom of speech, etc.) and 
see themselves “different” from Mainland Chinese. Here I go back to Barth’s (1969) idea 
that the formation of ethnic consciousness is not from shared culture and common 
ancestry. Even they do share some Chinese cultures and sometimes attach the term Hua-
Ren to themselves, the cognitive differences between Taiwanese/Hong Kongese and 
PRC-Chinese contradict any attempts to define ethnicity through a “shared culture” or 
“common origin.” In sum, even there is a social group we can term it as a Hua-Ren group, 
the content and ethnic ascription is always variable and changing. The fluidity of national 
and ethnic identification leads to dynamic group interactions in the workplace, which I 
will discuss in the following sections.  
 
Making and Unmaking the Group Boundary in the Workplace 
Making a Boundary 
Siu (2005: 140) claims that “Chinese” is “culturally mediated, context-specific, 
and embedded in a web of power relations.” The affirmation of ethnic and national 
identity depends on social settings and is relevant to an actor’s perception of that situation. 
Focusing on the workplace, in this section I will highlight that the cultural dynamics and 
class positions in the workplace do influence and even determine group boundary 
making/unmaking among these three Chinese subgroups. By examining the example of 
Chinese migrant groups in the workplace, this chapter will substantiate Wimmer’s (2013) 
claim that ethnic boundary making/unmaking should be based on contexts.      
Wimmer (2008a, 2008b, 2013) systematically constructs “modes” and “means” of 
strategic ethnic boundary making and unmaking through expansion, contraction, trans-
valuation, repositioning, and blurring. “Strategic,” for Wimmer (2013: 44), refers to 
individual efforts “to promote certain types of classification – of defining who is what – 
rather than others, in an attempt to gain power, recognition, or access to resources.” In 
exploring different strategies, Wimmer illustrates the processes and contexts of how 
actors revise a boundary to a more inclusive or less inclusive level. For example, 
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expansion means “creating a more encompassing boundary into a new, expanded 
category.” (Wimmer 2008a: 1032) “Asian-American” is a good example here as different 
Asian groups sometimes expand their previous category (e.g., Filipino Americans, 
Chinese Americans) to a broader category for different purposes. Contraction, on the 
other hand, refers to “drawing narrower boundaries.” Such is the case among many 
Taiwanese and Hong Kongese who dislike being thrown together into the same “Chinese” 
category with PRC-Chinese (Chung and Tai 2015; Tseng 2014). 
How is identity shaped and influenced in the workplace? What is unique about the 
workplace and how does it influence group boundary making/unmaking among Chinese 
migrants? To be more specific, how do people strategically use the national (PRC-
Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese) and pan-ethnic (Hua-Ren) identities to make and 
unmake boundaries in the workplace? During my fieldwork I have found that in the 
workplace, national identity can be adjusted so that people can regularly unmake group 
boundaries with other national groups and manage differences without changing their 
categorical memberships. The different dimensions of national identity, ethnic 
imagination, and different ways of managing difference in the workplace, give Chinese 
migrant groups the means to exploit different identities to make/unmake group 
boundaries. 
The first question we may ask here is: How does the concept of Hua-Ren reflect 
in the workplace? For example, in the supermarket I worked, I frequently heard my boss 
saying: “Hua-Ren customers prefer coming here to buy Hua-Ren food, most of them do 
not get used to Western foods.” (Field notes, December 10, 2014) In the Chinese 
restaurant, there were also Hua-Ren elements there since it featured famous dishes from 
Beijing (e.g., Beijing Roast Duck), Hong Kong (e.g., Hong Kong-style BBQ), and 
Taiwan (e.g., Three-cup Chicken). I also heard waiters/waitresses frequently use the term 
Hua-Ren to describe characteristics shared by PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, Hong Kongese, 
or those with Chinese backgrounds in Australia. For example, one night after calculating 
tips, a twenty-year-old PRC-Chinese waitress, Fanny, complained about Hua-Ren 
customers leaving small or no tips (Field notes, September 27, 2014): 
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You know our restaurant is next to the casino, supposedly, customers who 
have won lots of money from the casino will leave large tips. Over 80% of 
people in the casino are Hua-Ren, but they never leave tips, even they 
earned a lot of money. Those who give bigger tips are always white people. 
 
Despite the attribution of stereotype-like characteristics to Hua-Ren, the three 
Chinese subgroups also share Chinese New Year, Chinese Festivals, and other Chinese 
traditions. For example, many Chinese migrants go to Hua-Ren churches and joined Hua-
Ren communities, which I will discuss more in the next chapter. The workplace, however, 
reflects how people resort to their own national identity to make the boundary between 
Chinese subgroups within the Hua-Ren category.  
Language is undoubtedly an important aspect of identity. In the restaurant I 
worked, because the two managers were both from Hong Kong, they spoke Bai-Hua 
(Cantonese), a common language used for communication in the restaurant. On the first 
day when the manager assigned a senior boy (James) to show me what jobs to do, I 
realized that James was a Working Holiday maker from Hong Kong when he was 
speaking Cantonese with Simon. I was nervous because I do not really speak Cantonese. 
At first I tried to use my poor Cantonese to communicate with him. He told me: “Do not 
be silly, if you do not know Cantonese then just speak Mandarin to me. Do not pretend 
you know, otherwise from now on, I will teach you everything in Cantonese.” (Field 
notes, August 30, 2014) I soon gave up the idea and told James to speak Mandarin to me 
so that I did not misunderstand him. After few days, whenever I made mistakes, he would 
always say: “Is my Mandarin so poor that you do not understand me?” (Field notes, 
September 8, 2014) 
Because Cantonese was a common language used for communication in the 
restaurant. In this case, Mandarin became “another” language that brought PRC-Chinese 
and Taiwanese together. At the same time, Cantonese set a boundary between Hong 
Kongese (who speak in Cantonese) and PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese (who use Mandarin), 
except those who came from southern China also speak Cantonese. Nevertheless, 
Mandarin did play an important role in the restaurant in “dissolving” the boundary 
between PRC-Chinese and Taiwanese. One day when Simon yelled at me in Cantonese, 
for example, one of my PRC-Chinese colleagues, Tim, comforted me and said: “Just 
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ignore him and let it go! He can scold us as much as he wants but it makes no difference 
since we cannot understand Cantonese.” (Field notes, September 19, 2014) 
The knowledge of specific language thus sets group boundary between the users 
of the language and those who are not familiar with it in the workplace. Indeed, the 
language difference can also be a proxy for class or positional differences (employers vs. 
employees), which is a key element in the workplace. In this restaurant the two managers 
were both Hong Kongese, whereas most PRC-Chinese and Taiwanese were employees. 
Cantonese became not only a dominant but also a “preferable” language in this restaurant. 
For example, the most exciting day for employees was Monday night that we called it 
“the day of Chu-liang.” (food-releasing) Chu-liang is a Cantonese word referring to the 
day/time of giving employees last-week’s salary. In the restaurant it was also common to 
call white male customers Gweilo (ghost people) and white female customers Gweipo. 
These two terms are both Cantonese and referred to white people.  
In the restaurant, the use of Cantonese and Mandarin also shows positional 
difference. During my time working there, I did notice Hong Kongese employees had a 
closer interaction and more frequent chats with managers, whereas Taiwanese and PRC-
Chinese employees were treated more like employees. For example, Simon always first 
called Taiwanese and PRC-Chinese waiters/waitresses when he wanted work done. 
Contrary to interviews I quoted in the previous section, even though Hong Kongese and 
Taiwanese migrants might share similar ideas of political identity, democracy/freedom, 
and shared status as Working Holiday visa holders, there was no workplace solidarity 
among us (Taiwanese and Hong Kongese) in the restaurant. Every time when Simon 
asked James to teach me to serve fish or roast duck, James always showed his impatience 
as if I caused him lots of trouble. James always complained and told me: “How many 
time do I need to teach and show you? I was blamed by Simon because of you!” (Field 
notes, September 15, 2014) The hostility also created against Hong Kongese 
waiters/waitresses by other Chinese subgroups (such as Taiwanese and PRC-Chinese), 
especially when some Hong Kongese employees were taking advantage of the closeness 
with manager and used it to have less working load (Field notes, September 19, 2014). 
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The blur of identity and boundary making happened not just between different 
national groups, it also appeared within the same national group because of positional 
difference. For example, Benson, a Taiwanese senior waiter, always took advantage of 
his “seniority” and ordered other Taiwanese rookies and me to do various work. One day, 
I caught him eating a piece of cake with Simon during work time, and he said: “What are 
you watching? There are lots of plates and bowls need to be replaced! There is another 
table over there that needs to be cleaned up as well!” (Field notes, September 17, 2014) 
Other Taiwanese waitresses also told me that they felt Benson always tried to “please” 
Simon so that one day he could be promoted to be one of the “white-vests.”    
In the previous chapter I showed the level of frustration Chinese migrant workers 
experienced when exploited by their co-ethnics. The same situation frequently occurred 
in the workplace, too. And it does not just happen vertically between co-ethnic employers 
and employees, it is also appeared “horizontally” among colleagues from the same 
country of origin. To be more specific, even when employees were all from Taiwan, there 
was no guarantee that Taiwanese would help Taiwanese. “Taiwanese take advantage of 
Taiwanese” becomes another parallel with “Hua-Ren exploit Hua-Ren.” It certainly 
influences national identity because the disappointment could be even worse when it 
comes from a co-ethnic. Take myself for example, I felt bit sad at that time because the 
one who is “supposed to” help me was not the person who comes from the same country. 
Instead, it is PRC-Chinese or even Korean colleagues whom I feel more comfortable 
talking to, even the Korean workers could not speak Mandarin and their English was not 
very fluent either (Field notes, September 18, 2014).     
In terms of boundary making, from Benson’s case it is clear that he tried to set a 
boundary between himself and other Taiwanese rookies based on “class” status; but at the 
same time, he dissolved the boundary with the Hong Kongese supervisor, even with the 
existence of language barrier. In this case, class obviously overrides the importance of 
national identity. How James and Benson treated co-ethnics or other subgroups might just 
be a reflection of their individual personalities. Through these examples, however, we 
can see that identity and group boundary in the workplace is never rigid. In other words, 
identity never strictly determines people’s group interactions, especially in the social 
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setting like workplace. In the workplace, class positions can always reflect and even 
change national identity.  
On the other hand, positional differences can also generate the solidarity among 
Taiwanese and PRC-Chinese employees against Hong Kongese employers. A PRC-
Chinese waiter, Gilbert, once told me: “Take your time bro! Do not listen to those stupid 
Hong Kongese [the managers], take it easy! We are paid by working hours, and we are 
not making a lot of money anyway…” (Field notes, September 29, 2014)  
Even there was no solidarity between Hong Kongese and Taiwanese in the 
restaurant, boundary making does happen between Taiwanese/Hong Kongese and PRC-
Chinese, especially when something associated with political status happens. In the 
supermarket I worked, there is a stand in the shopping mall distributing the Epoch 
Times83 for free, which is a big overseas Chinese press against the Chinese Communist 
Party. Vivian told me she always read the first page on the newspaper that shows how 
many people in China resigned from the Communist Party everyday. One day she 
mentioned the number of people resigning from the Communist Party and told me: “We 
should get all Hong Kongese and Taiwanese workers together and run a strike. And we 
mark the numbers of workers going on strike every day like the Epoch Times does, then 
we can threaten the PRC-Chinese government to acknowledge our independence!” I told 
her it is unlikely that people will join us, and she replied: “Well, maybe we can ask our 
PRC-Chinese boss to raise our salary first?” (Field notes, November 30, 2014) Vivian’s 
narratives show how she makes the group boundary with PRC-Chinese while at the same 
time unmaking the boundary with Taiwanese. For Vivian, Taiwanese and Hong Kongese 
face similar political situation and can thus work together to resist the Chinese 
government. 
 
Unmaking and “Playing” at the Group Boundary 
When people are overseas, the different interpretations of Hua-Ren and the 
change of national identities mentioned provide some room or flexibility for people to 
unmake and play at the group boundary, especially when there is a co-presence of 																																																								
83 See: http://www.theepochtimes.com 
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different national groups, such as workplace. As discussed before, people may either 
change their attitudes after migrating to Australia, or they may have a better sense of 
where a boundary should be, as the interaction patterns in the workplace has been 
established. Once people know what constitutes group boundaries between each other 
and to what extents they can display or hide their identity, they can make/unmake those 
boundaries and manage identity differences without changing their ethnic position or 
resorting to a broader, shared pan-ethnic identity. 
As Wimmer (2008b: 976) suggests: “When boundaries are salient, alliances are 
more likely to be formed between co-ethnics than between individuals on opposite sides 
of a boundary.” For example, one of my Taiwanese colleagues (Sara) in the supermarket 
once tried to unite “us” Taiwanese as her witnesses when she tried to sue the company 
over a pay issue. During that time, she kept saying that “other Taiwanese colleagues are 
on my side, and we Taiwanese should stand together against the bad PRC-Chinese boss.” 
(Field notes, November 18, 2014) This example is dramatic because I was inadvertently 
involved and was seen as an “ally” over whom Sara and management competed. Sara 
told me the CCTV set in the supermarket was to monitor whether we worked hard or not 
and even stalked us (Field notes, November 18, 2014). The PRC-Chinese boss, Wendy, 
during that time period, asked me whether Sara had told me about her intention to sue the 
company. The owner told me one day after work (Field notes, November 20, 2014): 
 
I have many employees, not just in this supermarket, but also in massage 
parlors. Many of these employees are now applying for permanent 
residency or working visa. Sara tried to sue the whole company. You 
know, it might influence the reputation of our company and even other 
employees’ applications. If she succeeds, I might need to spend two years 
to get the business permit again. I do not mind paying the fine, but all my 
other employees…what about them? Their life could be destroyed by her! 
 
At the same time, Wendy used strategies to separate me and other Taiwanese 
colleagues from Sara, such as giving us more bonuses and asking us to get off work 
earlier. 84  She clearly tried to blur the group boundary between PRC-Chinese and 																																																								
84 I wonder if it is because most of the employees in the supermarket were from Taiwan so that the 
employer needed to develop some strategies to unmake the boundary between PRC-Chinese and 
Taiwanese. The ethnic combination (and proportion) and the positional difference (which group is the 
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Taiwanese and shifted the focus to Sara’s “personal” (bad) behavior. For example, one 
day the owner told me and other Taiwanese employees that the reason she did not fire us 
was because she “trusts” us. She said: “all you Taiwanese are my good employees.” She 
believed we would not stand up with Sara simply because we are all from Taiwan (Field 
notes, November 20, 2014). 
Not just Wendy, even other Taiwanese colleagues started to suspect that it was I 
who “taught” Sara to sue the company. Because Sara’s English was not good, they 
thought somebody (potentially, me) might coach her to file a complaint and submit the 
forms to the Fair Work Ombudsman. A Taiwanese colleague, Abby, asked me if I 
encouraged Sara to sue the company. One day she told me when there are no other 
colleagues around (Field notes, November 21, 2014):  
     
I treat you as a friend, so I want to tell you about this straightforwardly. 
You have to be careful! Wendy [the PRC-Chinese boss] might fire you! 
She thinks there must be someone who has been teaching her how to make 
a complaint through the authorities. Wendy knows Sara and her boyfriend 
did not have good English ability, she suspects it might be one of us. She 
knows you are a PhD student so…you are the most likely person teaching 
Sara how to do that. I think from now on, really, we need to set a 
boundary with Sara, decreasing the conversations with her, even though 
we are all Taiwanese. 
 
Another Taiwanese colleague, Susan, asked me if I had conversations with Sara 
about something I did not tell them. She said (Field notes, November 24, 2014):  
 
I have un-friended her on Facebook. You do not need to make friends with 
every single Taiwanese here in Australia, someone like her [Sara]…I 
would not bother to make friend with her. It is not worth the efforts. I have 
told Wendy that I will never trust what Sara said and would instead focus 
on my work…she [Sara] basically tries to put all of us in the same 
situation like she faces at the moment…if we keep interacting with Sara, 
who knows, maybe one day we will all be fired.”  
 
In the week following Sara’s dismissal the owner told me (Field notes, November 
31, 2014):  																																																																																																																																																																					
employer/employee) will certainly influence the strategies created by the employer.    
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I asked Sara not to come to work. It has been annoying in the past few 
weeks that she kept saying bad things about you guys. She told Haley 
[another PRC-Chinese manager] that Susan played mobile phone during 
the working hours, and said you are lazy at work. I do not want these 
gossips to be existed and influence the workplace harmony.  
 
Few days after, she even increased Abby’s and my hourly wage by a dollar. It 
may have been just be a coincidence: the owner let me know, “I have been thinking of 
increasing your wage. You have been working here over a month and I can see you work 
very hard.” (Field notes, December 5, 2014) Abby and I, however, felt the owner’s 
strategy was to avoid a similar situation as Sara’s complaint by showing her kindness. 
Abby told me after work: “It can not be just a coincidence! I think she [Wendy] is afraid 
of something [like Sara’s complaint] similar happens again.” (Field notes, December 5, 
2014) 
The workplace is unique also in that people can establish their everyday 
interaction patterns regardless of national identity or political belief. Once people are 
aware of the boundaries to each other, group boundaries or political issues between PRC-
Chinese and Taiwanese/Hong Kongese become less sensitive. For example, one day a 
PRC-Chinese colleague, Tony, showed me his Chinese banknote and said: “Do you want 
one? Look, there is our greatest chairman Mao on it! Do not tell me you do not like it 
[money] even though I know you Taiwanese people want independence!” (Field notes, 
September 16, 2014) 
When people know each other’s limits, there is flexibility for boundary remaking 
between groups. People even find their nationality and group tensions can be talked about 
and can be a topic of everyday interactions. For example, during the first week of work in 
the supermarket, when I was talking about a local election in Taiwan with Susan, Haley 
(a PRC-Chinese manager) joked: “You know what? I support Taiwan independence. In 
fact, China is big enough, we do not need Taiwan.” (Field notes, November 6, 2014) 
The possibilities of “playing” at the boundary create “hybrid” situations and can 
be used to manage differences. That is, people hold their national identities (e.g., PRC-
Chinese, Taiwanese or Hong Kongese) constant, on the one hand; while talking about 
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political or other sensitive issues as a way of joking in their everyday interactions, on the 
other. Some may assume that one way to unmake the group boundary is to highlight their 
pan-ethnic (Hua-Ren) identity and downplay the importance of national identity. In the 
workplace, however, giving up one’s national identity is not a necessary condition to 
unmake the group boundary. Once people know other national groups’ limits, they can 
play within the process without adopting pan-ethnic identity. For example, Susan 
identifies herself as Taiwanese, and she once told me: “We poor Taiwanese, have to do 
these shitty jobs for PRC-Chinese bosses.” (Field notes, December 11, 2014) For Susan, 
however, there is no further need to revise the group boundary, such as enhancing her 
recognition as a Taiwanese. She treats the group boundary as a fun topic and often uses 
cross-Strait situations (China–Taiwan relation) as topics to tease Haley. For example, one 
day she said to Haley: “I can do you this favor, as long as you ask the leader of the 
Chinese government to remove the missiles aimed at Taiwan.” (Field notes, November 
19, 2014) She also often picks up certain elements or values (democracy, freedom) and 
highlights that China is conservative and anti-democratic (Field notes, November 19, 
2014): 
 
The Chinese passport is useless overseas. It can be used only to travel to a 
very few countries without visa authorization. In contrast, our Taiwanese 
passport can be used to travel to more than 150 countries visa-free. You 
know why? Because other countries do not like China, they know the 
Chinese government is antidemocratic! 
 
Susan clearly holds her own identity constant and even highlights the existing 
boundaries between PRC-Chinese and Taiwanese. She proposed her opinion and tested 
whether other national groups (e.g., PRC-Chinese) agree with her or not. Hearing Susan’s 
comments, Haley responded it accordingly: 
 
Haley: That is true. Sometimes I wish I could have a Taiwanese 
passport…do you know how to get one as a PRC-Chinese? Or do you 
guys give the travel certificate like the one our government issues to 
Taiwanese?  
 
Susan: Maybe the fastest way is to find a Taiwanese boyfriend and get 
married with him? 
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Haley: True. Do you know any good Taiwanese guys whom you can 
introduce to me?  
 
Susan: But they may not want to marry a PRC-Chinese bride!  
 
Similarly, Haley would say something to me like: “I have noticed that you are 
using wechat [PRC-Chinese app software], you are exactly Zhongguo-Ren just like us, 
aren’t you?” (Field notes, November 27, 2014) Acknowledging the cross-Strait tension, 
however, Haley sometimes also poked fun at her own country to dissolve the boundary 
between PRC-Chinese and Taiwanese. For example, one day Susan mentioned that she 
has never travelled to China and she does not want to apply for mainland travel permit for 
Taiwanese residents. Hearing Susan’s comments, Haley said (Field notes, December 12, 
2014):  
 
You guys are welcome to China! If you visit China, I would come to the 
airport with a sign showing: “Welcome! My democratic Taiwanese 
brethren!”…oh wait, I might be arrested by my government before 
meeting you! (laughing)…Please! Please ask your democratic Taiwanese 
government to come save us from authoritarian rule in China! 
 
The cross-Strait tension and identity categorization, within the workplace context, 
become less sensitive and can be used to unmake the group boundary. In other words, 
people do not think of boundary unmaking as a way of re-valuing or repositioning their 
ethnic status, as Wimmer (2013) suggests. 
Another example can be introduced here is how PRC-Chinese might unmake the 
group boundary and be closer to Taiwanese. In the restaurant I worked, a PRC-Chinese 
colleague, Leila, who always watched Taiwanese idol dramas on her ipad from 4:30 to 
5:00 pm before starting her shift, told me: “I really like Taiwanese accents, lots of my 
friends try to mock them because they sound very cute.” She even asked me to teach her 
how to effect a Taiwanese accent and always talked to me with Taiwanese accent, asking 
me to check if she practiced it correctly. She told me her ex-boss asked her to talk more 
like a “Taiwanese” (Field notes, October 1, 2014):  
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My ex-boss told me: “Can you learn to speak the way that other waitresses 
from Taiwan speak? The customers would feel happier if you change your 
way of speaking”…He always thought I speak too directly and he said my 
behavior is not qualified to work in a service industry. Other Taiwanese 
waitresses always started with “excuse me” in a very polite way, and their 
accent is cute…  
 
Again, unmaking the cultural boundary may not necessarily come along with the 
change of national identity. Leila, for example, still thinks Taiwan, similar to Hong Kong, 
is part of China (Field notes, October 3, 2014). Showing an interest in Taiwanese drama 
or learning to pronounce Taiwanese accent is just one example of showing friendship or 
unmaking group boundary. Another display of breaking boundary is expressing shame 
about co-ethnic behavior. For example, a PRC-Chinese waitress, Shayne, said:  
 
If you compare the customers who come to this restaurant, you can tell 
approximately where they come from…those who speak loudly in 
Mandarin, those who are more rude, and mess up the table after finishing 
meals, are always PRC-Chinese. And they are probably the most 
stingy…[They] seldom leave tips. Sometimes I feel bit embarrassed as a 
PRC-Chinese, but I guess it is part of our culture, it might take some time 
to change it gradually…  
 
Shayne went on and said she felt Taiwanese customers are more “courteous” and 
one day she even told me that she wanted to find a Taiwanese boyfriend (Field notes, 
October 21, 2014): 
 
Everyone said Taiwanese men are gentlemen. They share the housework, 
cooking, and would carry the bags for girls. I do not like “Big man” [male 
chauvinist], I hate seeing man yelling at woman. For example, Simon and 
Bruce [a PRC-Chinese colleague], they always yell loudly at us. I do not 
like that… you, and Jinbo [a Taiwanese colleague], you guys got good 
personality and are always willing to help others, so I believe it would be 
very nice to find a Taiwanese boyfriend. 
 
Similarly, when rude behavior came from Taiwanese customers, PRC-Chinese 
would link it to their stereotype of their co-ethnics (PRC-Chinese) and at the same time 
they also unmake the existing imaginary boundaries. For example, one night after the 
work was done, Fanny said (Field notes, September 30, 2014): 
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Today the customers from table 8 really changed my perception of 
Taiwanese people. I thought talking loudly and yelling at customers are 
more likely to happen among PRC-Chinese customers, now I think I need 
to change my stereotype. In fact, both Taiwanese and PRC-Chinese are no 
different from each other.     
  
Both Shayne and Fanny broke their imaginary boundary because the workplace 
culture and experiences allow them to change or to strengthen stereotype of people from 
China or Taiwan. Clearly, cultural dynamics and class positions might override national 
identity. In other words, in some contexts like workplace, national identity can be flexible 
in determining how people interact with other national groups. On the one hand, the 
examples provided above show that people can make a boundary to those from the same 
country of origin out of utilitarian concerns; on the other hand, from both Shayne and 
Fanny’s remarks we also see people can selectively dissolve the boundary to other 
national groups because of other cultural reasons like the proximity of language or 
cultural allure.   
Boundary unmaking not just happens between PRC-Chinese and Taiwanese, 
playing at the group boundary also happens between Hong Kongese and PRC-Chinese. 
My Hong Kongese colleague, Vivian, once discussed the Occupy Central movement85 
with Haley: “Look at the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong. Now you guys know it is 
hard to be a ‘big brother’! Give us more freedom, then we will think about whether to be 
Zhongguo-Ren.” (Field notes, November 21, 2014) Similar to Susan, Vivian also talks 
about these political issues in a humorous way because she knows the boundary to other 
PRC-Chinese and treats talking such issues as a way of having fun. She also told me 
during the interview: “I feel it is fun to test their limits, and see at which point they would 
get upset!” When I kept asking her why she tested her colleagues’ limits, she replied: “I 
do not know, I just feel it is fun!” (Interview with Vivian, December 17, 2015) 
Wimmer (2013) distinguishes five types of strategic boundary making/unmaking 
and argues that by overcoming ethnicity as a principle of categorization, we can “blur” 																																																								
85 In September of 2014, Hong Kong citizens occupied central Hong Kong for several months to protest 
against the Chinese government’s control of Hong Kong’s electoral nomination process for the city’s top 
position, demanding an open nomination process for candidates in the next election. 
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the ethnic boundary. If we examine Wimmer’s indicators of “strategic boundary 
making/unmaking,” such as expansion, contraction, trans-valuation, repositioning and 
blurring, we find that in the workplace, the examples provided above show that people 
make and unmake the group boundary (between Taiwanese, Hong Kongese, and PRC-
Chinese) without expanding or contracting the existing categories. People do not give 
their own ethnicity (Taiwanese, Hong Kongese, and PRC-Chinese) a new value (trans-
valuation) or try to “reposition” their ethnic status, either to a more inclusive or exclusive 
level. Instead, by highlighting ethnic elements and moral values (democratic, freedom), 
my colleagues in the supermarket treated these “boundary making/unmaking” episodes as 
a chance to have fun in their everyday interactions. They even highlighted the existing 
boundaries and group tensions between each other. In this sense, “playing at the 
boundary” can not only be strategic for minimizing tensions, it can also manage 
differences and be a fun topic in everyday social contexts. This is a kind of boundary 
work that has not been articulated in Wimmer’s account.      
Indeed, here I am not making a universal claim that group boundary 
making/unmaking appears in every workplaces and is presented in the same way. The 
interaction patterns in the workplaces I worked at may be different from the ones in other 
industries. For example, people work in a massage parlor or as a room attendant in a hotel 
may not have as many opportunities to chat with their colleagues. Furthermore, different 
company scales, gender proportions, and ethnic backgrounds of employers/employees 
(and which group is the management) will also influence the interaction patterns among 
these three subgroups and how their national identities will be changed. What I want to 
emphasize here, is highlighting that workplace serves as a specific context in which 
people can generate group boundary making/unmaking without resorting to a pan-ethnic 
identity.  
 
Presenting National Identity in the Temporary Work Place  
In the above sections I have discussed the dynamics of group interactions in the 
“regular” workplaces. In this section I want to include more discussions about 
experiences in the casual and temporary working places to highlight that the time factor 
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can also make differences in terms of group perception and interaction. The importance 
of temporary work to group relation lies in its temporariness. Temporariness is not only 
important in deciding what types of job people will seek (as discussed in the previous 
chapter), it also influences the way people interact with each other in the workplace. As 
mentioned in the previous section, in the regular workplace, if people frequently see and 
interact with each other every day, they would know the limit of each other’s boundary 
better and could thus strategically make or unmake group boundary to meet strategic 
needs or simply to have fun. When jobs are casual, however, personnel may change on a 
daily basis, group interaction may thus be different.  
For example, people generally do not think national identity is an issue in the 
temporary workplace. When doing temporary work, identity can be adapted to suit other 
people, making them comfortable. For example, one twenty-three-year-old Taiwanese 
respondent, Nora, said:  
 
Since I am alone overseas, if other people really force me to identify 
myself as Zhongguo-Ren [PRC-Chinese], or when I try to get a casual job 
where the boss is PRC-Chinese, I might say, “ok, yes I am Zhongguo-Ren. 
I support Taiwan’s reunification with China.” Who cares? Especially we 
are just here working for a short period of time. In our shop, many 
Working Holiday makers and students come to work and leave the job 
frequently. People just want to get the money, and then leave. 
 
Nora’s narratives show how she hided her identity and unmade the boundary to 
meet strategic needs. Nora’s response also reminds us of Ngan and Chan’s (2012: xv) 
concept of different Chinese “faces.” To be specific, Chinese-ness is like a mask, “to be 
put on and off, depending on the audience.” People can thus perform Hua-Ren identity 
and national identity strategically in different social settings as performances. The self-
identification of ethnicity reflects the rationalist individualism that has come to permeate 
identity and group formation in contemporary society.   
From March to September 2015, I worked casual jobs such as moving furniture, 
loading/unloading warehouse containers, house-cleaning, product-packing, product-
delivery, and gardening jobs. I took these jobs three to four days a week. During the time 
working in these temporary workplaces, the first question most employers—from China, 
		
127 
Hong Kong, or Taiwan—asked was always: “You are from Taiwan, right?” With my 
accent and speech patterns people could easily tell where I am from. One time, for 
example, I asked one of my PRC-Chinese colleagues back: “Seriously? I do not think my 
accent is that clearly to be told that I am Taiwan.” My colleague said: “In China, we 
would not say ‘seriously,’ nor like the way you just said.” (Field notes, May 15, 2015)  
Some might assume on most casual jobs, without knowing other’s identity or 
political position, people would avoid talking about sensitive political issues. As Nora’s 
narratives, part of the reason is people simply do not think such political issues are 
important; in the temporary workplace, “getting work done” is the priority. Another 
reason is without knowing other colleagues’ political position, it is more safe to talk 
about less sensitive issues and keep their identity “neutral” at first.  
Yet, my identity as a Taiwanese in the casual workplace was always the 
conversational icebreaker my PRC-Chinese colleagues or employers started with. Those 
who had been to Taiwan told me where they went and how much they liked it (the food, 
scenery, culture, etc.), whereas those who had never been told me they wished to visit 
one day (Field notes, March 4, 2015). A truck driver I was working with told me: “I feel 
Taiwanese are always easy-going. I like to work with Taiwanese, because our culture and 
backgrounds are so similar. We both speak Mandarin, it is always easy to communicate 
with each other.” (Field notes, April 12, 2015) His narratives represent when first 
meeting other subgroups, without knowing other’s identity, people may try to show 
friendliness and dissolve the existing (political) boundary (between PRC-Chinese and 
Taiwanese). 
Political issues were usually avoided, although occasionally they could be raised 
as some people love to talk about politics but in a “non-political” way. Because of doing 
temporary work, I had several experiences when PRC-Chinese employers or colleagues 
whom have never been to Taiwan but would like to know more about the opinions of 
Taiwanese. Sometimes they asked me directly: “Do most Taiwanese really feel Taiwan is 
an independent country and it is not belonged to China?” (Field notes, April 22, 2015)  
When I was asked about how many Taiwanese people supported independence or 
whether I supported it, I always told my colleagues that I do not have a specific position. 
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Instead, I asked them, “What is your opinion”? Some told me they really liked Taiwan’s 
female potential presidential candidate, Ing-Wen Tsai,86 and some of them even said that 
they envied Taiwan’s democracy and freedom (Field notes, April 28, 2015). For example, 
once after unloading a container with two PRC-Chinese colleagues (Frank and Derek), 
we walked together to the train station. For some reasons, we started talking about cross-
Strait relations (Field notes, April 26, 2015):  
 
Frank: “I know you Taiwanese people always look down on PRC-Chinese, 
you feel we are poor and uncivilized. But so what? You are part of us and 
will return to China ultimately one day. I also know lots of Taiwanese 
people want independence. If Taiwan claims independence, then sorry, 
Chinese government will absolutely attack Taiwan!” 
 
Derek, hearing Frank’s comments, showed his disagreement:   
 
Taiwan really preserved lots of traditional Chinese culture, especially 
during the Cultural Revolution. I am not criticizing the Communist Party, 
but some customs and institutions are outdated! You cannot blame it if 
Taiwan wants to separate from China! If I were Taiwanese, I might want 
to be independent from China as well! 
 
The conversation happened naturally, and as a Taiwanese, I did not feel offended 
at all. I did not even mind sharing with them why most Taiwanese people (especially 
young generations) feel they are different from PRC-Chinese (Field notes, April 26, 
2015). Again, it is because of the context (we were in Australia) as well as the 
temporariness in the casual work so that we felt more comfortable talking about these 
issues with each other. My colleagues and me all knew we might not see each other again 
because the unloading work did not happen everyday. 
As mentioned, the interaction pattern in the regular workplace is based on mutual 
understandings of the boundary to each other, so people can unmake the boundary by 
talking about or even highlighting the group tensions; in the casual workplace, however, 
people also talk about politics or sensitive issues. The reason people talk about sensitive 
issues is not because they know other national groups’ limits. Instead, it is because of the 
frequent change of personnel in the temporary workplace so that people can display their 																																																								
86 Who was also elected as the new Taiwan president in 2016. 
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identities more straightforwardly. For example, when I did some house-cleaning jobs, one 
day a Taiwanese Working Holiday maker, Lawrence, had some discussions with another 
PRC-Chinese colleague. I heard Lawrence talking to another PRC-Chinese colleague 
(Field notes, February 26, 2015):  
 
You guys are more patriotic when you are overseas, huh? If China is that 
great as you said, why are there so many PRC-Chinese coming to 
Australia and are eager for PR [permanent residency]?...Why do many 
PRC-Chinese complain there is no access to Facebook or Youtube in  
China? Do not cheat yourself!”  
  
The other day when I interviewed Lawrence and asked him about this discussion, 
he told me (interview with Lawrence, March 15, 2015):  
 
PRC-Chinese people have “glass hearts,” they get hurt so easily. It is 
ridiculous. I did not understand why he felt upset with me. Anyway, I did 
not care if Max [the PRC-Chinese colleague] was unhappy or how he 
would think of me. At that time I was just doing a three-day work with 
him, and maybe the next case I would not be paired up with him again. 
And I would not make friend with him anyway, so it does not really matter 
if I pissed him off. (laugh)   
 
Group interaction in the casual workplace also reflects boundary making when it 
involves different use of language. Instead of maintaining superficial harmony between 
groups in the regular workplace, people do not really care about keeping relationship with 
other groups because of temporariness of the work. For example, as Hong Kongese 
people communicate in Cantonese, some Taiwanese, when working with other Chinese 
subgroups, also use Taiwanese as their communicating language when they have 
“opinions” of or want to say something bad about other subgroups. A Taiwanese 
colleague, Tricia, whom I met in the cosmetics-packing factory, after discovering I 
understood Taiwanese, would speak to me in Taiwanese and disparage PRC-Chinese 
colleagues: “Look how lazy they are! They just tried to slow down the process in order to 
extend the working hours [the salary was paid by hour].” When I asked Tricia whether it 
would be too impolite to speak Taiwanese in front of them, she replied: “It does not 
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matter, I think the manager would not call them back to work again next time.” (Field 
notes, May 7, 2015) 
These examples show that when temporariness interacts with group relation, it 
can also generate specific boundary making/unmaking in the workplace. People can 
soften the potential tensions between different groups to show friendliness by treating 
national identity as an “unimportant” topic in causal work. On the other hand, people can 
also make or even strengthen group boundaries by expressing their perceptions of other 
groups directly or by speaking their own language and excluding those who do not 
understand the language. Compared to regular workplace, people do not care about 
creating harmony or maintaining relationship with other subgroups, so they can more 
freely express their own thoughts. Again, temporariness here also provides some 
flexibility for people to “play” at the group boundary within which neither expansion nor 
contraction of group boundaries is as salient or important as Wimmer (2013) claims.  
  
Summary 
The workplace provides a specific context where people can express, hide, realize, 
change, and manage their national identity, as well as understand other national group’s 
boundary. These examples and narratives show the diverse views in Australia of national 
and pan-ethnic identity among PRC-Chinese, Hong Kongese, and Taiwanese migrant 
groups. At the same time, in this chapter I also argue that different interpretations of 
national identity and how people change their perceptions of other groups before and 
after migrating to Australia give them the room and flexibility to make or unmake group 
boundaries, even though boundary making/unmaking does not necessarily involve 
identity change.  
Workplaces are unique contexts from others (e.g., community organizations) 
because people spend more daily social time working than any other activity. Workplace 
also represents a context in which different degrees of identities are either highlighted or 
hided. The long stretches of time spent with co-workers, along with the dynamics of 
cooperation and conflicts produce varied identities and interactions. In this chapter I 
distinguish dynamics within regular workplaces and the group relations when people do 
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casual jobs. Within the regular workplace, we see that boundary making and unmaking 
are strategic than simply associated with rigid identity. In some cases the boundary 
making and unmaking are more associated with the class status and refracted through the 
employer vs. employee, regardless of nationality. The boundary to other national groups 
can also be dissolved when the horizontal boundary is strengthened (e.g., between 
Benson and other Taiwanese employees). In others, however, nationality can be dissolved 
to show a way of friendliness, such as the willingness to learn other group’s accents or 
making fun of their own group.  
In contrast, within the temporary working contexts people either think identity 
issues is unimportant or may be more straightforward in terms of expressing their 
national identity because of temporariness. Temporariness not only decides the ways 
different national groups interact with each other, it also influences how one expresses 
his/her own national identity. For example, identity can be “hided” when people want to 
get a job from another national group. But in other cases, people talk about these identity 
topics in a more straightforward way with other subgroups because of the frequent 
change of personnel. In contrast with the established interaction pattern in the regular 
workplace, people concern less about whether the expression of national identity would 
influence future relations with their colleagues because the interactions are temporary and 
less frequent. They thus do not bother too much to maintain the relationship with other 
subgroups nor feel there is a need to “hide” their national identity.   
In sum, this chapter situates specific empirical findings in the different working 
places within literature on pan-ethnicity and Wimmer’s (2013) theoretical framework of 
strategic boundary making/unmaking. I argue that Hua-Ren pan-ethnic identity, is not 
simply shaped “voluntarily” or “imposed,” (Espiritu 1992; Okamoto and Mora 2014) and 
it is not just about boundary expansion or contraction either. Instead, it is a matter of how 
people interpret differences within shifting contexts. For example, Chinese migrants may 
be slotted into a “Hua-Ren” ethno-racial category in Australia, but at the same time they 
also grow their own identities “voluntarily” to distinguish Taiwanese/Hong 
Kongese/PRC-Chinese from each other. The extents of national identity and pan-ethnic 
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identity are reflected differently between these three Chinese subgroups (as Figure 13 
showed above). 
Furthermore, in different types of workplaces we can see how people frequently 
make and unmake group boundary out of their strategic interests. In the workplace, 
different interpretations of national identity and the dynamics of workplace also give rise 
to possibilities or flexibilities for people to “play” at the group boundary. Playing at the 
group boundary can thus be used to manage identity differences. Some may assume when 
people unmake the group boundary, they would at the same time highlight their shared 
pan-ethnic identity; from my respondents’ narratives, however, I find people can hold 
their own national identities or highlight group tensions, on the one hand; while they blur 
group boundaries by talking about political and identity topics and get closer to each 
other, on the other. I also show that individuals can make or unmake group boundaries 
with different strategies such as minimizing tensions, managing differences, or having 
fun in the workplace.  
In the next chapter I will shift my focus to the social and community life of 
Chinese migrants. I will describe how PRC-Chinese, Hong Kongese, and Taiwanese 
migrants choose social affiliations, participate in social activities, and form respective 
group identities. By examining whether ethnic networks and community organizations 
manage to override differences and enforce a Hua-Ren identity or not, I will highlight the 
relationship between national politics and Chinese migrants’ Hua-Ren identities within 
overseas networks/organizations and how such networks and national organizations play 
different roles of ethnic connection, imagination, and solidarity among Chinese migrants.  
Parts of this chapter are published in Ethnic and Racial Studies. The dissertation 
author was the primary investigator and author of the published article.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
ONE PERSON, TWO IDENTITIES? SEGMENTED PARTICIPATION OF 
OVERSEAS CHINESE MIGRANT NETWORKS AND COMMUNITY 
ORGANIZATIONS  
 
 
“There is no and never was, a single community we can call the Chinese 
community in Australia.”                                                            
(Chan 1999: 6) 
 
“When you talk about food, then maybe I am Chinese. But when you talk 
about communism, then I feel I am Hong Kongese, not Chinese.”                                                     
                                                                                           (Mathews 2000: 137) 
 
 
 
In the immigration context, “Chinese network” and “Chinese community 
organization” refer to networks and organizations established by Chinese groups to 
reduce risk and costs during the migration processes. After arriving in Australia, people 
create networks or community organizations with specific purposes, but at the same time, 
these networks and organizations also reflect and influence how they see other groups.  
Chinese networks and community organizations have been established 
everywhere in the world and facilitate a range of religious and socio-cultural connections 
(Kuah-Pearce and Hu-Dehart 2006; Liu 1998). For example, in Australia, the creation of 
overseas Chinese business networks operating on a global scale accelerated in 1990s. 
They originated primarily in traditional voluntary associations, organized mainly under 
the principles of place, kinship, dialect and were dedicated to traditional obligations such 
as ancestor worship (Ang 2001: 78). Currently, there are approximately 300 associations 
and organizations self-prescribed as Chinese or Hua-Ren (mostly in Sydney and 
Melbourne). These organizations were established based on business (e.g., Australia 
China Business Council), social service (e.g., Australian Chinese Community 
Association; Chinese Community Social Services Center), or religious needs (e.g., Hua-
Ren Presbyterian churches). These Hua-Ren organizations rarely distinguish national 
identities between PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, Hong Kongese, Singaporean, or Malaysian. 
People with different national identities will certainly establish and participate in
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different networks and organizations. Although scholars have pointed out that overseas 
Chinese networks and communities are heterogeneous (Chan 1999; Crissman 1967, 1991; 
Salaff et al. 2007), surprisingly, few studies address how PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and 
Hong Kongese differentiate and selectively use “Chinese” networks or the extent to 
which disparate Chinese groups identify with specific Chinese community organizations.  
This chapter explores the relationship between ethnic (Hua-Ren) identities and 
national politics (China vs. Taiwan/Hong Kong) within migrant networks and social life. 
In addition, because statistical results cannot really show subjective feelings about 
national identity and motivations to join particular networks or organizations, I also seek 
to supplement the usual statistical data with more detailed information about the everyday 
experiences of different Chinese groups and link them to the ways in which they identify 
themselves and other national groups within organizations. Understanding the 
implications of segmented participation in different migrant networks and organizations 
not only allows us to better understand the meanings/functions of overseas 
networks/organizations to migrants, it can be beneficial for future projects of social 
integration and assimilation of Chinese migrants as well. 
Focusing on the social and community life of Chinese migrants in Australia, this 
chapter discusses the purposes of various migrant networks/organizations, how Chinese 
migrants choose social affiliations, and how they form (pan-ethnic and national) identities. 
It is expected that people use social networks strategically and have different attachments 
to ethnic community organizations when they have different national identities. Different 
organizations with different goals will conflict with each other as well. Linking 
networks/organizations to national identity, however, in this chapter I explore contexts 
under which Hua-Ren ethnic unity forms, and why in other organizations national 
identities (PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese) are more salient. To be more specific, 
in this chapter I ask: How do migrant networks and organizations, such as religious 
congregations or business associations, manage to override national differences and 
enforce a Hua-Ren identity? Can a Hua-Ren identity be carried into other organizations 
and why or why not?  
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Identity and social practice among the Chinese networks/organizations in 
Australia have both political and theoretical importance. In this chapter I provide a 
concept: segmented participation, to illustrate that the participation patterns of overseas 
Chinese networks and community organizations in Australia are divided and unified 
under different circumstances and with different purposes. I will introduce the main 
purposes of several overseas Chinese networks and organizations since their functions 
directly influence whether migrants want to be part of them, the ways migrants 
participate in the activities, and how they perceive themselves and each other in the 
networks/organizations.  
In the following I will show how ethnic networks and community organizations 
provide a specific context where different identities are formulated. My interview data 
mainly addresses people’s sense of belonging and their patterns of using ethnic networks 
and participation of community organizations, as well as the significance of “being PRC-
Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese” in such networks/organizations. 
Given the shared experiences of being a foreigner or ethnic minority, some 
overseas Chinese networks and communities define themselves as Hua-Ren and consider 
their missions serving all overseas Chinese. These community organizations gradually 
eliminate migrants’ national identities and replace them with a broader Hua-Ren identity. 
The process is similar to Filipino Americans or Japanese Americans in the United States 
may see themselves as “Asian-Americans” and participate Asian-American community 
activities. I will also show that in contrast with some networks/organizations where 
national identities are less important, some Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants have 
developed their own community organizations and do not deploy Hua-Ren narratives or 
aim for Hua-Ren collective actions. Rather, they maintain their national-specific values, 
cultures, and particularly, languages (e.g., Cantonese for Hong Kongese organizations, 
Taiwanese for some Taiwanese churches) and political identities.87 National identities, 																																																								
87 Internal fragmentation exists as well among the PRC-Chinese along axes of class and linguistic groups. 
China is divided and unified under different circumstances. For example, class affects who will be joining 
different social networks and communities. Presently, many students from China come to study English or 
find opportunities to work and settle in Australia. Their social and community lives are certainly different 
from those who come for business or family reasons, as discussed before. Furthermore, the new arrivals are 
mostly upper-middle- or middle-class immigrants with professional skills and capital resources. They are 
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are also strengthened through participating in activities in these national-specific 
organizations. In other words, group boundaries among these three national groups, are 
permeable in some networks/organizations yet durable in others.  
 
Overseas Migrant Network/Community Organization and the Politics of Pan-
ethnicity  
Since the 1980s one of the most widely discussed theoretical perspective in 
migration theory has been network theory, which focuses on the collective agency of 
migrants and communities in the organizing processes of migration (Boyd 1989). The 
sociological literature has dissected differences between networks and community 
organizations. Emphasizing network connections with co-ethnics already established in 
host societies, ethnic networks often provide potential or new migrants with valuable 
information about housing, job opportunities, and other benefits. With such resources 
available, the costs and risks associated with international migration are reduced 
(Bankston 2014; Haug 2008; Nee et al. 1994; Peng 2000). Ethnic networks are always 
effective in expanding the employment opportunities and some migrants have been able 
to create successful enclave economies (Portes and Jensen 1987; Wilson and Portes 1980; 
Zhou 1992).  
Ethnic community organizations, in contrast, have a sense of group-ness and are 
more likely to provide people with a stronger sense of belonging and identity attachment 
(Breton 1964; FitzGerald 2000; Zhou 1992). Community implies a high degree of 
interrelation between various aspects of ethnic community life and ethnic communities 
are unified by numerous ties (Sengstock 1978: 55). In particular, ethnic community 
organizations enforce a sense of belonging in which members imagine themselves as part 
of an organic diasporic community. As Cohen notes in his book Global Diaspora (1997, 
ix): “a member’s adherence to a diasporic community is demonstrated by an acceptance 																																																																																																																																																																					
distinct from earlier Chinese settlers, who were associated with “coolie” or physical labor (Inglis and Wu 
1994). I also acknowledge that people from Guangzhou and Fujian province might share more cultural 
practices with the Hong Kong and Taiwan people than with the Northeasterners or Shanghaiese. Similarly, 
even within Taiwan, there are sub-differences between Bensheng-ren (who speak Hokkien) and Waisheng-
ren (who may speak other Chinese dialects) as ethnic differences (Chun 2009: 341). The reason I treat 
PRC-Chinese as a unified group to be juxtaposed with Taiwan and Hong Kong communities, is to highlight 
the identity at the national levels. 
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of inescapable link with their past migration history and a sense of co-ethnicity with 
others of a similar background.” 
The differences within and between ethnic networks and community 
organizations deserve close analysis. Networks and community organizations have 
functional differences in social life and are talked about differently in the social science 
scholarship. Definitions of community organization and network affect the selection of 
my sample and my research findings as well. Here I see networks as having a more 
utilitarian purpose and mainly providing members with access to resources or 
information, while community organizations play a role in organizing group members 
and involve more affective/political meanings.  
The above discussions, however, focus on strategic needs such as finding a job, 
business networking, seeking relevant information, or emotional support. They are 
limited in the way that people might have different senses of national attachment to these 
networks and community organizations. In the quantitative data regarding ethnic 
networks and community connections from the Australian Bureau of Statistics,88 it is 
impossible to tell whether PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, or Hong Kongese see each other as 
part of the same membership in certain networks or organizations either. As mentioned, it 
is not surprising that people have different degrees of identification and senses of 
attachment to each ethnic network and community organization, given there are 
reproductions of nation-state tensions and cultural resistance among them. For example, 
Siu (2005) provides a different picture of PRC-Chinese and Taiwanese overseas. She 
mentions there still exist identity differences between diasporic PRC-Chinese and the 
Taiwanese community organizations, which reveal the tensions and contradictions within 
diasporic subjectivities. Taiwanese immigrants in Panama try to construct Taiwanese 
immigrant identities, which involve rejecting an all-embracing Hua-Ren identity. 
Similarly, Chan (2007: 56) also found older Hong Kongese respondents who perceived a 
declining level of trust in Sydney and attributed this to the increasing PRC-Chinese 
population in the community.  
																																																								
88 Details available at: 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/3416.0Main+Features22012?OpenDocument  
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Echoing Siu and Chan’s findings, in this chapter not only do I highlight that 
overseas Chinese networks/organizations are heterogeneous, I also present how different 
Chinese groups use and perceive these networks differently, as well as whether they 
identify each other as members of each ethnic community organization, and why. I point 
out that strategic interests and national identity (PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese) 
are emphasized in different networks and community organizations, and influence the 
participation pattern of different Chinese subgroups. To be more specific, I focus on the 
segmented participation of Chinese network and community organizations to supplement 
existing literature on migrant networks and community organizations. On the other hand, 
I also seek to have a conversation with other literature regarding politics of pan-ethnicity 
(Ho 2011; Li 2016; Liu 2014; Wu and Liu 2014), highlighting when pan-ethnicity would 
be highlighted or downplayed and for what purposes. In a word, I seek to extend current 
studies on migrant network/organization in a new direction by exploring how Hua-Ren 
identity and national politics intertwine and separate within different networks and 
community organizations.  
 
The Value of “Cosmopolitan Chinese” in Migrant Networks and Community 
Organizations 
Chinese migrants (whether long-term or temporary migrants) in Australia are 
always associated with the concept of “ethnic concentration” and spatial clustering (Alba 
et al. 1990; Anderson 1990). It is common for Chinese migrants to reside close to 
Chinatowns in major cities or in predominantly Chinese neighborhoods near their places 
of work (see Figure 14).89 According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics Census of 
Population and Housing (2011, Figure 15),90 Sydney suburbs with large concentrations of 
China-born migrants include Hurstville (35.8%), Rhodes (28%), Burwood (28.3%), and 
Campsie (23.4%). Similar geographic distribution applies to Hong Kong- and Taiwan-
born Chinese. In my fieldwork I found a high percentage of Taiwanese and Hong 
Kongese migrants who also live in the above districts because they tend to access 
																																																								
89 For the history of Chinatown in Sydney, see Inglis (2011). 
90 See: http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.0main+features102014 
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job/accommodation information through Chinese websites or Facebook webpages.91 
Better accessibility to Hua-Ren grocery stores and restaurants is another reason to live in 
these neighborhoods. A twenty-eight-year-old Hong Kongese respondent noted that: 
“I’ve been living in Burwood for at least 5 years, living in a Hua-Ren district is a lot 
more convenient.” (Interview with Gordon, May 25, 2015) Chinese neighborhoods 
provide a sense of familiarity and better access to job information as well.   
 
Figure 14. Geographic Distribution of Sydney Residents Born in China (excluding 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau; one dot denotes 100 residents). Source: ABS 2011 
Census of Population and Housing 
 
 
Figure 15. Sydney Suburbs with Large Concentrations of China-born Migrants. 
Source: ABS 2011 Census of Population and Housing 																																																								
91 Ethnic employment is an important factor in deciding people’s choice to live in an ethnic neighborhood 
(Alba et al. 1990: 307–08). 
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If we further examine the geographic distribution of the Chinese community 
organization listed in Sydney,92 we find that most Chinese organizations are located in 
Haymarket, Campsie, Burwood, Hurstville, and Chatswood, where a large proportion of 
Sydney’s Chinese live. In other words, the distribution of Chinese community 
organizations also fits the pattern of ethnic concentration.  
In Australia, as mentioned in chapter three, Chinese migrants widely use Chinese 
job-search websites, newspapers, or Facebook pages to find jobs and accommodations. 
These networks contain either traditional or simplified Chinese, and most posts on them 
are information about jobs and accommodations. When hanging out with my respondents, 
some Taiwanese migrants also told me they regularly check information from PRC-
Chinese websites like Sydney Today or Tigtag. As one PRC-Chinese respondent said: “I 
installed the app on my phone, and when I wait for the bus or feel bored, I check it and 
see what has happened in China and Australia.” (Interview with Paul, September 2, 2015) 
Interestingly, even with strong national identity, it is less likely people would care 
about being categorized as Taiwanese, PRC-Chinese, or Hong Kongese when using such 
networks, as long as they get a job. Most of my respondents said the reason they use such 
networks was simply because their English is not good. Their proficiency determines 
whether they use “Australian” or “Chinese” networks. Paul also said: “There are updated 
news on Sydney Today which reported in Chinese, it is easier and faster to know what 
happened around in Sydney.” (Interview with Paul, September 2, 2015) For those who 
mainly rely on these online networks for finding a job, they might never use the networks 
again once they have secured a job. The few who choose to stay and keep using the 
network mostly do so because they are not fully satisfied with their current job and may 
want to change employment later.  
Networks function not only to guide migrants in their choice of networks to join, 
they also influence and determine migrant identities. In online networks, members do not 
really distinguish the nationality of other members. Because when the job ads are posted, 
																																																								
92 See: http://bbs.huaglad.com/thread-52000-1-1.html and 
http://multicultural.nsw.gov.au/communities/communities/list_of_nsw_community_organisations/  
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everyone can be applicants as long as they can read Chinese characters. I asked my 
employer interviewees and many consciously posted recruitment ads across different 
Chinese websites (either in traditional or simplified Chinese). As a PRC-Chinese 
employer, John, told me:  
 
I posted the ads on many websites, I also asked my Taiwanese employees 
to post it for me on any other Taiwanese websites like backpackers.com 
[in traditional Chinese]. I do not care where people see my ads, as long as 
they can understand simplified Chinese, and are willing to come to work 
for me in this shop.  
 
Other networks, like Asian Women at Work (AWatW), is an active organization 
that has been working to empower migrant women in low paid and precarious 
employment since 1995. In its website it mentions:93 
 
Asian Women at Work is a network of Asian migrant women workers that 
empowers, resources and assists women to stand up, speak out and take 
collective action to advocate for their rights and develop strategies that 
improve women’s lives, end exploitation in the workplace and home, 
obtain secure employment and enable them to understand and contribute 
to Australian society.  
 
This network primarily targets women, particularly women migrants from China, 
Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines who are in precarious situations. 94  In this 
organization, gender and class are more salient factors than ethnicity, although ethnicity 
always intersects with class differences and even gender violence. When I occasionally 
helped run some events for AWatW, I found it does not exclude women from 
membership based on their nationality or ethnic identity (Field notes, November 11, 
2015). In other words, national identity becomes less significant when a network’s 
purpose is to improve women rights or ameliorate class inequality.  
Compared to strategic needs of joining certain ethnic networks, migrant 
attachments to community organizations are stronger, even when attachments are secured 
for needs such as seeking help or social support. There are many Chinese hometown 																																																								
93 See: http://www.awatw.org.au/index.php?lang=zh 
94 Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, pan-Asianism in Australia is another important issue 
worths our attention. 
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associations in Sydney serving the interests of Hua-Ren. For example, the Chungshan 
Society of Australia, which was formed in the early 1990s as an ethnic association to 
assist immigrants mainly from southern China, remains active today (Ngan and Chan 
2012: 86). Its publication Zhongshan Overseas Chinese Edition states:95 
 
The association unites overseas Chinese and plays a vital role in protecting 
the interests of overseas Chinese and developing friendly relation between 
China and Australia.  
 
The Chungshan Society of Australia’s constituency is “overseas Chinese” and its 
goal is to serve the interests of all overseas Chinese. Even though most members are from 
southern China, areas like Guangdong province, it does not actively distinguish between 
members from China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong. At some regular meetings, the group 
leader asked members to vote for candidates with Chinese names because “we are all 
Hua-Ren,” (Field notes, March 11, 2015) as if the candidates with any Chinese 
backgrounds will promote the Hua-Ren interests. When I was volunteering in running the 
state election for a candidate with Chinese background, he stated clearly in one of the 
campaigns in Mandarin: “If I am elected, I will dedicate to the promotion of the Hua-Ren 
interests96 in this district.” (Field notes, March 23, 2015) Similarly, another ethnic 
business organization, Chinese Business Women in Sydney,97 helps Chinese women 
prosper in business and connect with other Chinese businesswomen in Sydney. It focuses 
on Chinese of similar class backgrounds and actively courts members from China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
Taiwanese Working Holiday Youth (T-WHY) is another good example. An NGO 
created by Taiwanese Working Holiday makers in 2013, it has been working together 
with other NGOs such as Korean Working Holiday Youth. T-WHY also helped Hong 
Kongese Working Holiday makers establish HKWHY. While nationality is certainly a 
defining factor for members, given its mission to help Taiwanese Working Holiday 																																																								
95 See: http://www.zsnews.cn/PDF/ZSQK_PDF/PDFDate/2009/83/51.pdf 
96 What constitutes Hua-Ren interests is relative vague. The candidate did mention creating language-
learning service, community support, and promoting the infrastructure improvement in the Hua-Ren 
district. Yet he did not specify who is Hua-Ren and seemed to take for granted that Hua-Ren will and 
should support Hua-Ren candidate, regardless of the platform or policy agenda (Field notes, April 1, 2015). 
97 See: http://www.meetup.com/en-AU/Chinese-Business-Women-in-Sydney/  
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makers cope with work exploitation in Australia, during my time working for the 
organization (2014–17), I received inquiries from PRC-Chinese students and Hong 
Kongese Working Holiday makers as well about how to report their illegal employers 
and whether working in the cash economy would lead to deportation. 
In other words, even though the main constituents were Taiwanese Working 
Holiday makers, T-WHY was more class-based and included any young people who 
worked in Australia and were treated unfairly. This organization did not embrace a strong 
national identity or describe its organization as a “Taiwanese-only” or a Hua-Ren 
organization. Instead, it focused the organization on illegal treatment itself. In fact, 
currently T-WHY is thinking about serving all temporary migrants and seeking 
cooperation with university student associations. In ethnic networks like the Chinese 
Business Women in Sydney and T-WHY, class becomes the main theme and in some 
organizations it may even appear in the name of serving Hua-Ren interests.  
Class does play a significant role and may downplay the importance of national 
identity. A typical scenario is when being exploited by employers, employees would 
stand together, regardless of nationality, to fight for their employee rights. For example, 
in one local union I met one Taiwanese migrant, Billy, who had worked in a warehouse 
for 9 months, told me it is his colleague who introduced him to join the union and 
claimed for back pay. He also told me why he decided to stand together with other PRC-
Chinese colleagues when they lodged a collective complaint about unpaid salary (Field 
notes, October 12, 2015): 
 
Generally speaking, PRC-Chinese people have a stronger wei-quan [to 
defend rights] consciousness than us [Taiwanese]. They are always ready 
to fight for their rights. If they work overtime, they will fight for overtime 
pay for every single minute. Taiwanese…I do not know if it is because we 
are too obedient or other reasons, we seldom fight for our own interests. In 
this regard, I really admire PRC-Chinese. So, when they initiated the 
complaint, I immediately joined them and hopefully I could get what I am 
entitled to have.  
 
Billy’s narratives show class is clearly a more important factor than ethnicity in 
deciding why he joined the union and took the collective action with PRC-Chinese. In 
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addition to strategic concern, in some business networks and community organizations, 
some first-generation PRC-Chinese migrants “actively” told me that to maximize 
“common” interests, we should give up our prejudice and not distinguish Taiwanese or 
PRC-Chinese (Field notes, April 9, 2015). In contrast with young-generation migrants 
who think identity is not anymore an important issue, some PRC-Chinese migrants, 
though, claim that shared identity to motherland (China) is supposed to diminish potential 
political cleavages between China and Taiwan. In the organization, they seek for creating 
pan-ethnicity to get a broader solidarity. For example, when being asked about the 
interaction experience and opinions of other members from different countries, a fifty-
four-year-old woman, Gina (PRC-Chinese), who is a member of Chinese Business 
Women in Sydney, commented: 
 
Gina: Why do you ask this question? This question, in my view, is 
meaningless.  
 
Interviewer: Hmm…I just wonder if there is any difference when you 
interact with people from other countries. 
 
Gina: You want to ask me whether Taiwanese are different from PRC-
Chinese? No, I do not see any differences. I think we are all Hua-Ren. So 
we should connect all overseas Chinese and do something together. We 
should give up our prejudice and not distinguish…say, you are Taiwanese, 
I am PRC-Chinese. Yes, China and Taiwan have different political 
structures, but so what? You cannot deny the fact that we are the same, we 
are the same race and come from the same culture. We are now in 
Australia, so we should not fight each other under the same roof…plus, we 
speak the same language! [Mandarin]  
 
Here we clearly see that Gina highlights common characteristics (speaking 
Mandarin), and does not distinguish between Hua-Ren and Chinese, not to mention 
national differences such as Taiwan vs. China. For Gina, national or political differences 
are “tiny” and do not influence Chinese as an integrity. Gina’s comments imply that she 
sees the concept of Chinese from a cultural perspective, and emphasizes that shared 
identity and cultural similarities are supposed to diminish potential political cleavages 
between China and Taiwan.  
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Wu (1994) has pointed out there are two types of sentiments of those who see 
themselves as Chinese. For PRC-Chinese, for example, Hua-Ren still carries the 
connotation of modern patriotism or nationalism that involves a connectedness with the 
fate of China as a nation. Associated with this is a sense of fulfillment and of being 
essentially separate from non-Chinese. “Such primodial sentiments are very common 
among Chinese who live overseas.” (Wu 1994: 149). The second type refers to the 
cultural sense. This type of identity is based on “concepts of cultural and historical 
fulfillment rather than the more conventional modern notions of nationality or 
citizenship.” (Wu 1994: 150) Gina’s concept of Hua-Ren might fits into this type.  
In some religious organizations, for example, people rarely differentiate 
nationalities as well. When I attended a Chinese church service one Sunday, after 
knowing I am from Taiwan, the PRC-Chinese pastor told me: “Here we do not 
distinguish between PRC-Chinese or Taiwanese; in front of God, everyone is the same.” 
(Field notes, 10 December 2014) Although for strategic reasons they provide different 
languages in church services, religious beliefs tend to eliminate national identity 
differences so that different Chinese groups see each other as part of the same 
membership in the church.    
In fact, Chinese churches in Australia serve many public service roles including 
education, social service, and charity activities. Historian Mark Hutchinson (2001: 213) 
has pointed out that the “public element” in Australian Chinese churches is significant. 
Watson (2009) also uses the concept of “adaptive dexterity” to indicate the openness of a 
church in Marrickville, Sydney, where he did research, and how it contributes to the 
sharing of multi-cultural space and diverse cultural practices. One thirty-three-year-old 
PRC-Chinese respondent, Sherry, told me: 
 
I have many friends from the church, including Taiwanese and Hong 
Kongese. We do not just meet regularly in bible study group or weekly 
services on Sundays. We also hang out regularly and keep a close 
relationship. You know, I am alone by myself here in Australia. Before, 
everyday after work I just went back home, but I soon realized I could not 
keep living like this. In addition to work, I knew I want to seek a group to 
have a sense of belonging and make more friends. 
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Participating different community organizations provides people a chance to 
exchange experience and know more about other group’s culture. Some Taiwanese 
participants, for example, Wayne, told me he felt interesting to learn different parts of 
culture in China: 
 
The Hua-Ren church I attend sometimes holds cultural events during some 
Chinese Festivals. If I have time I would go, I do not have anything to do 
during days off in any case. Some activities there are quite interesting, like 
in some donation events you will see handmade artifacts from different 
parts of China, and the folk dance…  
 
The national identities are downplayed particularly within some non-profit 
associations like the Australian Chinese Community Association (ACCA) and Chinese 
Community Social Services Center. These associations provide their services to all the 
overseas Chinese, presumably including Singaporeans, Malaysians, and those who speak 
Mandarin. People highlight pan-ethnicity and “Hua-Ren help Hua-Ren” is always the 
core belief in such organizations. One staff (Tina) from ACCA told me: 
 
We are formed to serve the Chinese community in New South Wales. 
Since its foundation in 1974, we have provided community services such 
as aged home care, aged day care, dementia service, interest classes as 
well as organizing various cultural and Chinese festival events. We have 
also tried hard to promote multiculturalism and anti-racism.   
 
In addition, ACCA also sees advocating for Chinese migrants with the Australian 
government as well as creating overseas Chinese solidarity as part of its role. In such 
community organizations, identity is more about organizational goals and beliefs (e.g., 
religious beliefs and community services) than political or national identity. Chinese 
migrants can also share their lives, work experiences, and even expand their friendship or 
commercial networks. In some business communities like China Chamber of Commerce 
in Australia, people always avoid talking about sensitive politics. In other words, 
boundary is blurring in business organizations. As a fifty-six-year-old community leader 
(PRC-Chinese), Bobby, told me: “Business is business, here we seldom talk about 
politics or cross-strait tensions, come on, we are in Australia!” (Interview with Bobby, 
March 30, 2015) One of the reasons people do not emphasize national identities is that 
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they simply do not think they are important, “getting the money” is the priority. Bobby 
went on and said: 
 
The reason why we created business associations here, obviously, is to 
extend the business networks, to create more opportunities, and to make 
money. People join the association and they may find potential customers 
through the networks. That is why we charge membership fee and people 
are willing to pay for it.  
 
In other cases, when national differences do appear in organizations, 
organizational leaders also try to manage and diminish national differences. For example, 
in an ACCA meeting to plan a Chinese cultural event, enquiries about which national 
characteristics should be highlighted in the performance, prompted a leader to remark: “It 
is not a problem, we can always include Taiwanese and Cantonese cultural elements, as 
long as they are not inconsistent with our topic.” (Field notes, September 1, 2015) For 
this leader, Taiwanese and Cantonese are just one of its “sub-” Chinese cultures as there 
are many ethnic minority groups in China.98 Including Taiwanese or Cantonese culture 
would not influence Chinese as an integrated cultural entity. When national identities are 
downplayed, identity differences are easier to overcome and thus provide some room to 
cultivate Hua-Ren identities in particular networks or organizations.  
The formation of Hua-Ren identities also influences the follow-up group 
boundary making and unmaking. In one organization (Yunnan hometown association) I 
participated, people there unmake the boundary and see me as Taiwan Tong-Bao 
[compatriots], we did folk dance rehearsal and practice together for the 2017 Chinese 
New Year. Cultural significance can contribute to the boundary unmaking (between 
PRC-Chinese and Taiwanese) and downplay national identity in some community 
organizations. 
During the Chinese New Year cultural event, however, there was another group, 
Falun Gong, 99  which is a big overseas Chinese organization against the Chinese 
Communist Party, also had its performance. One member of the Yunnan hometown 																																																								
98 See: http://www.china.org.cn/e-groups/shaoshu/ 
99 http://en.falundafa.org 
		
148 
association, Brook, told us (Field notes, January 28, 2017): “Be careful! If anyone from 
Falun Gong came to take a photo with any of you, say no to them! You would not know 
how they are going to use the photos.” Then he turned his head and told me: “Including 
you! You cannot take photos with them as well!”   
This example vividly presents the internal cleavages among overseas Chinese 
groups (Yunnan hometown association vs. Falun Gong). Falun Gong, is always seen by 
PRC-Chinese as a dissident group that destroys Chinese harmony and integrity because it 
challenges the legitimacy of the Chinese government. Thus, even the hometown 
association is more culturally-based, national identities can decide how people draw the 
boundary with other co-ethnic groups.  
In sum, in the networks or community organizations where “cosmopolitan 
Chinese” is always deployed, group members tend to share interests across national 
differences. Cosmopolitan Chinese is “a loose epithet, but one that embraces both a 
fundamental commitment to Chinese culture and a multicultural receptivity, which 
effectively cut across all conventional national boundaries.” (Lee 1994: 229) Members 
within such networks and organizations either have a strategic need, or their identity is 
oriented towards the more cosmopolitan goals of the organization (e.g., class interests, 
business networking, or community service). The various community organizations 
provided needed services for migrants working for low wages, welfare for the sick and 
elderly who were without family, and help them deal with alien legal and political 
systems. In this sense, group boundaries among PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong 
Kongese are permeable, their national identities are thus downplayed. If these functional 
networks and community organizations can overcome national identity difference and 
serve all overseas Chinese migrants, then under what circumstances, and why, do people 
highlight their national identities in other networks or organizations? I will discuss this 
question in the next section. 
 
Segmented Participation and the Block of Hua-Ren Identity  
In the previous section I showed that some Chinese networks and communities 
downplay national identities and potential national-state tensions. In my fieldwork, 
however, I also found in other organizations that national identities are not always easily 
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overcome. In other words, Hua-Ren identity is not always a likely outcome even when 
networks and organizations are established to perform similar functions such as providing 
community service or mutual help.  
For example, the language used in different networks may have already decided 
the expected members from China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong. For example, an ad written in 
traditional characters and titled: “Farming Job, only for Taiwanese” caught my eye in a 
Taiwanese website backpackers.com.tw (a job ad posted on 13 September, 2015). This ad 
did not explain why the boss wanted only Taiwanese employees. However, the job ad did 
not show up in other simplified Chinese websites such as Sydney Today or Tigtag. When 
I asked my respondents to rank the social media networks that they use most frequently, 
PRC-Chinese migrants ranked Sydney Today and Tigtag the top two, followed by 
Yeeyi.com and OZYOYO. Seven respondents had not even heard about 
backpackers.com.tw.  
In contrast, even they do check PRC-Chinese websites regularly, Taiwanese 
migrants mostly rely on backpackers.com.tw and Facebook pages like “Job-Seeking Net 
in Australia” or “Sydney Communication”100 to find a job or other information because 
they think these channels are more “reliable.” (Interview with Abby, November 17, 2014) 
Many PRC-Chinese migrants do not have the habit of using Facebook, because of the 
PRC prohibition of social media like Facebook and Google. PRC-Chinese rely more on 
other social media like Wechat or Weibo. Almost all of my Taiwanese and Hong Kongese 
respondents, however, know all these PRC-Chinese websites, but few of them would read 
the discussions or information other than job/housing information in Sydney Today or 
Tigtag (Field notes, March 12, 2015) As Justin’s narratives in chapter three, some 
Taiwanese prefer to check backpackers.com.tw or Taiwanese Facebook pages first when 
looking for a job, even there might be more job information in other websites. Here 
ethnic media plays an important role highlighting different cultural values and identities. 
Cecilia, a Taiwanese respondent, echoed other Taiwanese respondents:      
 
																																																								
100 “Sydney Communication” has several sub-pages to distinguish the topic categories such as “job,” 
“accommodation,” “sell and buy,” “exchange,” “life,” and “carpool,” etc. 
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…maybe it is a habit issue…I just do not like reading simplified Chinese, 
they are ugly…and I think most job offers on Sydney Today or Tigtag are 
bad jobs…you can say it is a stereotype of PRC-Chinese employers, but I 
really think it is true. If you do a statistics and compare the salaries or job 
content, the jobs provided on those websites are always “black market 
labor.” 
 
A preference for traditional Chinese or Taiwanese media is similar to Huang’s 
finding (2011) that Taiwanese migrants distrust the PRC-Chinese news (chap 4) and 
maintain Taiwanese-only social networks in China (chap 6). As migrant network theory 
suggests, here we can see Chinese social networks play an important role in creating 
social trust, although such trust may go towards certain national groups but not others. 
The Taiwanese distrust of PRC-Chinese networks confirms that the goal of creating a 
cosmopolitan Hua-Ren identity is not always achieved.  
In terms of community organizations, scholars have noticed that there is no 
homogenous overseas Chinese community. Salaff and her colleagues (2007: 106) claim 
that in Canada, PRC-Chinese do not share a common language, education, or cultural 
background with people from Hong Kong or Taiwan. “They may live nearby or shop at 
the same Chinese stores, but they do not share the same social space.” Within the Chinese 
community in the United Kingdom, there are significant differences between ethnic 
Chinese from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia (Lee 2001: 143). 
Other scholars (Ip 2007; Lever-Tracy and Ip 2005; Pan 2008) also point out that 
Taiwanese and Hong Kongese in Australia create different transnational ties, social 
capital, and business strategies.  
Hua-Ren identity declines in some community organizations where members 
distinguish themselves from other national groups. A PRC-Chinese based cultural group, 
CPA (pseudonym), declined its cooperation with other Hua-Ren groups when organizing 
a cultural event because it did not agree with some Taiwanese groups’ ideas, especially 
when some ideas proposed involved the meanings of “Taiwan independence.” (Field 
notes, February 10, 2016)   
The cleavages not only happen in different organizations, individual’s national 
identity also influences how one sees specific organizations. For example, a fifty-year-old 
Hong Kongese migrant, Betty, told me about her experience of joining a local Cantonese 
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community organization:  
 
My child was born here in Australia, at that time I had a good career in 
Hong Kong. I used to be an executive manager in a local company. You 
can imagine how tough it was to make a decision to give up my career and 
start everything over in Australia. I did not have any contacts or personal 
networks at that time…so I decided to participate in some Cantonese-
speaking community organizations. The local Cantonese community 
organization I went provided some activities like exchanging experiences 
of bringing up babies, doing community environment-keeping 
activities…these experiences were important to me and I appreciated their 
efforts because once upon a time, I really felt I was going crazy staying at 
home all day!      
 
Indeed, the narratives of Betty could also be explained in terms of dialects 
(Cantonese) rather than national identification. Cantonese is a language shared among not 
just Hong Kongese but also migrants from southern China and even Malaysia and 
Singapore. She told me, though, that the community organization she identifies with is 
different from those “PRC-Chinese” groups (Interview with Betty, February 19, 2015). 
Even though she shares the language with people from southern China, it does not 
necessarily mean she shares a political or group identity with PRC-Chinese. The shared 
attribute of dialect does not necessarily lead to the shared attribute of group identification.  
The theorization of Chinese identity often entails the notion of “cultural China,” 
which assumes Chinese diasporic communities have certain cultural symbols in common 
that originated in China (Ngan and Chan 2012: 27). Yet a diversity of experiences and 
identities exist in different Chinese diasporic community organizations with each 
organization having its own cultural conception of pan-ethnicity or national identity. As a 
Hong Kongese migrant, Jessie, said: “I only went to the PRC-Chinese church twice, then 
I gave up participating in their activities. I feel I do not belong there, and most of them 
there do not understand my language.” (Interview with Jessie, May 5, 2015) Jessie’s 
response shows she attaches different senses of belonging to different community 
organizations because of identity and language differences. 
The distinction between organizations is salient especially when people have 
options. For example, even though target members of the Chungshan Society of Australia 
are overseas Hua-Ren, the organization’s name makes Taiwanese or Hong Kongese 
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reluctant to join. Its primary purpose is to provide services for people from south China, 
and its name certainly excludes outsiders. A Taiwanese migrant, Ronald, who has lived in 
Sydney over twelve years, told me (Interview with Ronald, May 9, 2015):  
 
If I really want, I can always find a Taiwanese group to join, why bother 
to attend a Hua-Ren group? Some organizations…I can guess the 
members there may all come from China. Why should I bother to join a 
group where there might be a lot of PRC-Chinese? I do not have anything 
in common with them and do not know what to talk to them there. 
  
During my fieldwork, I also found similar language and cultural background do 
not always make Chinese civil organizations homogenous. Hua-Ren values do not shape 
a universal cultural nationalism among PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, or Hong Kongese 
either. For example, after the ACCA meeting to plan a Chinese cultural event, one 
attendant from Taiwan told me: “Some leaders apparently want the event to be done in 
certain ways. However, Chinese culture should not be monopolized by a single country, it 
is for everyone.” (Field notes, September 1, 2015) 
Objectively speaking, in Australia, most Chinese organizations are seldom 
involved in politics (except for groups like Falun Gong mentioned in the previous 
section), but political organizations like the China Youth Corps (CYC), a Taiwanese 
group, clearly distinguish its members because it is a political organization established by 
the Kuomintang (KMT) to mobilize overseas young people to support the party.101 Even 
in recent years, many Taiwanese organizations, like all other Chinese organizations, are 
incorporating PRC-Chinese members, but political identity is still a significant factor in 
deciding membership of many organizations like the Sydney CYC. For example, CYC’s 
information is exclusive to Taiwanese. In other words, it is a political organization 
established to support an imagined/overseas Taiwanese political community and national 
campaigns. The most common information shared in the group is about political 
campaigns, propaganda, and outreach strategies; other information includes everyday 
information about living in Australia like important immigration policy change, and 
updated political news regarding Taiwan, China, and Australia. Of course, people in the 																																																								
101 Regarding the history and purpose of CYC, see Brindley (1999). 
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group also share lots of overseas Taiwanese community activities and ethnic events like 
Sydney Taiwan Festival. Furthermore, they do not really embrace the concept of Hua-
Ren. A member I met told there me straightforwardly (Interview with a Taiwanese 
migrant, Boris, September 16, 2015): 
 
Interviewer: Would you claim your group a Hua-Ren group? 
Boris: I would not say our group a “Hua-Ren” group. I would say we are a 
Taiwanese group overseas. Because…if I say we are a Hua-Ren 
organization, people may think it is a group which also includes PRC-
Chinese. But in fact, we do not. 
  
Similarly, in September 2014, there was the Umbrella Revolution (a pro-
democracy movement) that started in Hong Kong to protest against the Chinese 
Communist Party-controlled election committee for the city’s top leader. To support 
Hong Kong protesters, several Hong Kongese organizations in Australia, like the 
Umbrella Movement Students Sydney and Hongkongers in Australia, cooperated with the 
Sydney Democracy Network and other student associations to build a mosaic of 
newspaper clippings, yellow ribbons, and Post-It notes to show solidarity and support for 
democracy (see Figure 16). “Hong Kong for Hong Kongers! Beijing get lost!” was a 
message stuck to the wall of the Hong Kong House in the Sydney central business district 
(Mao 2014). 
 
Figure 16. Messages of Support for the Hong Kong Protesters on the Wall of Hong 
Kong House on Druitt Street in the Sydney CBD. Source: David Grey/REUTERS.  
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On the other hand, if we consider linguistic diversity among Chinese groups, we 
find language could be an important factor that sets apart Hong Kongese and other older 
generation PRC-Chinese (Inglis and Wu 1994). For many Hong Kongese, Cantonese is 
not just a dialect. Like Betty and Jessie’s experiences, the use of Cantonese in ethnic 
schools, religious services, and organizations also contributes to a distinctive Hong 
Kongese community, separate from the rest of the PRC-Chinese population (except for 
people from southern China who also speak Cantonese). A Hong Konese Working 
Holiday maker, Mary, told me directly: “We define our group as Hong Kongese, not 
Chinese. We speak Bai-Hua [white language, Cantonese], not Mandarin. You see the 
differences?” (Interview with Mary, April 30, 2015) 
In PRC-Chinese organization like CPA, Taiwanese organization like CYC, or 
Hong Kongese communities like Hongkongers in Australia, there are no Hua-Ren 
narratives that emphasize a unified political community composed of all these three 
subgroups or other people with Chinese backgrounds such as Singaporeans. Nor do they 
mobilize Chinese collective actions. Such community organizations still maintain their 
own national identity, language, culture, and traditions. They maintain their boundaries to 
other groups and do not look to other national organizations when planning national 
events or activities like Sydney Taiwan Festival or support for the Umbrella Movement 
in Sydney. One of the event participants explained to me why it is hard for inter-group 
cooperation (Interview with Kathy, November 29, 2014): 
 
You know the Umbrella Movement was organized to against China, right? 
So when we are showing the support for the Umbrella Movement, it may 
be awkward to include PRC-Chinese and ask them to protest their home 
country.  
  
In this case, unless some PRC-Chinese groups agree with other groups’ beliefs 
such as democracy, there is little room for building a Hua-Ren community that highlights 
shared interests among Chinese population. To be more specific, in such community 
organizations each group only addresses its national-specific needs; the symbolic 
boundaries between each other remain strong.  
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The conflicts and varied characteristics these three subgroups exhibit are 
substantiated not only in political ideology but also in various cultural interpretations of 
pan-ethnicity. As mentioned, both the Taiwanese and PRC-Chinese claim to have 
preserved more traditional and “authentic” Chinese culture and customs (Shih 2007; Tu 
1994). In this sense, Chinese culture becomes a contested field where different Chinese 
groups may have different cultural practices and interpretations. The segmentation of 
identity can be seen in many different customs and cultural practices, as well as in 
different stands on specific issues. A good example is the different perspectives on the 
“Safe Schools” program initiated in August of 2016, when the Australian Chinese 
Community Association and the Chinese Australian Forum, along with several other 
Chinese businesses and community leaders in Sydney’s north west, organized a petition 
against an anti-bullying program lodged in NSW (Kozaki 2016).102 Opposing the LGBT-
inclusive program on campus, several Chinese community organizations accused the 
program of promoting “homosexual ideas and practice” and “stealing our children from 
our own culture.” When asking about the attitude of the organization, a member of the 
Sydney CYC, Robin (Taiwanese), commented: 
 
Regarding this case, I do not think we will join the other Hua-Ren 
organizations and sign the petition together…because obviously, we have 
our own positions. We support LGBT groups and do not think the 
program will necessarily take our culture. I feel some Hua-Ren 
organizations here are a bit conservative. They only stick with Confucian 
culture or whatever they think is traditional Chinese culture.  
 
The different opinions on specific issues such as LGBT reflect that the overseas 
Chinese community organizations are not coherent and may interpret what can be 
counted as Chinese culture in different ways. Another example is the Chinese New Year. 
In Australia, each Chinese community organization has its respective celebratory cultures, 
traditions, and foods. In my fieldwork, I found PRC-Chinese community organizations 
tend to have dumplings for the New Year while Taiwanese ones have hotpot. In a Hua-
Ren business dinner meeting, when people are served “Beijing Roast Duck,” a person 																																																								
102 It is a program called “Safe Schools” which is funded by the state and federal governments. The main 
purpose of the program is aimed at helping LGBTI school students. 
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from Beijing complained the dish is not done in the “authentic” Beijing style. Hearing the 
complaint, another Beijingese replied: “Maybe it is the southern version!” (Field notes, 
February 9, 2015) 
Cultural celebrations can be viewed as a symbolic way to express national identity. 
In a sense, I echo Okamoto and Mora’s (2014) argument that ethnicity and pan-ethnicity 
can coexist. On the one hand, these three Chinese subgroups celebrate Chinese New Year 
that implies a common culture; on the other hand, the Chinese community is culturally 
pluralist because each Chinese group has its own customs and traditions. Simply 
speaking, group boundaries are permeable yet durable. Symbolic boundaries remain 
strong, even strengthened, by activities held by different community organizations. These 
three subgroups participate in a common culture while still focusing on their own 
distinctive cultural activities.  
The transnational migrant networks and linkages that migrants sustain with their 
homelands through cultural, social, and political activities have a direct influence on the 
construction of national identity. As discussed earlier, demands associated with 
assimilation and other strategic needs encourage the expansion of identities and national 
boundaries within organizations. While PRC-Chinese may claim a common sentiment 
towards China, some Taiwanese and Hong Kongese organizations do not always 
acknowledge experiences and histories shared with PRC-Chinese. Within any particular 
community organization, group boundaries can be durable and even highlighted. In 
contrast with ACCA or Chinese Community Social Services Center where national 
identities are diminished, other organizations (like CPA, Sydney CYC, or Hongkongers 
in Australia) assert clear distinctions regarding their political and cultural identity. Even 
though some do share a limited sense of pan-ethnicity, they do not necessarily see 
themselves as sharing a group identity and culture with other subgroups. Instead, they 
created imagined cultural communities with clear group boundaries separating 
themselves from other national groups. 
 
Summary 
This chapter shows how migrant network and community organization can be a 
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specific context where national identities are highlighted or downplayed. Overseas 
Chinese networks and communities are divided and unified under different circumstances 
and with different purposes. For example, nationality, class, gender, and language, are 
important factors affecting how networks and organizations formalize and organize. 
Different immigration trajectories and visa statuses also influence the ways and the 
extents to which immigrants rely on migrant networks and community organizations. For 
example, middle-aged women on family visas who come to Australia to look after their 
children. Their patterns of participating in community activities certainly differ from 
those who come for short-term study or work.       
In Australia, when Chinese migrants use networks to exchange information and 
experiences regarding work and social life, there is no strong national identity needed (or, 
at most, a Hua-Ren identity). The common experiences as foreigners and minorities help 
develop a Hua-Ren community organization that stresses the concept of cosmopolitan 
Chinese. In my fieldwork I also found people do not really distinguish others’ national 
background or identity in some online networks or service-oriented community 
organizations. Such networks or organizations manage to override differences and 
enforce a Hua-Ren identity towards a more cosmopolitan organizational goal (e.g., 
religious beliefs, business networks, and community services). In addition, class and 
gender factors also downplay the importance of national identity in specific networks and 
organizations (e.g., T-WHY and AWatW), and sometimes the actions are highlighted in 
the name of “serving all Hua-Ren interests.” 
As Cornell (1996) correctly points out, “group attachments based largely on 
shared interests tend to be more subject to the impact of circumstantial change, other 
things equal.” The shared use of Hua-Ren networks and the shared interests of Hua-Ren 
community organizations, however, can not always be carried over into other 
organizations and strengthen cultural ties among members of different Chinese groups. 
From the examples and discussions provided above, I not only challenge the monolithic 
view that overseas Chinese networks/community organizations play similar roles in 
connecting overseas Chinese migrants or simply mobilize around the concept “pan-
Chinese-ness,” I also show how some groups distinguish between networks and create 
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their national-specific organizations to address separate interests and unmake the pan-
ethnicity. In other words, the co-existence of various Chinese networks and organizations 
is not necessarily exclusive with national-specific identifications among migrants from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China. In this chapter I highlight the participation of 
overseas Chinese networks/organizations in Australia is segmented and different pan-
ethnic and national identities are demonstrated in the community organizations. When 
seeking information, they have their strategic preferences for which network to use first, 
and, of course, they have different senses of belonging to their national-specific 
communities. These communities reflect their different immigration trajectories, cultural 
traditions, identities, and future goals. 
To explain why some Chinese groups distinguish themselves from one another, I 
illustrate that the participation in overseas Chinese networks and community 
organizations is segmented. On the one hand, some Chinese organizations focus more on 
the strengthening of global Chinese identification and ties with other Hua-Ren; in such 
networks/organizations group leaders also spend more efforts on resolving potential 
national differences. On the other hand, however, Hong Kongese and Taiwanese migrants 
have developed their own networks and organizations to distinguish themselves from 
other PRC-Chinese. They do not deploy Hua-Ren narratives, nor do they aim for Hua-
Ren collective action. Rather, they maintain their national-specific values, languages, and 
identities. In these organizations, they maintain their boundaries to other subgroups and 
do not look to other organizations when planning national events or activities like the 
“Sydney Taiwan Festival” or support for the “Hong Kong Umbrella Movement in 
Sydney.” They do not aim to build a broader Hua-Ren community that highlights the 
shared interests among overseas Chinese populations either. To be more specific, they 
distance themselves from the Hua-Ren model and chose not to foster Chinese ties.  
The segmented participation patterns suggest there are political roots and identity 
differences to the segmentation. On the one hand, “one China” policy incorporates both 
Taiwan and Hong Kong and thus creates a sense of cosmopolitan Chinese-ness overseas; 
on the other hand, however, youth politics in both Hong Kong and Taiwan are leaning 
toward nativism and a rejection of the PRC’s expansionist aims. As mentioned above, the 
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fat that people grow up in very different political and economic environments has shaped 
their distinct national identities from other Chinese groups. When they are in Australia, 
some parts of their identities can get blurred in order to fit the “common goals;” other 
parts, however, remain strong and boundary unmaking is not always easy to be achieved.    
Indeed, there is a transitional process that provides an option for Chinese migrants 
to embrace different identities in Australia. One may agree on a Hua-Ren identity in 
some networks/communities but substantiate a national identity more significantly in 
others. The same network or organization may also have different meanings for long-
term settlers and temporary migrants. The contribution that this chapter makes to 
sociology scholarship is that it integrates migrants’ participation pattern and national 
identity in an examination of the functions and identities substantiated in different 
networks/community organizations.  
The examples discussed in this chapter substantiate the fragmentation of identity 
exist in various overseas Chinese networks and organizations as shown in contested 
discourses. Segmented participation pattern within networks and community 
organizations also shows that pan-ethnic (Hua-Ren) identity and national politics are not 
mutually exclusive. The coexistence of Hua-Ren and national identities are symbolic that 
convey one’s belonging to two separate but overlapping communities. These identities 
help produce an understanding of oneself as both Hua-Ren and PRC-
Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese in different organizations at the same time. 
In the next chapter I will add another “variable” and shift my focus to another 
social context of Chinese migrant everyday life: their daily interactions with another 
“non-Chinese” group (white Australians) and see whether and how the race relations with 
white people strengthen or change their ethnic (Hua-Ren) or national identity. I will also 
highlight how different Chinese migrant groups distinguish between racial discrimination 
from Australians and political hostility between each other (e.g., China vs. Taiwan/Hong 
Kong), as well as whether racial discrimination from Australians constitutes a condition 
that compels overseas Chinese migrants to embrace a broader Hua-Ren solidarity.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
NO GUARANTEED SOLIDARITY: THE REJECTION OF PAN-ETHNIC IDENTITY 
IN THE FACE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN AUSTRALIA  
 
 
“There are so many Hua-Ren here in Australia, why are we still looked 
down upon by Australians? The reason is we do not come together. In this 
regard, Koreans and Japanese are doing a better job than us.”  
(Interview with Andrew, April 23, 2015) 
 
 
“If there is a need and if there is Hua-Ren solidarity, why has not there 
been any Chinese group movement in the past 10 or 20 years? Racial 
discrimination against Hua-Ren happens here every day, but why does it 
seem nobody cares?”                        
(Interview with Simon, October 26, 2014) 
 
 
One day when I first arrived in Sydney, Australia in 2012, I hung out with my 
friends in a pub close to Redfern District. Around 9:30 pm, when we were about heading 
back home, a group of white teenagers came and tried to pick a fight. They spoke to us 
rudely, telling us to go back to China, and even spitting on us. We kept walking, entered 
a train station, and, luckily, they did not chase us. My girlfriend told me it is unusual here 
in Australia, I agree with her and most of the time I feel very safe walking in the streets 
even at night by myself. During my fieldwork from 2014 to 2015, however, many 
respondents shared that they felt discriminated against, in the workplace and in everyday 
life. 
When talking about racial discrimination against Chinese or Asians in Australia, 
people would immediately think of the “White Australia policy.” As briefly mentioned in 
chapter one, the legacy of discrimination towards Chinese in this country can be traced 
back to 1901 when the “White Australia Policy” was introduced. There were two pieces 
of legislation: the Immigration Restriction Act and the Pacific Island Labourers Act, 
which placed restrictions on immigration and excluded Chinese and Japanese immigrants 
(Fitzgerald 2007; Windschuttle 2004). Although these policies were abolished between 
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1949 and 1973,103 the discriminative legacy towards colored migrants has been remained 
in today’s society (Pung 2008). In Australia we constantly see race relevant news or 
racial discrimination directed at aboriginal people, immigrants, and refugees. There has 
been a broad literature reporting on Australia as a migrant-receiving country and the 
racial tensions that continue to simmer in its present-day society (Affeldt 2014; Noble 
2005; Stratton 2011). The ongoing flow of immigrants combined with the government’s 
immigration policies has lead to a contradictory situation in Australia where 
multiculturalism (as a policy) has co-existed with various forms of institutionalized 
racism (Forrest and Dunn 2007; Jupp 2009). In this dissertation I particularly focus on the 
experiences of Chinese migrants in Australia because they are a frequently targeted group 
and they almost always experience some forms of discrimination (Ang 2001; Fitzgerald 
2007; Pung 2008; Tan 2003).  
Pan-movements involve shifts in levels of group identification from smaller 
boundaries to larger-level affiliations (Espiritu 1992: 2). In the United States, facing 
racial discrimination can bring racial/ethnic groups together to protect common interests, 
examples can be seen from the Asian-American movement. Generally, by creating large-
scale affiliations and a broader pan-ethnic identity (e.g., people with yellow/black skin or 
“Asians/Blacks”), more people can come together to fight for shared interests or against 
racial injustice.    
Research in ethnicity, migration, and social movement studies has sought to 
identify conditions under which pan-ethnic identities will be developed to consolidate 
group benefits. They include: changes in immigration policy, racial segregation, ethnic 
organizing, economic and other structural conditions, and organizational leadership 
(Cornell 1990; Espiritu 1992; Kwong 1987; Min 2008; Nielsen 1985; Okamoto 2006, 
2014; Wei 1993; Zia 2000). Historically, claims have been made for extensive forms of 
solidarity, for example, pan-Asian or pan-African/Black power movements (Bell 2014; 
Du Bois [1915] 2001, [1939] 1970; Gilroy 1993; Rickford 2016). The distinctiveness of 
pan-ethnic identity is that it is able to create an imaginary community that can be 
transformed into notions of solidarity and be used to unite more members (Roosens 1989: 																																																								
103 See: https://www.border.gov.au/about/corporate/information/fact-sheets/08abolition 
		
162 
12) The competition model also claims that intergroup competition or attacks against 
Asians will encourage Asian groups to organize collectively to make claims and thus lead 
to “reactive” pan-Asian activity and identity (Espiritu 1992; Okamoto 2006), such as 
electing Asian American candidates in particular electoral districts, highlighting anti-
Asian physical violence, and rejecting the cut on welfare monies for Asian Americans in 
particular cities. The influence of residential segregation on the formation of pan-
ethnicity has also been noted (Min 1995; Ong et al. 1994). 
Meanwhile, sociological analyses highlight the relationship—in some cases co-
existence, in others conflict—between pan-ethnicity and national identity (Itzigsohn and 
Dore-Cabral 2000; Kim and White 2010; Okamoto 2014). Ethnic and national boundaries 
could continue to remain meaningful for groups even when they share similarities in 
culture and history. In other words, pan-ethnic solidarity and pan-ethnic identity can be 
two different things (Rosenfeld 2001: 162). The former refers to the general alliance 
between individuals from different national groups, whereas pan-ethnic identity describes 
the extent to which people have a sense of being part of a broader ethnic group (e.g., 
Asians or Latinos) based on culture and physical characteristics. In this sense, subgroups 
might only maintain pan-ethnic solidarity when they need to protect their common 
interests in politics, economic adaptation, social welfare, or as a way to react to racial 
violence. People can set aside their national identities and accept the ascribed pan-ethnic 
label in order to achieve collective goals (Espiritu 1992: 10). As mentioned in chapter 
five, in Australia, we can see the creation of overseas Chinese organizations expand 
economic opportunities and strengthen diasporic cultural ties across ethno-national 
boundaries. Hua-Ren solidarity may also occur in a particular electoral district to promote 
overseas Chinese interests or in connection with indiscriminate physical violence against 
Chinese groups. In some contexts, Chinese-ness even becomes a form of cultural and 
economic capital that gather people together who speak the same language and exclude 
those like Australians who cannot speak Mandarin.  
If we agree that pan-ethnicity can be used as a way to defend common interests, 
then, under what conditions and for what reasons do people reject pan-ethnic identity and 
solidarity? In this chapter I contrast pan-ethnic identity among three subgroups (PRC-
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Chinese, Hong Kongese, and Taiwanese) within the same pan-ethnic category (Hua-Ren). 
Intuitively, if the common interests are not threatened, there is no possibility or need for 
these three groups to work together. Similarly, given that migrants from China, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong may have moderate or strong PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese 
identity because of political tensions between each other, there is no reason we expect a 
pan-ethnic solidarity in Australia. During my fieldwork, however, I did find these three 
groups sometimes identify themselves as Hua-Ren and Chinese people are discriminated 
against as a whole ethnic group. Furthermore, no matter the official census of population 
and housing, or the viewpoint of Australians, PRC-Chinese, Hong Kongese, and 
Taiwanese are all lodged in the same ethnn-racial category (Chinese), and they may face 
discrimination because of racial lumping (English proficiency or cultural differences, and 
they all look like “Chinese”). If racial discrimination occurs in everyday life, why do not 
Chinese migrants form a stronger pan-ethnic identity and solidarity? How do everyday 
interaction with another “non-Chinese” group influence the ethnic and national 
identification of PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese migrants? 
Pan-ethnic solidarity among these three subgroups, as I will show, only occurs to 
a narrow extent. They participate in Hua-Ren community organizations out of more 
strategic needs and use the word “Hua-Ren” in a broad way: They only use the word to 
distinguish Chinese vs. non-Chinese or other Asians. For example, Chinese groups may 
not want to be placed in the “Asian” category and thus they emphasize their Hua-Ren 
culture to distinguish themselves from Japanese or Koreans. However, even “Hua-Ren” 
is used widely by some Chinese migrants to distinguish “Chinese” vs. “non-Chinese,” it 
does not always guarantee the Hua-Ren solidarity among these three subgroups. 
During my fieldwork, I found Chinese migrants in Australia always compare their 
experiences with racial discrimination from Australians to the political tensions they have 
with each other (e.g., China vs. Taiwan/Hong Kong). Racial discrimination from white 
people in Australia did not necessarily cultivate pan-ethnic solidarity among Taiwanese, 
Hong Kongese, and PRC-Chinese; neither did discrimination experiences lead to a strong 
overseas pan-ethnic identity. To explain why this is so, I focus on how these three groups 
interpret racial discrimination differently. I argue that racial discrimination from 
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Australians is not a sufficient condition that compels Taiwanese and Hong Kongese 
migrants to embrace Hua-Ren identity. Instead, assertions of pan-identity can be strategic 
and have different meanings at the diasporic and national level, respectively. Thus when 
PRC-Chinese political oppression is ongoing and more persistent than racial 
discrimination, pan-ethnic or a supra-national identity is an unlikely outcome.  
In previous chapters I have looked at ethnic identity and group relations in 
different social settings, including job seeking, workplace, and community/social life. In 
this chapter I focus on a context in which Chinese migrants have interactions with 
another racial group in their everyday life. Like other social settings, interaction with 
white Australians is an important aspect of people’s social life because through it we can 
better understand whether and how Hua-Ren identity is strengthened or not.  
In the following, I focus on how Hua-Ren identity and solidarity operate 
differently at the diasporic and national level. At the diasporic level, people do adopt the 
concept of Hua-Ren and apply it to meet strategic needs during their interactions with 
white Australians; however, the distinction of national identity and ethnic (Hua-Ren) 
solidarity remains strong for Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants at the national level. 
I also discuss other reasons why some Chinese migrants do not feel “a need” to come 
together and claim their collective rights. In addition, I highlight in regard to whether to 
adopt pan-ethnic solidarity or not, Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants always 
distinguish between “racial” oppression from Australians and “political” hostility from 
PRC-Chinese. When they find the latter is stronger, the chance of merging themselves 
into a Hua-Ren category with other PRC-Chinese decreases.  
Indeed, different groups see and interpret racial discrimination differently. In the 
second half of this chapter I also borrow Derald Sue and his colleagues’ (Sue et al. 2007) 
definition of “racial micro-aggressions” and argue it is through an internalization process 
or “wrong” interpretation that micro-aggressions from white people are accepted or 
justified by Chinese migrants. The failure to challenge racial micro-aggressions decreases 
the chances for the cultivation of a pan-ethnic solidarity against racial hierarchy and 
group inequalities. By showing that perceptions of discrimination do not always lead to 
pan-ethnic identity and why this is so, this chapter advances the understanding of the 
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potential limitations of pan-ethnicity among Chinese groups within an immigration 
context.  
 
Pan-ethnicity at the Diasporic and National Level  
As discussed in chapter five, in Australia, Chinese migrants widely use Chinese 
job-search websites, newspapers, or Facebook pages to find jobs and accommodations. 
These networks contain either traditional or simplified Chinese, and most posts on them 
are information about jobs and accommodations.  
In addition to online networks, in some non-profit organizations like the 
Australian Chinese Community Association (ACCA) and Chinese Community Social 
Services Center, pan-ethnicity is strengthened while downplaying national identities. 
These associations provide their services to all the overseas Chinese, presumably 
including Singaporeans, Malaysians, and those who speak Mandarin. In this sense, group 
boundaries between PRC-Chinese, Hong Kongese, and Taiwanese within these 
organizations are permeable. 
The residential pattern and social participation of PRC-Chinese, Hong Kongese, 
and Taiwanese migrants also suggests that in Australia, there is evidence of pan-ethnicity 
at the diasporic level. Scholars have found that there may be an indifference attitude 
towards national identity among young-generation migrants, if they have successfully 
assimilated into the host society (Fenton 2007; Zhou 1997). In my interview, however, I 
found the successful assimilation applied to other first-generation Chinese migrants as 
well. For example, many of my first-generation Chinese respondents told me they do not 
really think identity is an important issue to them. A forty-three-year-old PRC-Chinese 
first-generation migrant, Hali, who migrated to Australia 16 years ago, said: 
 
I am a first-generation migrant. I came here to study my Ph.D. degree. 
You know the identity of first-generation migrants is always more flexible. 
For me, Hua-Ren identity is culturally Chinese, not geo-politically 
Chinese, so of course, this idea is not fixed and can be shared with other 
groups, whether Taiwanese, Hong Kongese, or Malaysian. 
 
In this regard, Hua-Ren identity becomes a broader and higher level of identity 
that overcomes differences of nationality. In some circumstances Hua-Ren identity at the 
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diasporic level also involves politic meanings that mark the boundary between Chinese vs. 
non-Chinese. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the broader identity can be used as a 
political slogan (e.g., serving the Hua-Ren interests) to mobilize for the political support 
and common interests. In this sense, Hua-Ren identity can connect to a political category 
and refers to whether people support the candidates from similar cultural backgrounds. 
A shared spatial location within urban areas, tendency to support Hua-Ren 
candidates, and common participation of Hua-Ren networks/community organization is 
not, however, always a necessary condition for pan-ethnic identity at the national level. In 
fact, not only do people have different extents of pan-ethnic attachment, but the three 
Chinese subgroups also perceive and react to racial discrimination in different ways. For 
example, for many PRC-Chinese, Hua-Ren is a broad concept that certainly includes 
Taiwanese and Hong Kongese. For them, one strategy reacting to intergroup competition 
is resorting to a broader pan-ethnic solidarity to raise their group esteem and pride. A 
twenty-four-year-old PRC-Chinese student, Ben, told me:   
 
We have group tasks in class, I feel the Gweilo [ghost people, Australians] 
do not want to be in the same group with we Hua-Ren students. They 
probably think our English is poor or think we do not understand the 
course materials. That is fine, we would not want to share our work with 
them either. Let’s see which group can get higher scores. I do not think we 
are inferior to them. 
 
Ben may be being overly dramatic about Australian hostility. From his narrative, 
however, we can see the PRC-Chinese perception of white people accords with much of 
the ethnic solidarity literature (Lin 1998; Portes and Bach, 1985; Zhou 1992). Ben’s 
narratives closely fit the theory that people will (and should) resort to a broader identity 
when facing outside-group challenge or racial discrimination. Because white people 
discriminate against Chinese people as a “whole” group, Australians do not distinguish 
whether the targets of prejudice are from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, or even Singapore. 
By solidifying pan-ethnic groups and strengthening the group power, “outsiders” are less 
likely to denigrate Hua-Ren, and discrimination should decrease. Many of my other PRC-
Chinese interviewees expressed the similar attitude and hoped that all overseas Chinese 
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would come together. For example, Andrew, a PRC-Chinese migrant who has lived in 
Sydney for 13 years, told me in the interview:  
 
There are so many Hua-Ren here in Australia, why are we still looked 
down upon by Australians? The reason is we do not come together. In this 
regard, Koreans and Japanese are doing a better job than us. When being 
overseas, they would introduce jobs to each other, and have a strong 
community to take care of each other. Hua-Ren…they only think about 
themselves. I feel we should learn something from them [Japanese or 
Koreans]. 
 
An interesting point here is compared to other Chinese groups, the term Hua-Ren 
is more readily available to be taken for PRC-Chinese and be used to claim their 
“collective” interests. The usage of Hua-Ren by PRC-Chinese shows the political factors 
that impact ethnic identity. The One China policy also enables PRC Chinese to use this 
category in a way that Hong Kongese and Taiwanese cannot nor are willing to do so. 
Categorizing Chinese who live oversea into the Hua-Ren group, another thirty-four-year-
old Taiwanese migrant, Micki, who has worked as a sales representative in Australia for 
twelve years, also distinguished Hua-Ren characteristics from other Asian groups like 
Koreans: 
 
Koreans are easier to tell here in Australia, they are courteous, always in 
groups, and focus on filial piety, and maybe…they are a bit patriarchal. I 
mean, they emphasize age and position order. When you hang out with 
Koreans, senior people would pay for the junior ones. Hua-Ren is exactly 
the opposite. So, it is difficult to involve a Korean into the Hua-Ren world 
even they live in Hua-Ren neighborhoods like Campsie.  
 
To a certain extent, PRC-Chinese migrants do not clearly distinguish pan-
ethnicity from national identity at the diasporic or national level. For most PRC-Chinese, 
ideas about Hua-Ren identity are expressed in a “racial” form of identification (covering 
Taiwanese and Hong Kongese but excluding white people) or national loyalty extending 
beyond the boundaries of the nation state. As Gina’s narratives quoted in the previous 
chapter, a Hua-Ren identity is difficult to distinguish from a PRC-Chinese identity 
because it comes from a shared Chinese culture and common origins.  
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For Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants, however, pan-ethnicity may have a 
different meaning at the national level. Micki, for example, even she distinguishes 
between Hua-Ren and other Asians such as Koreans and Japanese, she still thinks there 
are sub-differences within the Hua-Ren category: 
 
Speaking of identity, I am a Hua-Ren, I feel different from other Asians 
like Japanese or Koreans. Indeed, I feel closer to Hua-Ren, and I always 
go grocery shopping in Hua-Ren supermarkets and cook Hua-Ren-style 
food. And though I will raise my kids here in Australia, I still hope they 
can speak Mandarin; however, I still feel different from PRC-Chinese, 
especially in terms of our ways of thinking. For example, when I have to 
deal with customers from China, I feel the interactions are totally different 
from when I interact with Hong Kongese and Taiwanese 
customers…Hong Kongese are closer to Taiwanese, in terms of their ways 
of thinking and doing things… 
 
In a migration context like Australia, people interpret Hua-Ren in a looser and 
strategic way (as discussed in chapter four). During my interviews, however, I also found 
some Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants were aware of the differentiation between 
Hua-Ren and their national identity (Taiwanese or Hong Kongese). Such differentiation 
also influences their self-identification and reactive strategies when facing racial 
discriminations from a non-Chinese group. For example, being asked about racial 
discrimination against Chinese, Joseph, a thirty-six-year-old Taiwanese migrant who 
worked as a public servant in Sydney for five years, noted: 
 
I do not think white people can really tell PRC-Chinese from Taiwanese. 
It is understandable: we look similar, and both speak Mandarin. But to be 
honest, I am not sure if the discrimination against Taiwanese and against 
PRC-Chinese always occurs for the same reasons.  
 
Although the reasons that prompt racial discrimination may be different, Joseph 
felt, the discrimination from Australians is towards every single ethnic Chinese migrant, 
not just Taiwanese or Hong Kongese. Some Taiwanese migrants, interestingly, even 
believe Taiwanese face discrimination simply because Australians cannot distinguish 
PRC-Chinese and Taiwanese. A Taiwanese Working Holiday maker, Lily, said she feels 
discriminated against because Australians see her as PRC-Chinese: 
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Once when I was walking on the street, I was yelled by someone saying: 
“Chinks go back to China!” You know nowadays there are so many PRC-
Chinese people here in Sydney, they make the housing really expensive.104 
I know lots of Australians do not like them. 
 
Another Taiwanese Working Holiday maker, Cecilia, expressed a more direct 
attitude about being put in the “wrong” category as the PRC-Chinese: 
 
No one likes to be discriminated against, and I particularly do not want to 
be discriminated against because I am seen as PRC-Chinese. I feel like I 
am a scapegoat. When people say something against China to me, I always 
reply by saying: “what you are talking about now is another country, it is 
none of my business.” 
 
Cecilia’s narratives substantiate Espiritu’s (1992: 20) argument that when facing 
with external threats, group members can either intensify their solidarity or they can 
distance themselves from the stigmatized segment. In previous chapters we can see 
Cecilia is pretty consistently distancing herself from PRC-Chinese. For Cecilia, she was 
discriminated because she was seen as PRC-Chinese. Here it is important to highlight the 
way both Joseph and Cecilia distinguish between PRC-Chinese and Hua-Ren. In the 
interview they did not clearly express their opinions regarding whether the discrimination 
targets against Hua-Ren. But clearly, discrimination happens because they are seen as 
PRC-Chinese (a stigmatized category for them). By drawing the boundary between 
people from China and Taiwan, they seek to show the group difference and decrease the 
chances to be discriminated against. 
In terms of strategies against racial discrimination, some Hong Kongese migrants 
offer a different perspective: assimilation, to explain why potential racial discrimination 
happens. Assimilation, which means to make alike, is seen as the rejection of 
multiculturalism or giving up one’s original identity (Joppke 1998: 31–32). Rather than 
adopting pan-ethnic solidarity to react to challenges from other groups, many of my Hong 
Kongese respondents told me “failure to assimilate” results in cultural misunderstandings, 
and vice versa. Some respondents feel that because they decided to come to Australia, 																																																								
104 In 2015, some Australians activists protested against what they described as a “Chinese real estate 
invasion.” (Liu 2015)  
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they should try harder to assimilate into the local society rather than “resist” it. A Hong 
Kongese migrant, Gordon, commented: 
 
If you only hang out with Hua-Ren and speak Mandarin every day, if you 
only go to Hua-Ren organizations, then, of course, you will not have a 
chance to understand what Australians are thinking. You will not 
understand their culture, and they will not understand yours either. Many 
of my friends never speak English unless they need to…I always feel we 
should take every chances [for mutual communication], since we are 
already here, otherwise, what is the point of coming here? Just stay in 
Hong Kong then. 
 
Attributing “fit into Australian society or not” to a self-issue, several of my Hong 
Kongese respondents think the problem of integration is not from racism but lies in 
whether they are willing to open their minds. Assimilation explains, at least in part, why 
people are willing to downplay their national identity. Current literature on cultural 
assimilation has discussed the relationship between English proficiency, ethnic identity, 
and the assimilation outcome (Alba and Nee 2003; Tran 2010; Portes and Hao 2002; 
Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Zhou 1997); indeed, when considering assimilation and 
people’s self-identification, we should not ignore time and generational status. When 
immigrants are consciously intending to assimilate into the local society, their perception 
of Hua-Ren identity may change. A good example comes from a forty-six-year-old 
Australian-born Hong-Kongese, Amelia. Asked if assimilation in Australia presented 
identity dilemmas to her, she immediately said no. Now she had the opposite identity 
issue, which is “not enough Chinese:” 
 
My parents…they are always very sad that they did not enforce more 
Chinese language and identity on me and my siblings. When we came, it 
was…it was not a very multicultural society back then, of course there 
was a policy of multiculturalism, but there were not so many Asian 
migrants…we really felt like…we were very visibly different, so we did 
not want to speak Chinese, we did not want to emphasize that aspect of 
our identity. We just wanted to fit in with everyone else, so now we do not 
really feel any attachment with our Chinese identity, you know, all of my 
siblings and I, our Chinese language is very bad. I think it is really because 
that in the era we grew up in, there were not many people from Asian 
countries. We would be quite isolated, if we wanted to emphasize Hua-
Ren culture.  
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In order to assimilate into local society, many migrants choose to give up their 
“original” identity and language. Assimilation not only raises the issue of social and 
economic status. As Amelia stated, it also significantly influences identity. She went on 
to speak about the tension between assimilation and identity: 
 
When I was growing up, I really wanted to fit in and be the same as 
everyone else because there were so few role models you could look up to. 
You did not see any Chinese faces on television, you know. You just did 
not have many…sort of chances where you can exploit different 
identities…really. There was just mainstream media, which was very 
white… so the last thing you want to do is to be different from that. I 
remember one of the things when I was a child, I used to believe in 
God…I used to pray to God, every night my prayer would be: “I just want 
to be an Aussie kid, please turn me into an Aussie kid!” There was this 
advertisement on TV for a breakfast cereal called Weetabix, and the 
slogan was: “Weetabix kids are Aussie Kids.” And the footage would be, 
you know, blonde-haired, blue-eyed kids running around the beach, and 
that was just my dream, my dream was… my prayer to God was, if I wake 
up tomorrow, and I have blonde hair, that is what I really want. It was just 
not cool to be anything other than white kids. 
 
The goal of assimilation might also be applicable to PRC-Chinese, though the 
way to achieve assimilation is different. For PRC-Chinese migrants, creating a broader 
affiliation to include all Hua-Ren and shape collective solidarity is one of the doable 
strategies. To “fit into Australian society,” Hua-Ren need to get together and be more 
influential, such as supporting the Hua-Ren candidates and play a role in the political 
field. A thirty-eight-year-old PRC-Chinese migrant, Lulu, while acknowledging there are 
different political identities existing between Taiwanese and PRC-Chinese, Hua-Ren 
solidarity is still the priority for her:  
 
Have you heard about our Chairman Mao’s famous concept of “United 
front”? It basically describes that in order to win, we should cooperate 
with our secondary enemy to fight against our main enemy…I am not 
saying Australians are the second enemy…I am just using this concept 
to…to say that sometimes we should put away our prejudice or different 
interests [between PRC-Chinese and Taiwanese], and get together first to 
be stronger. Once we are stronger and influential, Australians will not look 
down upon us!     
		
172 
 
From the above quotes, however, we found that assimilation is perceived in 
different ways among Hong Kongese and PRC-Chinese. For Hong Kongese migrants, the 
problem of assimilation is not racism but whether they are willing to open their minds 
and shed constructed racial stereotypes. For PRC-Chinese migrants, in contrast, it is 
because various Chinese subgroups did not solidify with each other so that Hua-Ren as a 
whole group is looked down. Thus, a stronger Hua-Ren identity and solidarity is needed.  
To be specific, how individuals react to racial discrimination reflects different 
strategies. For PRC-Chinese migrants, pan-ethnic solidarity is a viable option, even 
though some admit they need to spend efforts on assimilating into the local society. Hong 
Kongese migrants, however, differ from PRC-Chinese when we talk about pan-ethnic 
solidarity and assimilation. They seldom think broader solidarity or participate the pan-
ethnic coalition can decrease racial inequality. Instead, when their primary goal is 
assimilation, they downplay the importance of identity and attribute discrimination to 
their lack of cultural understandings. In other words, when facing racial discrimination, 
both Taiwanese and Hong Kongese seldom challenge outsiders through Hua-Ren 
narratives or view themselves in a broader Hua-Ren category shared with other Chinese 
subgroups (particularly PRC-Chinese). 
For diasporic Africans, the memory of slavery helps reproduce collective 
identification and consciousness (Gilroy 1993). When facing outside threats against the 
whole ethnic community, Chinese groups may come together and assert their sense of 
Hua-Ren collectivity (Siu 2005: 141). However, Hua-Ren can be a looser concept that 
Taiwanese and Hong Kongese use strategically. Unlike the Asian Americans whom 
Espiritu (1992) and Wei (1993) found taking collective action to alter society’s 
perceptions, Taiwanese and Hong Kongese rarely think, particularly at the national level, 
that seeking a Hua-Ren identity is that important. They use Chinese websites and attend 
activities held by Hua-Ren community associations but primarily out of strategic needs 
(e.g., finding jobs and accommodations or creating business networks) rather than a 
nationalist desire. Taiwanese and Hong Kongese do not always acknowledge experiences 
shared with PRC-Chinese. When facing racial discrimination from another non-Chinese 
group, they do not build a community across ethnic and cultural lines, nor do they 
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necessarily see themselves as sharing a collective Hua-Ren identity and culture with 
PRC-Chinese at the national level. They maintain their boundaries with PRC-Chinese and 
do not look to extend their group boundaries even when facing outside group challenges. 
We can use a graph to approximately present the meaning of pan-ethnicity for 
Taiwanese (and Hong Kongese, to a certain extent) at the diasporic level and national 
level (see Figure 17). In an immigration context, Taiwanese can and do adopt Hua-Ren 
practices. Demands associated with strategic needs encourage the expansion of pan-
ethnic identities and unmake the group boundaries between Taiwanese and other Chinese 
subgroups at the diasporic level. However, while PRC-Chinese may claim a common 
sentiment and a wider alliance, Taiwanese do not always acknowledge experiences 
shared with PRC-Chinese. They do not build a community across ethnic and cultural 
lines nor do they necessarily see themselves as sharing a collective identity and culture 
with PRC-Chinese at the national level.  
 
Figure 17. The Shifting Identity of Taiwanese Migrants 
 
Racial Oppression vs. Political Hostility 
How do Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants, if there is any difference from 
PRC-Chinese migrants, perceive racial oppression in Australia? In the previous section I 
mentioned the perspective of assimilation among Hong Kongese respondents, but why 
Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants eschew cooperating with PRC-Chinese involves 
another dimension. They actually distinguish racial discrimination from political hostility. 
To be more specific, White oppression is “racial,” whereas oppression from PRC-
Chinese is more about “political” hostility. As Espiritu (1992) asserts, pan-ethnic unity is 
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decreasing primarily because the symbolic re-interpretation of common history and when 
the history involves political oppression, the perception of political hostility from the 
Chinese government can deter people’s willingness to unmake the group boundary and 
formulate a strong pan-ethnicity. 
The racial discrimination Taiwanese and Hong Kongese face from white 
Australians is experienced differently than the political hostility they experience from 
PRC-Chinese. Indeed, these two types of oppressions do not always happen 
simultaneously. But particularly because in Australia, with the co-presence of white 
Australians and PRC-Chinese, we can see how Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants 
make distinctions between these two kinds of oppression. 
In a word, Taiwanese and Hong Kongese distinguish between Australian-directed 
racial oppression and political hostility from PRC-Chinese. The latter is “stronger” 
because it is a persistent phenomenon to Taiwanese and Hong Kongese and has more 
serious consequences (e.g., China does not recognize that Taiwan is an independent 
country and impose direct control over Hong Kong’s autonomy), especially for young 
generations. For example, in Taiwan, Taiwanese sense the threats from China every day 
through their experiences growing-up, being educated, and daily news reports. Some 
even instill this anti-China sentiment in their children’s minds after migrating to Australia. 
A thirty-six-year-old Taiwanese migrant, Grace, who is now a house-wife, said she 
constantly told her kids not to buy products made in China and that China and Taiwan are 
different countries (Interview with Grace, October 6, 2015). For Taiwanese migrants, 
racial discrimination from Australians is less common or obvious until they really face it. 
So, people compare between and show their sentiments toward PRC-Chinese and 
Australians, respectively. When being interviewed about political hostility from PRC-
Chinese and racial discrimination experience in Australia, one Taiwanese migrant, 
Natalie, who has lived in Sydney for over 15 years, said: 
 
Hostility from PRC-Chinese is just everywhere. Wherever you go, as long 
as there are PRC-Chinese people, you will be likely running into these 
sensitive political issues. People will always ask you about your political 
attitude on cross-Strait relations, and whether you support unification with 
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China or Taiwan independence. Whereas not everyone meets racial 
discrimination here in Australia, you know what I mean?   
 
As briefly mentioned above, the ongoing flow of immigrants combined with the 
government’s immigration policies has lead to a contradictory situation in Australia 
where multiculturalism has co-existed with various forms of racism. Some migrants, 
however, selectively highlight the part of multiculturalism while at the same time 
downplay or attribute racism to individual cases. A thirty-year-old Taiwanese Working 
Holiday maker, Justin, who works in a warehouse, commented: 
 
Racial discrimination…I guess it depends on where you live, districts in 
west side of Sydney like Bankstown and Cabramatta are bit unsafe. But in 
general, I do not think it is that common. Of course sometimes you hear 
the news saying there are some racial discriminations here and there, you 
feel a bit racism, you got the wrong name-calling, and so on, but they are 
just few cases. Overall, most Australians are still quite friendly and easy-
going…I do not know about the situations in other countries, but I hear in 
the US racial discrimination is more serious… 
 
Joseph’s quote in the previous section shows that for many Taiwanese people, the 
discrimination from Australians is towards every single Chinese migrant (or “non-white” 
people), not just Taiwanese. In contrast, the political hostility from PRC-Chinese 
particularly targets Taiwan. In the interview, Joseph expressed his sense about political 
hostility from China and explained why he does not want to be “one of the Hua-Ren 
group:” 
 
First of all, I do not really feel any connection with PRC-Chinese in terms 
of ethnic identity because they are so different, I do not share the history 
they have, I do not understand the institutions and systems they are talking 
about. When my PRC-Chinese colleagues are talking about something 
happened on Weibo or Wechat, I just feel very distanced from them. 
Second, you should know if you had served in the army, the reason our 
army exists is exactly because we need to fight against Mainland China, 
why would we stand together with them? 
 
For the Chinese government and people who are trying to encourage Hua-Ren 
solidarity, they may think all migrants with ethnically Chinese background are related to 
China and thus should stand together when facing racial discrimination. However, as 
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Kathy’s claim in the previous chapter that the Umbrella Movement was mainly against 
the Chinese government, Joseph also shows his subjective understanding of cross-Strait 
tensions. Even being overseas, some Taiwanese do not necessarily ascribe themselves the 
Hua-Ren identity the same way as what PRC-Chinese do, and may not agree that they are 
“one of them.” Thus, there is no need to stand together. Or, the threat from white 
Australians is not strong enough to create such a need for Chinese migrants. In contrast, 
the political hostility from China is persistent, and to a certain extent stronger, which 
decreases the incentives of many Taiwanese migrants to participate in this pan-ethnic 
category. 
Similarly, for Hong Kongese migrants, the pro-democracy movement and anti-
Mainland sentiments keep spreading out, either in Hong Kong or overseas (Jones 2014; 
Ma 2015). Under 150 years of colonial rule by a foreign country, many people of Hong 
Kong have believed that they are Hong Kongese more than Chinese, and felt uneasy 
about returning to a national home that they do not sense is theirs (Lau 1997; Mathews 
2000). In other words, people of Hong Kong have developed their unique identity and 
culture. To some extents, people of Hong Kong feel being Hong Kongese is arguably 
superior to being Chinese as a citizen of the People’s Republic of China. For example, 
Olivia, a forty-eight-year-old Hong Kongese migrant, who migrated to Australia 20 years 
ago, told me: 
 
We experienced British colony rule for decades. But as you might hear 
regularly, Hong Kong people, especially the older generations, would say, 
they miss the time under the British rule. It was more liberal and had less 
constraint. People in my generation would say that they wish the UK still 
rules Hong Kong today! 
 
Olivia told me many older-generation Hong Kongese have had interactions with 
white people, so they can “clearly distinguish what they themselves prefer.” As 
mentioned in the previous section, some Hong Kongese migrants see assimilation as the 
reason why some people experienced racial discrimination, Olivia told me it is people’s 
decision to come and stay in Australia. If they do not like it, “they could just stay in Hong 
Kong then.” (Interview with Olivia, May 20, 2015) Another Hong Kongese Working 
Holiday maker, Eason, also compared his sentiments toward China and Australia: 
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Obviously, I am not a big fan of communism. For all my life I have not 
felt Hong Kong is part of China. I have too many differences with 
Mainland Chinese to think that I am Chinese. Overall, Hong Kong is a 
very different place. Hong Kong is not communist. Even though I do not 
follow politics very much, I just know I hate communism, and the 
communist Chinese government is a terrible regime. I want to be able to 
say whatever I want to say, using Facebook, my words and posts would 
not be censored all the time by the government. But Hong Kongese 
government…it is controlled by the Chinese government and I feel 
nowadays there is less freedom in Hong Kong, so I came here to Australia. 
If I can stay and get someone to sponsor me, I would not probably go back 
to Hong Kong. 
 
In fact, many Hong Kongese migrants disconnect being Chinese from supporting 
the Chinese government. In other words, they identify themselves as culturally Chinese 
but Hong Kongese in terms of national identity. For those who have experienced the rule 
of British rule, they may situate in a different environment where Chinese and Western 
culture are mixed. Such mixture adds another element on Hong Kongese identity: 
Chinese-ness plus freedom/democracy/human rights/the rule of law (Mathews 2000: 150) 
Thus, people may hold different identities at the same time, as Mathews (2000: 136) 
claims, Chinese-ness is expressed at a number of levels: “as one’s ethnicity, the culture of 
one’s daily life; as one’s background and its history and heritage; and as nationality and 
state to which one belongs.” People can select, however, which level they identity with. 
In the case of Hong Kongese migrants, for example, they only take the cultural/historical 
side of pan-ethnicity and forgo the national and political meanings of Chinese-ness.  
Language is another important factor in shaping why Hong Kongese migrants feel 
“alien” to PRC-Chinese. Jaselyn, another second-generation Hong Kongese migrant, who 
migrated to Australia with her parents when she was seven, recalled her education 
experience in Australia: 
 
When I was in grade 8 or 9, there were Saturday language classes teaching 
in Mandarin, my parents sent me to those classes for a little while, but they 
did not have Cantonese classes, they only had Mandarin classes. Because 
our family did not speak Mandarin, I hated going there…I had to give up 
our weekends to sit in the classroom, I really hated it so I complained a lot 
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to my mum. And I remember my mum said: “oh well, you are learning a 
different language anyway, even it is not our language.”  
 
The sense of alienation happens across generations. As discussed in the previous 
section, my interviewee Hali mentioned that the identities of first-generation migrants are 
always more flexible. During my interviews, however, one of my interviewees, Amelia, 
her parents (first-generation migrants) still hold their “original” national identity strongly 
and reject any sense of pan-ethnic identity with PRC-Chinese. Amelia described her 
parents: 
 
Like my parents, they definitely have a strong attachment to Hong Kong, 
they are anti-China, as years go on, they seem to be more violently anti-
China, my mum will not even buy any food if it is said: “made in China;” 
if she buys groceries in the supermarket, she avoids buying any food from 
China, because she just does not trust it, you know, she thinks it could be 
contaminated…she just feels that, anything that comes from China at the 
moment, is suspect, like the people with money they are spending is dirty 
money, politics is dirty politics, that is how she feels…any news report she 
sees, seems to confirm that for her too. I have been quite surprised by how 
much they hate China, they do not feel any sense of pan-ethnic Chinese 
identity at all, they do not have any sense of being Chinese, and they do 
not even speak Chinese. You know, it is exactly the opposite…my 
mum…even though she was born in China! 
    
The narratives show that long-term migrants may not completely lose their 
national identity as time goes by. As well, parents might encourage their children to 
involve into local culture while distancing them from being Chinese. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, within an immigration context, the common experiences as foreigners 
and minorities might help develop a Hua-Ren community that stresses the concept of 
cosmopolitan Chinese-ness. Yet, Chinese networks and Chinese community goals do not 
always strengthen cultural ties among members of the three Chinese subgroups. A Hong 
Kong Working Holiday maker, Louis, also commented: 
 
When you think about community in terms of its public representation, 
often the people who run those ethnic community organizations are 
business people or middle-class people. They do not necessarily represent 
the interests of others, like students or we temporary workers. Do not be 
silly, they just want to do networking and earn more money. If you do not 
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have any value, they would not come to invite you or even contact 
you…they [the Chinese government] use the business to reach their 
political goals too. For example, in Hong Kong, they threaten to cut our 
electricity and water, if we do not follow their orders or cooperate with 
them politically. 
 
Louis’ comments show the threat from the Chinese government that Hong 
Kongese sense in their everyday life. In contrast, even assimilation into the local 
Australian society is hard, it is still a desirable goal. The perceived threat from China, 
along with rare and less obvious discrimination from white Australians, together block 
the potential pan-ethnic identity for Hong Kongese. Perceiving the pan-ethnicity from the 
strategic perspective, the Hong Kongese manager, Simon, in the restaurant I used to work, 
told me even more directly: 
 
The logic is simple. Think about this: if there is a need and if there is Hua-
Ren solidarity, why has not there been any Hua-Ren movement in the past 
10 or 20 years? Racial discrimination against Hua-Ren happens here every 
day, but why does it seem nobody cares? It is because we only say 
something like “we are all brothers and sisters,” “we are all Hua-Ren,” 
these pieces of shit when we need help from other Chinese people; 
otherwise, who cares about it? Everyone wants to be Australian, who cares 
about being Hua-Ren? 
 
The clear distinction between PRC-Chinese and Taiwanese/Hong Kongese, the 
political threat from China, and the strategic claims of being a Hua-Ren, all decrease the 
possibilities for Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants to grow pan-ethnic identity and 
seek solidarity with PRC-Chinese. The block of pan-ethnic identity results in Taiwanese 
and Hong Kongese would feel “alienated” if they are put in the same ethnic or identity 
category as other PRC-Chinese.  
I am not arguing, however, that every Taiwanese and Hong Kongese prefer 
Australians over PRC-Chinese. The point I want to highlight is under the condition where 
Chinese migrants have a chance to interact with white Australians, Taiwanese and Hong 
Kongese migrants always distinguish between the effects of two types of oppression and 
tend to perceive them separately. The distinction and awareness of political hostility 
decrease the likelihood that Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants will seek pan-ethnic 
solidarity with PRC-Chinese. 
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When the Discrimination Is “Micro” 
Internalizing Racial Micro-aggression 
Why some migrants pay more attention to political hostility over racial 
discrimination is also related to the strength of racial discrimination. In addition to 
assimilation reasons, many of my respondents told me, they do not always realize there is 
discrimination from white Australians. If the threat from white Australians is not strong 
enough, Chinese migrants do not see there is a need to adopt Hua-Ren solidarity. In 
contrast, the political hostility from China is persistent, and to a certain extent stronger. 
As discussed in chapter three, some respondents told me that compared to racial 
discrimination, exploitation from Hua-Ren is much more common in Australia. In many 
cases, victims of racial discriminations can be “unaware” of the discrimination and even 
“internalize” the unfair treatment, which makes Hua-Ren identity and follow-up 
solidarity an unlikely outcome. 
In this section I borrow Derald Sue and his colleague’s (2007) definition of racial 
micro-aggression. Scholars and observers of race relations have argued that 
contemporary life is marked by a “changing face of racism.” (Sue et al. 2007) Instead of 
overt and direct racism against minority groups, racial micro-aggressions are increasingly 
a feature of everyday life. Such aggressions are “micro” because they are subtle and not 
easily recognized (Johnson 1988; Solórzano et al. 2000). They may even be generated 
“unconsciously” without intending to cause harm (Sue 2010). Sue and his colleagues 
(2007) give an explicit definition: racial micro-aggressions include “verbal or behavioral 
indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, which communicate hostile, derogatory, 
or negative racial slights and insults.” (p. 278) 
According to Sue and his colleagues (Sue et al. 2007: 274–275), micro-
aggressions primarily occur in three forms: micro-assaults, micro-insults, and micro-
invalidations (Sue et al. 2007: 274–275). Micro-assaults are explicit racial derogations 
characterized primarily by verbal or nonverbal attack (e.g., comments implying that 
Chinese are lazy). Micro-insults, on the other hand, refer to communications that convey 
rudeness and insensitivity, and demean a person’s racial heritage (e.g., someone is 
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surprised that Chinese people speak English well). And lastly, micro-invalidations refer 
to communications that exclude, negate, or nullify the psychological thoughts, feelings, 
or experiential reality of a person of color (e.g., feeling people of color are always over-
sensitive about racial issues). These forms can cause uncomfortable feelings and may 
even lead to tensions between groups.  
Uncomfortable feelings or feelings of being offended are common results of racial 
micro-aggressions (Feagin 2006; Pieterse and Carter 2007). The question remains, 
however, if recipients do not report feeling uncomfortable or offended, can we still claim 
that there is a racial micro-aggression? Scholars like Sue (2005) recognize the invisibility 
of racial micro-aggressions. Perpetrators, in fact, may not intentionally initiate micro-
aggressions, which can in turn cause recipients to feel uncertain about how to interpret 
the behavior. Intentions and the uncomfortable feelings that come from racial micro-
aggressions are thus difficult to attribute (Solórzano et al. 2000). Current studies 
generally focus on how racial and ethnic groups perceive micro-aggressions from other 
social groups. What remains to be explored is how micro-aggressions are misinterpreted 
and used to justify or strengthen racial stereotypes within a given specific racial/ethnic 
group (e.g., Chinese). In this section I argue that racial micro-aggressions can also 
involve people’s own racialized assertions and interpretations about their racial category, 
to the extent they may agree or disagree with such racial stereotypes. As I will show in 
the following, meaning is not just created by the perpetrator, but by the recipient of racial 
micro-aggressions, a fact not often examined in scholarship. I will also illuminate how 
the internalization of micro-aggressions may alleviate mutual tensions between the 
advantaged (i.e., white Australians) and the disadvantaged (Chinese migrant workers), 
even as this behavior at the same time reinforces racial hierarchies and stereotypes in 
their everyday lives. The process of internalization also explains why Chinese migrant 
groups do not see there is a need to cultivate a stronger Hua-Ren identity. 
In the field of race and ethnicity, scholars have examined race relations in 
Australia from other perspectives such as class, cultural differences, and social-spatial 
context (Forrest and Dunn, 2006; Kuhn 2009; Markus 2001; Rizvi 1996). Few of them, 
however, looked at subtleness and unconsciousness of racial micro-aggression that many 
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migrants have experienced in Australia, and how self-perception of migrants themselves 
reinforces such racial stereotypes. The phenomenon of racial-micro-aggression is 
different from institutionalized racism as it is less regular and is more relevant to the 
ways people interact with each other in their everyday lives.  
In present-day Australian society, racial discrimination against Chinese is not 
always overt. During my interview, for example, my respondents did not necessarily feel 
uncomfortable when a micro-aggression occurs. Thus, the point here is to understand 
how people “internalize” and “interpret” racial micro-aggressions. For example, as 
briefly mentioned in chapter three, English proficiency and accents are key sources of 
racial micro-aggression. In Australia, it is not surprising that English proficiency directly 
determines whether migrants can get a proper job. When I asked my interviewees to self-
evaluate their English proficiency, only a few said they were confident of their English. 
Such reactions result from racial stereotypes based on national origin and racism. As said, 
some Chinese migrants learn that they have to speak English better to be hired, and have 
to be more “Australian” and less “Chinese” in order to assimilate into the local society. 
Thus, they believe it is their language proficiency and accents that make them less 
“qualified” for better jobs rather than seeing getting bad jobs as racial discrimination in 
the job-hiring processes. Chinese migrants clearly live under a racial hierarchy 
constructed by the advantaged group (white Australians); however, they internalize such 
constructed values as if they do not deserve wages equal to other Australians.  
However, being used to the constructed racial hierarchy and accepting the fact 
that they are now living in Australia, people do not necessarily feel insulted by the 
follow-up racial discriminations. A PRC-Chinese migrant, John, attributed the integration 
problem to English proficiency: 
 
My English is poor, and I always feel in Australia, poor English...people 
will look down upon you if you do not speak good English. In contrast, if 
today you speak good English, you can find as good jobs and earn as good 
money as other Australians. When I first came, I went to some free 
English courses, but I soon felt bored because I could not understand 
anything. Living in Sydney is fine, though. There are so many Hua-Ren 
here, you do not need to speak any English and you can survive…the only 
thing is you may not be able to earn good money…    
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In most cases, Chinese migrants feel such unequal treatment is normal, regardless 
of their nationalities. People even accept the outcome that employers select their 
employees based on nationalities. As a twenty-three-year-old Hong Kongese Working 
Holiday maker, Vivian, who works as a cashier in a Chinese supermarket, explained: 
 
I can understand why Gweilo seldom hire Chinese migrants. Most Chinese 
migrants do not speak fluent English. Yes it is unfair, but we can not 
blame them. If I were the boss, I would also want my employees to 
communicate easily and take orders immediately.   
 
As Du Bois’s (1961 [1903]) idea of double consciousness and Emirbayer and 
Desmond’s (2015) concept of racial order, Vivian perceives the job market and hiring 
practice according to the racial hierarchy that advantaged groups have constructed. The 
belief in constructed racial order further sustains and strengthens racial stereotypes within 
Chinese migrant workers. Another PRC-Chinese student, Doris, also thinks cultural 
differences are the main sources of misunderstanding. When I asked her about whether 
she feels being discriminated against,  she told me she would not “overthink” nor 
interpret her expeiences as racial discrimination: 
 
It is my first time being an environment where there are so many 
foreigners, I guess I am kind of shy myself. They [Australians] may think 
I look dumb because I seldom talk in class or participate in their activities. 
I think it is cultural difference, they think I am different, but I would not 
think it is racial discrimination.  
 
Accent is obviously another issue. From my interview I found it is common that 
Chinese migrants would mutually tease each other’s strong accents. For example, a 
Taiwanese Working Holiday maker, Lisa, told me: 
 
My colleague [Taiwanese] is super crazy about foreign things and people. 
She wants to marry an Aussie [Australian] and get permanent residency. 
Sometimes I really feel ashamed for her. She always sucks up to our 
[Australian] supervisor and always talks to us [Taiwanese] in English as if 
she was ABC [Australian Born Chinese], but she never realizes how 
strong her Taiwanese accent is. Her accent betrays her origins! 
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Lisa’s response illustrates two points. First, to a certain extent, accent is key to 
whether one can successfully integrate into the host society or not. Second, when people 
tease each other’s accents, they accept and internalize the constructed racial stereotype. In 
other words, migrants believe that those with a more “local” accent may have a better 
chance of getting good jobs.   
Following this logic, people generally blame themselves when others (e.g., local 
Australians) cannot understand them or do not treat them equally. “It must be my accent 
is too strong or I cannot pronounce words correctly.” Several of my respondents express a 
similar attitude. Other respondents would attribute it to “cultural differences and cultural 
misunderstandings.” Very few of my respondents think that other racial/ethnic groups 
should spend the effort to understand them. My respondents attribute English proficiency 
and accent to their own “problems” and think it is they who are responsible for their 
failure to assimilate into the host society or their unfair treatment.  
Can we thus conclude that people “agree” with racial micro-aggressions happen 
to them? When racial stereotyping occurs, some people do ask themselves whether such 
discriminations are right. A twenty-three-year-old PRC-Chinese student, Tiffany, who 
does a part-time job as waitress, told me: 
 
I was doing a group task with three other Australians. One day one of my 
colleagues told me: “Not many Chinese are as generous as you.” I did not 
know if it is a compliment or has other meanings…To be honest with you, 
I did not feel there is any racism meaning at the moment because I knew 
what she said was true. I have worked with many other Chinese people, 
some of them are very selfish. 
 
The narratives of Tiffany’s colleague clearly involve both micro-assaults and 
micro-insults (Sue et al. 2007) because they include comments implying that Chinese 
always take advantage of other people so that people feel surprised when seeing Chinese 
people help others. We do not know if Tiffany tries to “switch” such racial stereotype by 
showing her generousness. We can see, however, that she actually agrees with her white 
colleagues’ racial stereotyping and does not feel offended when racial discriminations 
occur. Tiffany also told me that many of her Australian colleagues are surprised by how 
Chinese migrants are willing to work for long hours and even on weekends, and some of 
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her Chinese colleagues feel proud of their work ethic (doing jobs that other people do not 
want). Another PRC-Chinese student, Fanny, who has a part-time job in the restaurant, 
also shared with me an interesting story when one day she tried to eat more staff meal, 
one white colleague squinted at her as if she comes from a poor country and wants to eat 
everything. She told me: “Who cares about what they think of me? I was hungry!” 
(Interview with Fanny, April 2, 2015) 
To be more specific, for some Chinese migrants, because discrimination is 
“micro,” it is never an issue, even though they are treated differently from other 
racial/ethnic groups. Thus, there is no opportunity to build Hua-Ren pan-ethnicity as 
Asian-Americans movement in the United States has. I argue such phenomena come from 
a process by which people have internalized racial stereotypes and racial hierarchies. 
Thus, people attribute failed assimilation, bad job conditions, or follow-up racial 
discrimination to personal failure, lack of English proficiency, cultural barriers, a sense of 
cultural pride that they are “willing to do the task,” or even an indifferent attitude like “I 
do not care, it does not hurt me.” Here we can clearly see the discussion of pan-ethnic 
identity is not only about how national identity gets stronger or weaker, it also involves 
how people understand and perceive themselves during the racialization process as well 
as why they do not seek further pan-ethnic solidarity.   
 
“Wrongly” Interpreting Racial Discriminations 
In addition to internalizing racial micro-aggressions and feeling themselves 
rightly deserving unequal outcomes, people sometimes wrongly interpret micro-
aggression and thus do not treat it seriously. Under certain situations, people do not feel 
offended or uncomfortable. Such situations generally accompany existing interaction 
models with other racial/ethnic groups so that recipients do not think racial micro-
aggressions are actually happening, or they try to deny their presence, intent, or meaning 
(Sue 2010). For example, a twenty-seven-year-old PRC-Chinese student, Sally, who has a 
part-time work in the cosmetics-packing factory, said:  
 
My boss always says something like: “Sweetheart, I like your Asian 
hairstyle!” Or, “hey, I heard that Chinese people eat dogs, how do you 
cook a dog? Does it taste good?” I know he does not know much about 
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Chinese…or Asians, I can understand that. I know he is just trying to be 
friendly with me, or trying to make some jokes, so it is alright, I think the 
jokes he made are funny too. I remember sometimes I even replied: “You 
can braise or stir-fry it, it is tasty, you want to try it?”  
 
Sally’s boss apparently has a mistaken stereotype that some eating habits are from 
Sally’s “Asian” or “Chinese” culture. His narratives also fit Sue and his colleagues’ (2007) 
definition of verbal micro-assaults. Here we can see that feeling offended or not depends 
on the perpetrator’s attitude. Harwood and his colleagues (2015) show that on campus, 
perpetrators may think their racial micro-aggression in the way that “it is a joke, or funny, 
or not a big deal.” (p. 7) Even if they feel disrespected, recipients may just ignore the 
slight or simply did not respond to it. Müller and his colleagues (2007: 341) also found 
that processes of racialization were simply not immediately recognized because they 
“occurred in the context of friendly and joking interactions.” For Sally, her boss is 
friendly and a nice guy. He always treats her well, and his racial stereotyping words are 
thus interpreted as a way of showing his friendliness. This example also shows racial 
micro-aggression in many ways is a relational boundary making/unmaking process that 
generated from a certain interaction pattern and then influences the relationships between 
different racial/ethnic groups.  
Another situation is even though people sense racial micro-aggressions, recipients 
do not feel offended because they attribute such micro-aggressions to other people’s 
ignorance. Like perpetrators, recipients may also think they are funny or not a big deal. 
As scholars (Billig 2001; Matsuda et al. 1993) suggest, perpetrators claim that their racial 
micro-aggressions are humorous in intent and should not be categorized as racism. As 
well, recipients do not want to be seen as unable to take a joke or perceived as too 
“politically correct” (over-sensitive about racial issues, see Sue et al. 2007). For example, 
during the time when I was doing casual jobs, I called the boss when I saw a job ad about 
unloading containers. The first question the boss asked me was my height and weight, 
and if I can speak English, and then she asked where I am from. I said Taiwan. She said 
she is not sure whether to hire me because Asian guys are generally more “soft” and have 
less strength (Field notes, May 17, 2015). 
To be honest, I did not really feel angry when the boss seemed hesitant to hire me 
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simply because of my nationality. The first thought came to my mind was “it is ridiculous 
but funny;” (Field notes, May 17, 2015) and I went to do the job to show her that I can do 
it and have a sense of humor.  
In other cases, to respond to the perpetrator’s ignorance, recipients may also show 
their sympathy with the perpetrators. A good example is from a twenty-eight-year-old 
Taiwanese Working Holiday maker, Chien-Ting, who now works as a bartender, he said: 
 
My boss always called me “the Asian guy” when he tried to ask me to do 
some tasks. It is fine with me because I do not have an English name and 
too lazy to think of one, and I know my “Chien” is probably hard for them 
[Australians] to pronounce, or they just simply forgot what my name is…I 
am the only employee who looks Asian, so gradually, “the Asian guy” 
becomes my nickname.  
 
Chien-Ting’s narratives clearly show that he does not feel offended by such racial 
micro-aggressions. For Chien-Ting, the remarks show only how ignorant the boss is. In 
other words, different from internalizing racial micro-aggressions, people create an 
interpretation that reinterprets micro-aggressions to mean that they are shows of 
friendliness or evidence of the perpetrator’s ignorance. Under certain situations (e.g., 
friendly atmosphere and existing interaction model), the uncomfortable feelings from 
racial discriminations may be reduced and micro-assaults can be interpreted in a different 
way. During the “misinterpretation” process, recipients make sense of racial micro-
aggressions, do not really feel insulted, and even think they are amusing, which sustains 
and reproduces stereotypes and the racial hierarchy. As such, Chinese migrants do not 
feel compelled to embrace a Hua-Ren solidarity.  
 
Summary 
In the field of migration and ethnic studies, pan-ethnicity has become prominent 
in explaining subgroups who expand beyond national origins and encompass shared 
historical and cultural traits. Such literature also focuses on the shared experiences in the 
immigration context that lead to the formation of pan-ethnic solidarities, such as 
intergroup competition and discrimination from outside groups. 
It is generally understood that pan-ethnic solidarity emerges within the political 
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context of a racialized society and from the experience of discrimination within a 
racialized society (Espiritu 1992; Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Wei 1993). Starting from 
another angle, however, this chapter identifies conditions under which people do not 
adopt pan-ethnicity, and highlights that the “perception” of discrimination, not simply 
discrimination itself, has a varied effect on the formation of pan-ethnic identity. 
In Australia, when Chinese migrants use networks to exchange information and 
experiences regarding work and social life, there is no strong national identity. The 
common experiences of being lumped together as foreigners and minorities help develop 
a Hua-Ren community that stresses the concept of cosmopolitan pan-ethnic identity. In 
my fieldwork I also found that people do not really distinguish others’ ethnic background 
or national identity in online networks or service-oriented community organizations. In 
such networks or organizations, members either have a strategic need or their identity is 
oriented towards a more cosmopolitan organizational goal (e.g., religious beliefs, 
business networks, and community service). 
The shared use of Chinese networks and the shared goal of Chinese communities, 
however, do not necessarily strengthen a stronger tie between Taiwanese, Hong Kongese, 
and PRC-Chinese groups. This chapter focuses on the context where Chinese migrants 
interact with a “non-Chinese” group in their everyday life and the impacts of racial 
discrimination and political hostility on Hua-Ren identity for different Chinese subgroups 
in Australia. Interaction with white Australians is an important aspect of Chinese 
migrants’ social life that also reflects how different Chinese groups perceive and interpret 
Hua-Ren identity differently. From the examples and discussions provided above, I not 
only challenge the literature on pan-ethnic solidarity, which portrays minority groups 
cooperating when facing outside group discrimination; I also extend the understanding of 
overseas Chinese groups by pointing out the pan-ethnic identity is neither shaped 
voluntarily nor imposed by outside groups. Pan-ethnic solidarity might be a doable 
strategy for PRC-Chinese migrants; for other Chinese subgroups like Taiwanese and 
Hong Kongese migrants, however, assertions of identity can be strategic, and can have 
different meanings at the diasporic and national level, respectively.  
At the diasporic level, even though some Chinese migrants see overseas Chinese 
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networks and organizations as “Hua-Ren” given the shared experiences of being a 
“foreigner” or ethnic minority in Australia, Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants still 
distinguish themselves from other PRC-Chinese at the national level. They do not deploy 
Hua-Ren narratives, nor do they aim for pan-ethnic collective action. Even when facing 
racial discrimination, they choose to distance themselves from the pan-ethnic model and 
chose to forego Hua-Ren ties. In this sense, pan-ethnic identity has its limitations. 
By examining national identity and how Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants 
distinguish between political hostility from China and racial oppression from Australians, 
this chapter provides a deeper explanation of why people do not resort to a Hua-Ren 
identity when facing racial discrimination. Meanwhile, I also point out the discrimination 
experiences in Australia might be “micro,” so that Chinese migrants do not feel there is a 
need to embrace pan-ethnic solidarity. These subtle and unintentional racial micro-
aggressions can be internalized and reproduced within the Chinese group. The 
internalization and reproduction of micro-aggressions may alleviate mutual tensions 
between the advantaged (i.e., white Australians) and the disadvantaged (Chinese 
migrants), and at the same time, maintain persistent racial stereotypes and hierarchies in 
everyday life.  
From the examples provided above, I argue the persistence of racial 
discrimination is a process by which people have internalized racial stereotypes or the 
racial hierarchy. On the one hand, Chinese migrants often attribute the failure to find a 
job or assimilate into the host societies, or follow-up racial micro-aggressions to their 
own personal failures (lack of English proficiency or have a strong accent). As Du Bois’s 
(1961 [1903]) idea of double consciousness and Emirbayer and Desmond’s (2015) 
concept of racial order, recipients perceive themselves according to the racial hierarchy 
that advantaged groups (white Australians) have constructed. On the other hand, Chinese 
migrants also interpret discrimination as just an expression of the perpetrator’s 
friendliness or ignorance, and even feel “I do not care, it does not hurt me.” As such, the 
mutual tensions between perpetrators and recipients are eased. Recipients do not 
necessarily feel insulted when racial discriminations happen. Clearly, these attitudes are 
different from Taiwanese/Hong Kongese perception and experiences with PRC-Chinese. 
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When racial discrimination is “micro,” it is not too surprising that Taiwanese and Hong 
Kongese migrants do not feel it as serious as political hostility from China. In other 
words, political hostility from PRC-Chinese is more tangible and persistent. By ignoring 
the sting of racism it minimizes hostility against Chinese migrants and prevents these 
three Chinese subgroups from cultivating a strong Hua-Ren identity and solidarity. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION: DIFFERING CHINESE MIGRANT  
INTERPRETATIONS OF HUA-REN IN AUSTRALIA  
 
 
“Identity is always in context.”                                 
(Ngan and Chan 2012: 19) 
 
 
“The notions of ‘Chinese-ness’ and ideas of belonging to a ‘Chinese’ 
community are not universally defined, but locally determined and 
historically contingent.”                                                              
(Siu 2005: 163) 
 
 
Scholars have been trying to explore what can be counted “national identity.” For 
example, a new poll conducted by the Pew Research Center (2017), which uses several 
variables from the Global Attitudes Survey,105 to unravel the idea of being truly national 
identity. The variables used include language spoken, shared customs, religion, and 
country of birth; and how important each variable can be considered as at the core of 
national identity (see Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18. Agreement that Language Is at the Core of National Identity. Source: Pew 
Research Center.  
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/02/01092801/Pew-
Research-Center-National-Identity-Report-FINAL-February-1-2017.pdf																																																								
105 See: http://www.pewglobal.org/database/ 
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The variables used in this poll are important in defining what constitutes national 
identity. However, we might want to ask questions such as: can these variables be applied 
to explain national identity in countries such as China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong? 
Furthermore, these variables did not fully represent how one’s identity might change 
when a person is overseas. The poll could not explain the situation when some groups 
share similar language and customs, while holding different national/political identities 
either.      
For example, the varieties of Chinese identities include differences among 
different Chinese migrant groups, as revealed by sub-ethnic markers like dialect, network 
preferences, culture, and political identities. As Reid (2009: 197) pointed out, Chinese 
identity differs from other globalized identities not just in terms of scale, but because it 
“looms so large in its past and current imaginings.” The term “Chinese-ness” has been 
debated and differently interpreted among different Chinese subgroups in different social 
settings.  
Take myself for example, I still remember, the day when I spoke with a group of 
Chinese migrants I knew from a community organization. After a friend noted that I was 
from Taiwan, a PRC-Chinese woman immediately corrected me: “China. Taiwan is part 
of China.” At that time I just smiled and did not want to have discussions with her (Field 
notes, October 8, 2015). I also remember my friend, Nick, who is from China, telling me 
how he changed his ideas about “Chinese” and “Taiwanese” after migrating to Australia 
and interacting more frequently with Taiwanese. National or ethnic identities can remain 
strong even when people migrate to another country; but they can also change.  
As a Taiwanese who grew up in Taiwan, the differences between Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and China seem natural to me. I do not see myself as sharing anything together 
with PRC-Chinese except our language. I also do not think Hong Kong is merely another 
province similar to Shanghai or Beijing. Survey data from chapter one show most 
Taiwanese and Hong Kongese have relatively autonomous identities and feel “different” 
from Mainland Chinese. During my fieldwork, however, I found that in the context of 
migration, even though people tell me they are from China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong, 
Chinese migrants oftentimes identify themselves and other Chinese subgroups as Hua-
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Ren. Yet there is no consensus regarding the meaning of “Chinese” and who can be 
counted as “Hua-Ren.” The terms not only involve racial, ethnic, cultural, and national 
attributes, but they also always elicit confusion. I do not intend to give my definitions of 
these terms, as they are differently understood by different Chinese subgroups. Yet, I do 
think it is important to understand under what contexts and how people use and interpret 
these terms, as these terms reflect different national and pan-ethnic identities.  
Identities, as Stuart Hall writes, “are …point of temporary attachment to the 
subject positions which discursive practices construct for us.” (Hall 1996: 6) Indeed, 
people have different identities; different backgrounds, visa types, migrant trajectories, 
socio-economic statuses, etc., will influence the formation and decline of national or 
ethnic identities. People’s identities also influence how they interact with other subgroups. 
However, in addition to asking how identity is constituted, we should also explore when 
and why specific identity is invoked or rejected. National identity can be muted, joked 
about, played with, disguised, or even hidden. Discussions from chapters one to six 
illustrate that identity is fluid, based on social settings and interaction experiences 
established among varied Chinese subgroups.  
Contingent on different contexts and situations, what we need to explore further, 
however, is the contexts in which different pan-ethnic and national identities may hide, 
transform, or intensify and why. Essentialist concepts cannot capture the dynamic and the 
fluid nature of identities (Young 1995: 27). National or ethnic identities can no longer be 
experienced as naturally based upon tradition and ancestry. Rather, they are constantly 
reinvented and renegotiated. Each Chinese subgroup has its own cultural conception and 
interpretation of Chinese-ness based on specific contexts. By understanding how people 
interpret Hua-Ren identity and how they make or unmake group boundaries we can better 
understand the characteristics of each Chinese subgroup and individual home societies, 
cultures, and immigration trajectories. 
Based on a year and half of fieldwork investigating national identity and group 
interactions in the workplace and community organizations, as well as hundreds of hours 
socializing with worker-friends and conversing with immigrants and their families, I 
highlight how people interpret Hua-Ren differently and switch their ethnic affiliations. 
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Ethnicity, as Espiritu (1992: 6) claims, “is largely a matter of choice — in the sense that 
individuals and groups can choose to keep or discard their ethnicity according to their 
changing psychological and material needs.” The different interpretations of Hua-Ren 
allow individuals to interpret, construct, and reconstruct themselves in their everyday 
lives and adjust boundaries with other subgroups. 
In chapters three to six, I extend existing studies on pan-ethnicity and identify 
conditions under which pan-ethnic identities develop or fail (see Figure 19 and Figure 20). 
These conditions include co-ethnic exploitation experiences in the cash economy (which 
gives each group a leverage cultivate discourses to explain or justify the exploitation 
experiences); internal ethnic conflict, established interaction patterns in the workplace 
(which allows individuals to make and unmake group boundaries), ethnic organizing in 
ethnic networks or community organizations (which segments individuals’ social 
participation patterns), and racial discrimination from another non-Chinese group (which 
provides a opportunity of seeking pan-ethnic solidarity or not). Workplace is a unique 
one here because within which people can make and unmake the group boundary without 
adopting or rejecting a broader pan-ethnic identity, even though the boundary 
making/unmaking process does achieve certain effects of pan-ethnicity making/unmaking. 
In addition, regular or casual workplace may also influence the dynamics of group 
interaction to different degrees. 
 
 
Figure 19. Likely Scenarios Leading to Pan-ethnicity Making 
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Figure 20. Likely Scenarios Leading to Pan-ethnicity Unmaking 
 
My intension is not to claim that particular social settings would definitely lead to 
specific group interaction patterns or identity formations. Different identities can be 
activated among different subgroups in the same context as well. People may not 
automatically make and unmake pan-ethnicity once they are situated in a particular 
context. Furthermore, this dissertation is not testing which factor is the most powerful 
“variable” in making or unmaking pan-ethnicity. My fieldwork and findings, focus more 
on the processes of how specific identities become possible, and under what conditions 
they may change. One thing needs to be noted here is making pan-ethnicity does not 
always have a negative correlation with the decline of national identity, and vice versa. 
Making and unmaking pan-ethnicity is strategic, and different layers of pan-
ethnic/national identity can be nested within different Chinese subgroups. In this 
conclusion, I will summarize my findings and contributions for the study of overseas 
Chinese identity in Australia, the limitations of pan-ethnic solidarity, and the literature on 
group boundary making/unmaking.  
 
What Does Hua-Ren Mean to You? 
This dissertation asks a classic identity question (Brown 2004; Chun 1996a; 
Wang 1994): Who is Hua-Ren and who is not? What does Hua-Ren mean? Such 
questions remain debated, and no consensus exists in the immigration context about who 
can be categorized as Hua-Ren and who cannot. When we talk about Hua-Ren in an 
immigration context, are we referring to people from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore, or are we referring to those who speak and write in Mandarin? Or anyone who 
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self-identifies as Hua-Ren? These questions always involve imagination of the Chinese 
community, recognition of other Chinese subgroups, as well as the authentication of a 
particular value (e.g., Chinese culture). Being Hua-Ren means knowing Chinese culture 
and history, but it also highly flexible and malleable. It is something that anyone in the 
world can enjoy and become (Mathews 2000: 143). 
Immigration trajectory undoubtedly factors into determining people’s identities. If 
we trace the immigration history of Chinese migrant groups, their trajectories and 
experiences to Australia are different. When the White Australia Policy was finally 
abolished in 1973, the initial incoming waves mainly consisted of other ethnic Chinese 
groups rather than PRC-Chinese migrants. In 1970s or earlier, most people living in 
Chinatown were speaking Cantonese rather than Mandarin (Interview with Amelia, Oct 
17, 2015). The PRC-Chinese immigrants had to wait until the opening up of China in the 
late 1970s. In the late 1980s there was a shift in Australian immigration policy with the 
government issuing more business and skilled migrant visas. During this period, the 
major sources of immigrants to Australia include China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
and Taiwan. In chapter two I paint a broad picture of PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and 
Hong Kongese demographics. I point out not only that socio-economic backgrounds 
influence which identity to embrace, but the new ideas that temporary migrants from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China bring to Australia about “being Chinese” contrast with 
those of long-term Chinese settlers. 
Again, defining Chinese-ness as natural is a common essentialist fallacy. What we 
need to understand is the role migration context plays in constructing cultural identity and 
the changing meanings of Chinese to people who live or work overseas. It is through the 
immigration processes and the changes of context that different strategies, meaning 
productions, community building, and cultural practices of boundary making/unmaking 
become possible. 
In chapter three, I started by examining the job-seeking processes of Chinese 
migrants, with a particular focus on co-ethnic exploitation experiences in the cash-in-
hand job market. Cash-in-hand job market represents a unique context because, unlike 
formal economy, it lacks labor regulations and can better reveal the economic rationale 
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and cultural perceptions of both employers and employees. The exploitation experiences 
reveal how people attach certain ethnic characteristics to Hua-Ren employers/employees, 
as well as how their ethnic perceptions of other national groups change. Most of my 
interviewees would agree that working for a Hua-Ren boss implies bad working 
conditions and a low salary. Their experiences of exploitation in the cash economy mean 
that Chinese migrants see Hua-Ren as a whole ethnic group with particiular 
characteristics, which can only be partially explained by employer vs. employee class 
distinctions. However, interaction in the cash economy with Taiwanese, Hong Kongese, 
or PRC-Chinese employers activates specific ethnic stereotypes of particular national 
group and intensifies specific national identities. So when working for another national 
group, people either feel their existing ethnic beliefs are “wrong” or seize upon existing 
ethnic stereotypes to reinforce the idea that they are working for “the other” subgroup and 
being exploited. 
Focusing on the employee side, I argue there are two layers of ethnic stereotype 
and identity among Chinese migrant groups. In the first layer, Chinese employees focus 
on pan-ethnicity and tend to believe that Hua-Ren bosses are exploitative. The second 
layer, on the other hand, is about the stereotype towards other Chinese subgroups (see 
Figure 21 and Table 2 in chapter three). Individuals move between perceiving co-ethnic 
employers as members of the broad group (Hua-Ren) or subgroup (PRC-Chinese, 
Taiwanese, or Hong Kongese) depending on their interaction experience with the 
stereotyped individual.  
 
 
 
   
    
 
 
 
Figure 21. Two Layers of Ethnic Stereotype among Chinese Migrants in Australian 
Cash-In-Hand Job Market 
 
During my fieldwork, I found that Chinese employers and employees perceive 
each other through a cultural lens. For example, when Taiwanese employees are 
Exploitative Hua-Ren 
Bosses 
Would not change too much even employees 
have a good PRC-Chinese boss 
TW/PRC-Chinese/HK 
Bosses 
Different hierarchies and stereotypes are 
highlighted when exploitation happens 
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exploited by Taiwanese employers, they tend to transform their national identities and put 
their Taiwanese employers into the category of Hua-Ren (comments like: “Hua-Ren 
bosses are all the same”), but when the exploitative employers are PRC-Chinese, they 
would seize upon existing ethnic stereotypes and associate the exploitation with the 
existing political identities/tensions of Taiwan vs. China. On the other hand, when they 
have a good Taiwanese employer, national identities are also highlighted as they 
distinguish their Taiwanese employers from other Hua-Ren bosses. Taiwanese employees, 
however, attribute having a good PRC-Chinese employer to “good luck,” which means it 
is unusual and their pan-ethnic belief that “Hua-Ren bosses are exploitative” remains 
unchanging. Similarly, for Hong Kongese employees, exploitation expereiences only 
strengthen the stereotype that PRC-Chinese employers are always bossy and do not care 
about labor rights.  
Different ethnic stereotypes and national identities can be seen within PRC-
Chinese group when they work for Taiwanese or Hong Kongese employers as well 
(comments like: “So what? They are part of us”; and “Hong Kongese are more pragmatic 
and profit-driven”). Various perceptions and comments imply specific ethnic stereotypes 
and identities within Taiwanese, Hong Kongese and PRC-Chinese employees’ minds. 
And particularly through the context of cash economy and exploitation experiences, these 
ethnic stereotypes and national/pan-ethnic identities are activated and intensified. 
Some may think the cash economy and employment relationships are more class-
based (employers vs. employees) than ethnic-dominated. Through the narratives provided 
in chapter three, however, we see even though Chinese migrants take cash-in-hand jobs 
for various economic reasons, and even if it is true that some people do not care much for 
whom they work, small Chinese ethnic businesses working within the cash economy 
evoke different cultural expectations and changes of identities. The norms and values that 
influence how employees view the employment relationships in the cash economy are 
defined along many axes but especially according to ethnic stereotype and national 
identity. In other words, status distinctions accompany ethnic stereotypes and cultural 
perceptions of other subgroups in the job market.  
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In chapter four, I situated specific empirical findings from my fieldwork within 
studies of pan-ethnic identity (e.g., Espiritu; Okamoto and Mora) and Andreas Wimmer’s 
theoretical framework of boundary making/unmaking. I examine how national and pan-
ethnic identity nest within different Chinese subgroups and how group boundaries 
become a field where people “play” in their everyday interactions. I also show that 
people can selectively deploy particular claims and cultural values (e.g., more democratic, 
liberal) without intending to change their national identifications and positions. In this 
sense, some actions reflect strategic purposes different from Wimmer’s idea of boundary 
making/unmaking since my respondents are not trying to give their ethnicities a new 
value (trans-valuation) or reposition their ethnic status by engaging in ethnic humor.  
The workplace provides a specific context where people can express, hide, realize, 
and change their national identity, as well as understand the identities of other subgroups. 
Situated in different types of workplaces, people may frequently cross, expand, or 
contract group boundaries by either highlighting or hiding their national identities. At the 
same time, the dynamics of the workplace also give rise to possibilities or flexibilities for 
people to interpret national identities differently. As my respondents’ narratives display, 
people may hold their own national identities or highlight group tensions, on the one 
hand, while blurring group boundaries and getting closer to each other, on the other. In 
certain contexts, holding national identity constant and “expanding or contracting”’ the 
boundary are not mutually exclusive. 
Furthermore, workplace also serves a good context where we can examine when 
and to what degrees class intertwines with identity, and how it influences group boundary 
making and unmaking. In the restaurant I worked, even from the same country, people do 
not necessarily categorize themselves as the same group. Instead, the boundary 
making/unmaking is refracted through the positional difference. The boundary to other 
national groups can be dissolved when the “internal” boundary within the same subgroup 
is strengthened. In other cases, boundary to other national groups can be dissolved as a 
way of showing friendliness, such as the willingness to learn other group’s accents, 
cultural allure of other subgroup, or making fun of their own group.  
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In this chapter I further the current literature by distinguishing between dynamics 
and group interactions within regular workplaces and in casual jobs as well. Within the 
regular workplace, we see that boundary making and unmaking are more strategic than 
rigidly identity based, because people have established interaction pattern and have 
shaped workplace culture. In contrast, within temporary job contexts people either avoid 
talking about sensitive identity issues or are more straightforward in expressing their 
national identity because of the frequent change of personnel.  
Temporariness is not only important in deciding what types of jobs people will 
seek (as discussed in chapter three), it also influences group interaction in the workplace. 
In regular workplaces people are more likely to see and interact with each other every 
day, and they know the limits of each other’s boundary better and can strategically make 
or unmake group boundaries. When jobs are casual, however, personnel may change on a 
daily basis, and may generate different types of group boundary making. People can blur 
the potential tensions between different Chinese subgroups by treating national identity 
as an “unimportant” topic in causal work; other times, people highlight it as a 
conversational icebreaking topic. On the other hand, some people can make or even 
strengthen group boundaries by expressing their perceptions of other groups directly or 
by speaking their own language and excluding those who do not understand the language. 
Again, temporariness here provides some flexibility for people to “play” at the boundary 
within which neither expansion nor contraction of group boundaries is as salient or 
important as Andreas Wimmer (2013) claims. 
In chapter five, I turned my focus to the relationship between pan-ethnic (Hua-
Ren) identities and national politics in social life, contested narratives between different 
Chinese networks and organizations, and the integration experiences of both long-term 
and temporary Chinese migrants in Australia. In this chapter I highlight that overseas 
Chinese networks and community organizations are divided and unified under different 
circumstances and with different purposes. For example, nationality, class, and language, 
are certainly important factors affecting how networks and organizations organize. 
Different immigration trajectories and visa statuses also influence the ways and extent to 
which immigrants rely on migrant networks and community organizations.    
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Considering statistical analysis cannot really show subjective feelings about 
national identity, motivations to join particular networks or community organizations, as 
well as whether people see each other as the same membership of each community 
organization. In chapter five I focus on the everyday experiences of Chinese subgroups 
and link them to the ways in which they identify themselves and other Chinese subgroups 
within networks and community organizations. Examining the purposes of migrant 
networks/organizations in Australia allows us to better understand how pan-ethnic and 
national identities are shaped by social and cultural contexts and modes of 
communication and interaction. To be more specific, this chapter focuses not just on the 
fact that people with pre-existing identities create specific networks or communities. 
Instead, I examine the segmented ways people create, participate, and identify with 
particular networks/community organizations.  
Using ethnographic participant observation and interviews with respondents from 
each Chinese subgroup, I illustrate that creation of overseas networks/organizations and 
conceptions about Hua-Ren identity fluctuate and depend on numerous factors, including 
strategic interests, class factors, as well as national politics, linguistics, and historical 
relationships between different Chinese subgroups. I also highlight different roles of 
ethnic connection, imagination, and solidarity played by migrant networks and ethnic 
community organizations.   
In Australia, when Chinese migrants use networks to exchange information and 
experiences regarding work and social life, there is no strong national identity (at most, a 
Hua-Ren identity). Common experiences as foreigners and minorities might help develop 
a Hua-Ren community organization that stresses the concept of a cosmopolitan Chinese. 
In my fieldwork I found people do not necessarily distinguish national background or 
identity in business networks or service-oriented community organizations. At the same 
time, some networks and organizations also manage to override differences and enforce a 
Hua-Ren identity in search of a more cosmopolitan organizational goal (e.g., religious 
beliefs, networking, and community service). In addition, class or gender factors also 
downplay the importance of national identity in specific networks and organizations, and 
sometimes the actions are highlighted in the name of serving Hua-Ren interests. 
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The shared use of Hua-Ren networks and the shared goal of Hua-Ren communities, 
however, cannot always be carried over into other organizations or strengthen pan-ethnic 
ties among members of different Chinese groups. From the examples and discussions 
provided, I not only challenge the monolithic view that overseas Chinese 
networks/community organizations play similar roles in connecting overseas Chinese 
migrants through pan-ethnicity, I also show how some groups distinguish between 
networks and create their national-specific organizations to address separate interests and 
organize national-specific activities. 
To explain why some Chinese groups distinguish themselves from one another, 
this chapter illustrates how participation in overseas Chinese networks and community 
organizations is segmented. On the one hand, some Chinese organizations focus more on 
the strengthening of global Chinese identification and ties with other Hua-Ren; in such 
networks/organizations group leaders spend greater efforts on resolving national 
differences. On the other hand, however, some Chinese subgroups have developed their 
own networks and organizations to distinguish themselves from other subgroups. To be 
more specific, they distance themselves from the Hua-Ren model and chose not to foster 
Chinese ties. The segmented participation patterns suggest there are political roots to the 
segmentation.  
People may use social networks strategically and have attachments to ethnic 
community organizations, if they have different national identities. Organizations with 
different goals will conflict with each other as well. Linking networks/organizations to 
national identity, this chapter explores social contexts under which Hua-Ren ethnic unity 
forms and why in other organizations national identities are more salient. To be more 
specific, in this chapter I examined how some ethnic networks and organizations manage 
to override national differences and enforce a Hua-Ren identity, whereas in other 
organizations a Hua-Ren identity is less salient.  
The findings in this chapter allow me to prove the conceptual ramifications of 
“fragmenting Chinese-ness” as substantiated in contested discourses and to claim that the 
transnational migrant networks and linkages that migrants sustain with their homelands 
through cultural, social, and political activities have a direct influence on the construction 
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of national identity. Segmented participation patterns within networks and community 
organizations also show that pan-ethnic (Hua-Ren) identity and national politics are not 
mutually exclusive. I provided empirical evidences to show that in contrast with some 
Chinese networks/organizations where national identities are less important, people may 
maintain their national-specific values, cultures, and particularly, languages (e.g., 
Cantonese for Hong Kongese organizations, Taiwanese for some Taiwanese churches) 
and political identities. National identities, are also strengthened through participating in 
activities in these national-specific organizations. The coexistence of Hua-Ren and 
national identities are symbolic that convey one’s belonging to two separate but 
overlapping communities. These identities help produce an understanding of oneself as 
both Hua-Ren and PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese at the same time. Similarly, 
group boundaries among these three national groups, are permeable in some 
networks/organizations yet durable in others.  
In my last empirical chapter (chapter six), I examine a context under which 
Chinese groups interact with another non-Chinese group in their everyday life. I examine 
under what conditions and for what reasons people reject pan-ethnicity and solidarity. I 
also focus on the effects of racial discrimination from white Australians and political 
hostility between each other on Hua-Ren identity for Chinese subgroups in Australia.  
Regarding conditions under which one would expect a pan-ethnic solidarity to 
emerge, it is generally understood that pan-ethnic solidarity emerges within the political 
context of a racialized society and from the experience of discrimination within a 
racialized society (Espiritu 1992; Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Wei 1993). Starting from 
another angle, however, this chapter identifies conditions under which pan-ethnicity 
might fail, and highlights that the “perception” of discrimination, not simply 
discrimination itself, has a varied effect on the formation of pan-ethnic identity and 
following pan-ethnic solidarity. 
In this chapter, I illustrate intergroup interaction and racial discrimination and 
how they provide a unique context where we can examine why Chinese migrants do not 
form a stronger pan-ethnic solidarity, as well as how race relations influence the ethnic 
identification of PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese migrants. By showing 
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how Taiwanese and Hong Kongese distinguish between racial discrimination from 
Australians and political hostility from PRC-Chinese, I argue that racial discrimination 
from Australians is not a sufficient condition to compel Taiwanese and Hong Kongese 
migrants to embrace pan-ethnic solidarity. For many PRC-Chinese migrants, pan-ethnic 
identity and pan-ethnic solidarity are associated with a shared identity (with other 
Chinese groups) to motherland (China) at both the diasporic and national level. For 
Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants, however, assertions of pan-ethnic identity can 
be strategic and can have different meanings at the diasporic and national level. In this 
sense, pan-ethnic identity has its limitations, which decrease the possibilities of following 
pan-ethnic solidarity and collective action.  
I discussed reasons why some Chinese migrants do not feel there is “a need” to 
come together and claim their collective rights. Meanwhile, I also pointed out the 
discrimination experiences in Australia might be “micro,” so that Chinese migrants do 
not feel there is a need to embrace Hua-Ren solidarity. I argue it is through an 
internalization process or “wrong” interpretation that micro-aggressions from white 
people are accepted or justified by Chinese migrants. As such, the mutual tensions 
between perpetrators (white Australians) and recipients (Chinese migrants) are eased. 
Recipients do not necessarily feel insulted when racial discriminations happen. 
Furthermore, by internalizing or misinterpreting racial discriminations, recipients do not 
question or challenge racial stereotypes. By ignoring the sting of racism it minimizes 
hostility against Chinese and prevents the three Chinese subgroups from cultivating a 
strong Hua-Ren solidarity. 
Putting chapters five and six together, I show that unlike the Asian Americans 
whom Espiritu (1992) and Wei (1993) found taking collective action to alter society’s 
perceptions, Taiwanese and Hong Kongese rarely think, particularly at the national level, 
that a Hua-Ren identity is that important. The shared membership within Chinese 
networks and the shared goal of Hua-Ren communities may lead us to expect that 
Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants would embrace pan-ethnic action with PRC-
Chinese, especially when discriminated against by white Australians. Most Chinese 
migrants do not distinguish national backgrounds or identities in overseas Chinese 
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networks and service-oriented community organizations when faced with racial 
discrimination. Taiwanese and Hong Kongese migrants, however, do not necessarily take 
pan-ethnic actions across ethnic and cultural lines nor do they necessarily see themselves 
as sharing a collective pan-ethnic identity and culture with PRC-Chinese at the national 
level. They maintain their boundaries with PRC-Chinese and do not look to extend their 
group boundaries. In this sense, pan-ethnic identity has its limitations, which also 
decrease the possibilities of following pan-ethnic solidarity. 
Furthermore, in contrast to Espiritu (1992), Wei (1993), and Siu (2005), who find 
that pan-ethnicity is always imposed by outside groups, my dissertation shows that 
individual Chinese subgroups also construct their own identities, which enable them to 
negotiate group boundaries with other Chinese subgroups after migrating to Australia. 
Although the dominant group (e.g., white Australians) can sometimes impose 
stereotypical identities on Chinese migrants, in-group members still play an important 
role in establishing their own national identities in different social settings.  
 
Exploring the Formation and Decline of Hua-Ren Identity/Solidarity 
In the field of migration and race & ethnicity, pan-ethnicity has become 
prominent in explaining subgroups who expand beyond national origins and encompass 
shared historical and cultural traits. Such literature also focuses on the shared experiences 
in the immigration context that lead to the formation of pan-ethnic solidarities, such as 
intergroup competition and discrimination from outside groups. 
Historically, claims have been made for extensive forms of solidarity, for example, 
pan-Asian or pan-African/Black power movements (Bell 2014; Du Bois 2001 [1915], 
1970 [1939]; Gilroy 1993; Rickford 2016). The competition model also claims that 
intergroup competition or attacks against Asians will encourage various Asian groups to 
organize and make collective claims or elect Asian American candidates in particular 
electoral districts (Espiritu 1992; Okamoto 2006; Wei 1993).  
In Australia, we see PRC-Chinese, Hong Kongese, and Taiwanese sometimes 
identify as Hua-Ren and emphasize pan-ethnic solidarity to expand economic 
opportunities and strengthen diasporic cultural ties across ethno-national boundaries (Liu 
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1998). Hua-Ren solidarity may also occur in a particular electoral district or in 
connection with physical violence against overseas Chinese groups.  
At the same time, this dissertation also identifies conditions under which pan-
ethnic solidarity might fail or be rejected. In my fieldwork I found that in Australia, 
internal political/identity conflicts among Taiwanese/Hong Kongese/PRC-Chinese lead 
to the decline of Hua-Ren identity. I pointed out the reason is not just that people identify 
themselves as pan-Asian/Chinese or not, it is also about how the nesting of identities 
works in different immigrant social settings. 
In this dissertation I focus on not only identity formation processes but also the 
processes in which people negotiate the conflicts between their different identities as 
individual’s block of pan-ethnic identity does influence the following collective pan-
ethnic solidarity. Before migrating to Australia, Chinese ethnicity may be linked to 
national or political identities. For example, some of my PRC-Chinese respondents felt 
Taiwanese and Hong Kongese people are “certainly” Chinese, whereas Taiwanese and 
Hong Kongese may identify themselves as a different national group. Or cultural and 
social values may be highlighted after migrating to another country. Groups may identify 
through their understanding of traditional Chinese culture and thus their claim to being 
Hua-Ren. Competition may occur over issues such as which group has preserved a more 
“authentic” Chinese culture. The identity conflicts and contradictions between these three 
subgroups result in diverse strategic boundary making/unmaking. Examining the 
interactions and tensions among these three subgroups in different social settings helps us 
understand the fluidity of pan-ethnic (Hua-Ren) identity vs. national identity, as well as 
how people negotiate the conflicts between national politics and ethnic identities. 
In other words, conflicts over identities reflect the respective identities, cultures, 
and strategies for managing group differences. Here I connect my findings to the concept 
of hybridity (Ang 2001; Tu 1994; Young 1995), which I use to explain the relational 
positioning of self and the other. As Ngan and Chan (2012: 89) claim: “the formation of 
identity is a fluid process and a number of different identities can be held and merged 
simultaneously without one identity necessarily predominating over, or resulting in the 
erasure of the other.” In each chapter, I show that in job-seeking processes and the cash-
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in-hand job market, in the workplace, in social life, and in everyday interactions with 
another non-Chinese group, pan-ethnic and national identities are nested and presented in 
a dynamic way. Sometimes people even take advantage of the fragmentation and 
multiplicity of identity to respond to everyday tensions in their daily lives (Chan 2011). 
Meanwhile, temporary and long-term migrants construct hybridized forms of identity of 
their own choosing. As discussed in chapters three and five, hybridity is sometimes 
constructed as the imaginary solution for real and potential group tensions. 
Hua-Ren identity and solidarity is thus a cultural product that involves hybridity 
and can be established in various ways depending on social location and context. 
Different Chinese subgroups in Australia have constructed new hybrid identities and 
communities. Meanwhile, the complicated nature of identity also implies the identities 
will never be settled (Ang 2001: 16). The variability in the affirmation of national 
identity may be dependent upon social settings or situations and relevant to an actor’s 
perception of that situation. In this sense, identity is “situational” and “is premised on the 
observation that particular contexts may determine which of a person’s identities or 
loyalties are appropriate at a point in time.” (Paden 1967: 268) The point I want to make 
here is that we need to examine not only how the hybridity of identity becomes possible 
but also the way it hybridizes. Understanding hybridity allows us to better understand 
why and under what conditions Hua-Ren identity and solidarity appear and decline. 
 
Boundary Making/Unmaking 
The hybridity of identity will certainly influence how groups interact. Given the 
ambiguity of Chinese-ness, we see how people use it strategically and cross group 
boundaries in their everyday lives. When talking about ethnic groups, Weber ([1922] 
1968) focuses on a set of subjective beliefs, collective understandings of a common 
ancestry and shared culture. My respondents’ narratives, however, demonstrate that for 
Chinese subgroups, the fiction of common origins or shared customs is neither important 
nor real when they are in Australia. When claiming a Chinese culture between PRC-
Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese, we do not know if the Chinese culture people 
refer to is the same and how different Chinese subgroups draw ethnic lines. In fact, there 
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is so many diversity and inter-relation within each Chinese subgroup that we can no 
longer easily speak of “Chinese culture” as a unified whole culture.  
I echo Barth’s (1969), Espiritu’s (1992), and Brubaker’s (2004) subjective 
classification of ethnicity and culture, as well as Wimmer’s (2013: 2–3) claim that 
boundary making should be based on contexts, because ethnicity may matter in certain 
societies but not in others. The cognitive differences between these three Chinese 
subgroups contradict attempts to define ethnicity through a shared culture or common 
origin. Thus I focus on how people categorize themselves and others and how they 
maintain or unmake the boundaries between each other. As I discuss in chapter five, 
while Chinese community organizations are established to serve the interests of all 
Chinese people overseas, some groups still maintain boundaries with other Chinese 
subgroups and reject Hua-Ren narratives in their organizations. Shared Chinese culture 
and common ancestry do not always form pan-ethnicity. Instead, people distinguish “us” 
from “them” for various reasons and individual experiences.  
Perception and cognition processes are important because they provide us with 
another way of thinking and explaining intergroup relations and boundaries, even within 
the same ethnic group (Chinese). The boundary-making process may be due to pre-
existing identities, but we see it can be transformed, intensified, hidden, and played with 
in social settings like the workplace. We know people frequently shift group boundaries 
in relation to other subgroups; however, in contrast to Wimmer’s (2013) argument that 
boundary making/unmaking is always the result of a series of strategies, I showed in the 
workplace (as discussed in chapter four), for example, people may cross group 
boundaries during their daily interactions without intending to revise their own ethnic 
positions or national identifications in a more inclusive or exclusive direction. 
Workplaces provide a unique context where people create interaction patterns, but the 
unique intersection of class, gender, and ethnicity also generates different identities and 
group interactions. Furthermore, different workplaces, regular or temporary, also 
influence how people draw and cross the group boundaries.  
Understanding the conditions under which the boundary making/unmaking 
becomes possible is also relevant for the study of pan-ethnic action among Chinese 
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subgroups in Australia. In chapter six, I show that for Taiwanese and Hong Kongese 
migrants, pan-ethnic solidarity is not a preferable option to be adopted as a reactive 
strategic response to external competition or racial discrimination. Instead, Taiwanese 
and Hong Kongese migrants consciously shift boundaries with PRC-Chinese at the 
diasporic and national levels, respectively. 
The findings in this dissertation allow me to examine to what degrees one’s 
identity shapes group interactions, and under what social settings individual national and 
pan-ethnic identities will be influenced and then formulate/change group boundaries to 
each other. In other words, I extend Brubaker (2004) and Wimmer’s (2013) research and 
look at the uniqueness of the interaction process and contexts.  
 
Ethnic Hierarchy and Stereotyping 
My dissertation not only explores pan-ethnic identity and ethnic boundary 
literature, since identity is the core of this study, it also touches upon issues regarding 
ethnic hierarchy and stereotyping. Scholars claim people form ethnic hierarchies when 
judging persons of other ethnic backgrounds and comparing different subgroups’ socio-
economic positions. I highlight, however, that ethnic hierarchies can also appear in other 
social settings like the cash-in-hand labor market where different groups establish 
hierarchy in different ways. In contrast to Snellman and Ekehammar’s (2005) and 
Bessudnov’s (2016) assumption that various subgroups might agree on an ethnic 
hierarchy, I show there are varieties of ethnic stereotypes among Chinese migrant groups 
in Australia.     
In chapter three, for example, I point out that when an ethnic hierarchy is involved 
in exploitation, people always link exploitation experiences to their national identities. 
People believe the other national group does not have the rights to exploit their group 
because it is unfair and illegitimate. Within constructed ethnic hierarchies (though 
differently as they are constructed by different subgroups), there are always political 
emotions and cultural identities. It is through the experience of exploitation in the cash-
in-hand job market that specific ethnic hierarchies and stereotypes are activated and 
intensified. Through the examples and interview data, I show Chinese ethnic economies 
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are not coherent ethnic communities with collective identities. The identities are not fixed 
either. Instead, Chinese ethnic businesses are internally divided along sub-ethnic lines 
and refracted through employer/employee interactions. 
The above discussions and findings directly involve one fact: the Hua-Ren 
identity encompasses varied dynamic subcultures. Hua-Ren is not a fixed entity and will 
not persist as a singular entity over time. The complexity and fragmentation of Hua-Ren 
identity allow subgroups their different representations of ethnic hierarchies and 
stereotypes. The dynamic process of “being and doing Chinese” also substantiates why 
the context of migration matters. Linking ethnic stereotypes to identity formation and 
transformation within migration processes, we can better see the processes of identity 
change in Australia, how different ethnic hierarchies are established and contested, and 
how ethnic stereotypes are either highlighted or downplayed in different contexts and for 
different purposes.  
 
Contexts Matter: Disaporic Identity in the Future 
Stuart Hall (1990: 225) points out that cultural identity is less a matter of “being” 
but more about “becoming.” Identities are subject to the continuous play of history, 
culture, and power, rather than grounded in the recovery of a past. On the other hand, 
however, Cornell (1996) criticizes on the studies for their failure to adequately address 
the cultural content of what defines an ethnic group. In his words, this approach “grants 
to ethnic identity itself little meaning…and makes it difficult to account for the tenacity 
with which some groups cling to identities.” (Cornell 1996: 267) Cornell claims that in 
addition to paying attention to the response of groups to situational context, we cannot 
neglect the importance of the shared cultural content of ethnicity.  
Echoing Cornell’s (1996) emphasis on how shared cultural content plays in 
patterns of ethnic persistence and change, as well as how different kinds of identities 
construct circumstance and action, this dissertation’s main contribution to sociology is 
understanding dynamic processes in identity formation and transformation; examining 
the complicated relationship between national politics and pan-ethnic (Hua-Ren) 
identities; presenting the limitations of pan-ethnicity and pan-ethnic solidarity; exploring 
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different meanings of migrant networks/organizations for migrants; and explaining how 
different Chinese subgroups shape their hybrid identities and how such identities 
influence their group interactions.  
In this dissertation I am not claiming pan-ethnic or national identity is treated as 
though driven by factors exogenous to the group. Instead, I am proposing some key 
contexts where identities are more likely to be activated, hided, or transformed. As Ngan 
and Chan (2012: 19) point out, Chinese-ness is an imagined construct always situated in a 
context. In Australia, we can see that even though it has long been thought that PRC-
Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese share backgrounds, cultures, and can be 
classified as Hua-Ren, national/pan-ethnic identities or group interactions vary. This 
dissertation took account of a few social settings, for example, job-seeking and cash-in-
hand market, workplace, overseas migrant networks and community organizations, and 
everyday interactions with white Australians. Migrant lives, however, certainly include 
more contexts other than those mentioned above. The same contexts may also have 
different meanings for migrants with varied socio-economic statuses, lengths of residence, 
visa types, etc. Exploring the dynamics of contexts helps us develop a sound 
understanding of in-group identity politics. Great diversity is found through Chinese 
migrants’ life experiences in different social settings, and this diversity may partly 
explain why some people see themselves as Hua-Ren while other do not.  
People may think pre-existing identities decide how one national group interacts 
with other groups or selects which organizations to join. Yet contexts do provide 
environments and chances where people can shift their national and pan-ethnic identities 
and make/unmake group boundaries. And it is exactly because of changing contexts that 
the meaning of  “Chinese” or Hua-Ren is still debatable and that their bearers continue 
reinterpreting themselves. In other words, what is “Chinese” or Hua-Ren is not merely a 
question of ideological difference, but is closely linked to being diasporic Chinese in 
terms of the meanings and practices of Chinese-ness. We thus need to emphasize the 
importance of contexts because “identity is conditioned by the historical, cultural and 
social contexts in which one is embedded across the life course.” (Wu 1994: 191) 
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What is more important, however, is to understand the dynamics of identity 
change and its social significance in different contexts. Instead of seeing disporic identity 
as different categories, we should focus more on “category of practice” (Brubaker 2015: 
129) in different contexts and within different stages of individual’s life course. Thus, for 
studies of diasporic identity in the future, we need to develop a deeper research agenda 
and include a comparative perspective of the migration experiences of ethnic groups in 
different countries and regions. For example, the interaction patterns among these three 
groups in Australia may be different from the ones in the U.S.; similarly, political and 
cultural similarities/ambiguities between my three target groups may make their 
experiences different from other migrant groups such as Latinos in the Unites States. 
Through close ethnographic study of these cases, we can further examine the effects of 
different contexts in creating different kinds and levels of social assimilation and group 
interaction, as well how contexts influence/change the ways individuals/groups perceive 
and interact with other racial/ethnic groups. 
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Appendix 1. The Demographic/Ethnic Backgrounds of Interviewees 
 
Name Age Nationality Place of 
Birth 
Occupation Time of Staying 
in Australia 
(as of the date 
being 
interviewed) 
Abby 24 Taiwan Taiwan Cashier 1 year and half 
Adam 20 China China Student 2 years and half 
Amelia 46 Australia Australia Academics 46 years 
Andrew 45 Australia China Engineer 13 years 
Barry 23 China China Student/Waiter 5 years 
Ben 24 China China Student 2 years and half 
Betty 50 Australia Hong 
Kong 
Freelancer 14 years 
Bobby 56 Australia China Community 
organizer 
28 years 
Boris 42 Taiwan and 
Australia 
Taiwan Engineer 10 years 
Cecilia 29 Taiwan Taiwan Kitchen-Hand 16 months 
Christine 57 Taiwan and 
Australia 
Taiwan Accountant 22 years 
Charlie 55 Australia China Owner of a 
delivering 
company 
25 years 
Chien-
Ting 
28 Taiwan Taiwan Bartender 17 months 
Cody 30 Taiwan Taiwan Worker (house-
maintenance) 
15 months 
Doris 24 China China Student 2 years 
Eason 21 Hong Kong 
SAR 
Hong 
Kong 
Waiter 4 months 
Fanny 20 China China Student/Waitre
ss 
5 months 
Frank 36 China China Casual 6 months 
George 43 Australia China Shop owner 9 years 
Gina 54 Australia China Accountant 30 years 
Gordon 28 Hong Kong 
SAR 
Hong 
Kong 
Warehouse 
worker 
5 years 
Grace 36 Taiwan 
(Australia 
PR) 
Taiwan Housewife 8 years 
Hali 43 Australia China Academics 16 years 
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Henry 44 Australia Hong 
Kong 
Restaurant 
Manager 
12 years 
James 22 Hong Kong 
SAR 
Hong 
Kong 
Waiter 7 months 
 
Jaselyn 29 Australia Hong 
Kong 
Physiotherapist 22 years 
Jessie 39 Australia Hong 
Kong 
Real Estate Agent 16 years 
Jinbo 27 Taiwan Taiwan Waiter 11 months 
John 52 China  
(Australia PR) 
China Shop owner 5 years 
Jojo 19 Hong Kong 
SAR  
Hong 
Kong 
Packer 3 months 
Joseph 36 Taiwan  
(Australia PR) 
Taiwan Public servant 5 years 
Justin 30 Taiwan Taiwan Storeman 1 year 
Kathy 29 Hong Kong 
SAR 
Hong 
Kong 
Waitress 1 year and 
half 
Lawrence 24 Taiwan Taiwan House-cleaner 1 year 
Lily 24 Taiwan Taiwan Waitress 11 months 
Lisa 28 Taiwan Taiwan Kitchen-hand 15 months 
Lok 36 Hong Kong 
SAR 
(Australia PR) 
Hong 
Kong 
Construction 
worker  
6 years 
Louis 28 Hong Kong 
SAR 
Hong 
Kong 
Construction 
worker  
10 months 
Lulu 38 Australia China Housewife 11 years 
Mary 25 Hong Kong 
SAR 
Hong 
Kong 
Packer 9 months 
Micki 34 Taiwan and 
Australia 
Taiwan Cosmetics Sales 12 years 
Natalie  45 Taiwan and 
Australia 
Taiwan Freelancer 15 years 
Nick 25 China China Student 3 years 
Nora 23 Taiwan Taiwan Shop assistant 5 months 
Olivia 48 Australia Hong 
Kong 
Shop owner 20 years 
Patrick 34 China  
(Australia PR) 
China Banker 7 years 
Patty 25 Taiwan Taiwan Chicken processing 
plant 
8 months 
Paul 25 China China Student/House-
cleaner 
2 years 
Peggy 28 Taiwan Taiwan House-keeper 6 months 
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Peter 23 Hong Kong 
SAR 
Hong 
Kong 
Casual 7 months 
Robin 47 Taiwan and 
Australia 
Taiwan Translator 20 years 
Ronald 36 Taiwan and 
Australia 
Taiwan Engineer 12 years 
Ruby 35 Australia China Sales 14 years 
Russell 58 Australia China Owner of a house-
cleaning company 
11 years 
Sally 27 China China Student 4 years 
Shayne 24 China China Student/Waitress 2 years 
Sherry  33 China  
(Australia PR) 
China Administrative 
Assistant 
6 years 
Simon 46 Australia Hong 
Kong 
Restaurant manager 15 years 
Susan 26 Taiwan Taiwan Cashier 19 months 
Tiffany 23 China China Student/Waitress 1 year 
Tina 43 Australia China Community 
organizer  
15 years 
Tony 33 China  
(Australia PR) 
China Chef 6 years 
Vivian 23 Hong Kong 
SAR 
Hong 
Kong 
Cashier 1 year and 
half 
Warren 35 Australia China Bus driver 10 years 
Wayne 32 Taiwan Taiwan Storeman 3 years 
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Appendix 2. Interview Outline 
 
Diaspora Experience and Immigration Trajectory 
．What is your current type of visa? Does the visa type make it easy or difficult to get a 
job? Why? 
．When did you start to migrate here?  
．Why did you choose to migrate to Australia (study, work, or others)? Did your  
    family come with you?  
．Before coming to Australia, did you know anybody here? 
．Have you ever feel regretted about the decision of coming to Australia? 
 
Job-seeking Process 
．How did you get current job? Through which website or network? How did you know 
it? Are you still using the network? 
．(For employers) How did you find your employees?  
．How do you feel about your employers/employees? 
．Is there a preference for you to work for a particular ethnic or national group? Why   
    or why not? Do you think white Australian bosses more trustworthy? 
．What is your impression of Hua-Ren employers/employees? Generally speaking,   
    do you feel Hua-Ren employers/employees different from other ethnic groups? 
．What is your impression of PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese  
    employers/employees? 
  
Work Life and Employment Practice 
．What is your job? What is the content of it? 
．Is it a full-time or a part-time job? 
．Do you have other (full or part-time) jobs at the same time? 
．Is there a positional or salary difference between different ethnic/national groups  
    within your workplace?  
． If there are PRC-Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kongese colleagues in your 
workplace, do you feel any different types of group interaction among these three 
groups? 
 
Ethnic Network 
．Which network do you feel you belong to now? 
．Do you feel excluded from certain networks? 
．Do you have any problems living here? When you have problems, where/whom do you 
ask for help? 
．Do you know of any websites or Facebook pages regarding various info you would 
regularly check? 
．How often do you use these networks? When you use these networks, what do you 
usually look for? 
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．Do you identify yourself as part of these networks? Why or why not? 
．Do you distinguish these networks as belonging to Taiwanese, PRC-Chinese, Hong 
Kongese or Hua-Ren? Or do you feel such networks are open to everyone as long as 
they can understand Chinese (culture or language)? 
．Is there anything such as your identity different after joining these networks? 
 
Community Organization and Social Life  
．Where do you live now? With whom? 
．How did you find your current place? 
．Do you think there is an obvious Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese community in 
Sydney? What kinds of community? 
．Do you live close to the Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese community? Why or why 
not? 
．Do you always do grocery shopping in a PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong Kongese 
supermarket? Or go to a Hua-Ren restaurant/bar?  
．Do you participate in any sorts of community organization here (church, service-
oriented organizations)? Do you feel that you have a strong linkage to the organization? 
Why or why not? 
．Have you known any friends from these community organizations? 
 
Group Relation and National/Pan-ethnic Identity 
．Under what conditions do you interact with PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong   
    Kongese groups? How often? Why or why not?  
．Do you find any differences in the way that you interact with each of them? 
．What is your general impressions of PRC-Chinese/Taiwanese/Hong   
    Kongese groups in Australia? 
．Have you had any interaction experience with white Australians? How was it? 
．Have you experienced any types of racial discrimination in Australia? How did you 
react? 
．If you have met racial discrimination, would you seek any help? How? 
．Do you feel the discrimination experience strengthens your identity towards the group 
you are belonged to? Why or why not? 
．Do you feel the discrimination experience strengthens your Hua-Ren identity shared 
with other Chinese subgroups? Why or why not? 
．Has your pan-ethnic identity changed after facing the discrimination? How has it 
changed?  
 
Future plan  
．In the following years, will you go back to China/Taiwan/Hong Kong or stay here?  
    Why? 
 
Personal Background (age, gender, ethnic background, family relation) 
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Appendix 3. Employment Record/Training Checklist of the Restaurant I worked 
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